Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sought to hold the city liable for injuries caused by the negligence of a tribal police officer based on the theory that the city had a "non-delegable" duty to provide law enforcement services to the community. Plaintiffs were ordered by the officer to ride on the back of a four-wheeler after he found plaintiffs violating a curfew ordinance. Plaintiffs alleged that they were thrown off the four-wheeler and injured when the officer lost control. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the city because the officer was immune from individual liability for plaintiffs' tort claims, both under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), and the tribe's sovereign immunity. Because the officer was immune, plaintiffs' claims against the city for his negligence failed since those claims were based on the city's vicarious liability for the officer's negligence. View "M.J. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued police officers for their alleged use of excessive force in violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages after a jury found that the officers' use of force was constitutionally excessive. Both parties cross-appealed. The court affirmed the district court's entry of judgment on the jury's verdict because the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court held, however that the district court abused its discretion by failing to adequately explain its decision to reduce the amount awarded to plaintiff and in denying plaintiff pre-and post-judgment interest. Accordingly, the court reversed those portions of the district court's orders, remanding for further proceedings. View "Barnard v. Theobald" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to a drug conspiracy charge and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment followed by supervised release. One condition of his supervised release required him to provide a blood sample for analysis of his DNA, and inclusion of his DNA profile into the government's CODIS database. After completing his term of supervised release, defendant sought the return of his blood sample under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g). The court concluded that the district court correctly held that defendant was seeking the return of "property" and defendant was "aggrieved" under Rule 41; rejected the government's contention that defendant lacked standing; and affirmed the district court's holding that the use of the blood samples to ensure the accuracy of DNA identification was a valid reason to retain the sample. View "United States v. Kriesel, Jr." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from disputes over the estate of the late Texas oil magnate and billionaire J. Howard Marshall. J. Howard died in 1995, leaving nearly all his assets to his son, Pierce, but excluding his wife, Anna Nicole Smith (Vickie), and his other son, Howard, from receiving any part of his fortune. Howard and his Wife eventually filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and their case was assigned to Judge Bufford, who had previously presided over Vickie's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. Judge Bufford published three separate opinions: (1) denying Pierce's motion for reassignment or recusal; (2) confirming the Plan and denying Pierce's motion to dismiss with respect to his constitutional arguments; and (3) confirming the Plan and denying Pierce's motion to dismiss with respect to his statutory arguments. Elaine, Pierce's widow, now appeals the district court's decision, contending that the district court erred in affirming the bankruptcy court's orders. The court addressed the various issues on appeal related to the motion for recusal or reassignment, constitutional issues, and non-constitutional issues, and ultimately affirmed the district court's decision. View "In the Matter of: Marshall" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their first amended complaint and the district court's denial of leave to further amend their complaint. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants improperly initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings after plaintiffs failed to comply with the mortgage obligations financing their residence. Because the provisions of the deed of trust foreclosed the pleading of a plausible "show me the note" claim by plaintiffs, the district court appropriately dismissed this claim; the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims premised on the unauthorized appointment of a successor trustee and/or the lack of proof of ownership of the note where these claims lacked legal and factual plausibility; because Arizona law countenances the trustee sale as conducted, plaintiffs failed to allege any plausible claims premised on the PEB Report or the UCC; plaintiffs' constitutional challenges of A.R.S. 33-811(b) were rejected by the court; plaintiffs' fraud and misrepresentation claims were barred by A.R.S. 12-543(3); and denial of leave to amend was within the district court's discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Zadrozny, et al. v. Bank of New York Mellon, et al." on Justia Law

ACT brought this suit against PCI and First National, alleging claims of breach of contract, quantum meruit, and recovery on a payment bond under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. 3131(b). Because United States ex rel. Celanese Coatings Co. v. Gullard was clearly irreconcilable with intervening higher authority, the court overruled it and held that the Miller Act's statute of limitations was a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional rule. Because nothing on the face of ACT's complaint indicated that it did not work on the project or rent equipment to PCI within one year of the date it filed the complaint, the complaint could not have been dismissed if the district court had treated the Miller Act's statute of limitations as a claim-processing rule. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Air Control Tech. v. Pre Con Indus." on Justia Law

Defendant moved to dismiss his federal grand jury indictment, charging him with one count of possessing child pornography, on double jeopardy grounds because he had been subject to nonjudicial proceedings (NJP) with the Coast Guard. At issue was whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited civilian criminal prosecution of a servicemember who previously received NJP without being informed of or waiving his statutory right to reject such punishment and demand a court-martial instead. The court concluded that the inquiry for the Double Jeopardy Clause was whether the defendant actually was previously placed in jeopardy, not whether he might have been placed in jeopardy if other procedures had been followed. Therefore, the court held that defendant's prosecution did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court also rejected defendant's alternative argument, reversing and remanding for further proceedings. View "United States v. Stoltz" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming an IJ's decision finding her removable, denying her temporary protective status (TPS) relief, and granting her voluntary departure in lieu of removal. Petitioner argued that she was denied due process when the government placed her in removal proceedings without her husband but she did not raise this argument before the IJ or the BIA. The court concluded that petitioner's claim did not fall within the exception to the exhaustion requirement because the IJ or BIA could have addressed petitioner's claim if she had raised it. The court did not have jurisdiction to consider the issue because she failed to exhaust her claim. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Sola v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed a state-law wage-and-hour class action naming CHA as a defendant. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's remand to state court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 153(c)(1). At issue was whether the two thirty-day periods described in 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) were the only periods during which the defendant could remove, or if they were merely periods during which a defendant must remove if one of the thirty-day time limits was triggered. The court concluded that sections 1441 and 1446, read together, permitted a defendant to remove outside the thirty-day periods on the basis of its own information, provided that it had not run afoul of either of the thirty-day deadlines. Accordingly, the court held that removal was not barred in this case and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Roth, et al. v. CHA Hollywood Medical Center, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal was consolidated from lawsuits brought by the City against two insurance companies. Both insurers rejected the City's claims for coverage for the underlying litigation between the City and condominium buyers. The insurers claimed that the City's alleged negligence and wrongful conduct in connection with the underlying litigation occurred prior to their policy periods. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers. The court rejected the City's argument for extending Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insurance Co., which held that claims for pollutants deposited in the ground prior to the policy period, but continuing to leach into soil and groundwater during the policy period, gave rise to a duty to defend, because continuance of the property damage during the policy period gave rise to coverage. View "City of San Buenaventura v. The Ins. Co. of PA" on Justia Law