Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in 2013
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Plaintiff brought suit against Boeing and BISS alleging breach of contract as well as several statutory and common law claims. At issue was the enforceability of a forum selection clause. The court held that the evidence submitted and the allegations made by plaintiff were more than sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the forum selection clause at issue here was enforceable under M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shores Co. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by granting BISS's motion to dismiss without convening an evidentiary hearing. The district court also abused its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend his pleadings. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. The court did, however, grant Boeing's and BISS's joint motion to strike the portions of plaintiff's reply brief that included new evidence or alleged new facts not in the record before the district court. View "Petersen v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

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Clevo appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Hecny. Clevo, a Taiwan-based manufacturer of computer parts and accessories, and Amazon, a Brazilian entity, agreed that Clevo would manufacture and sell, and Amazon would buy, millions of dollars' worth of Clevo computer parts. Under Clevo and Amazon's negotiated terms, the Hecny Group was designated to handle all of the contract shipments. More than a year after the initial misdelivery to Amazon, Clevo sued numerous Hecny Group entities for the unpaid remainder of the goods' purchase price. The court concluded that the Guarantee was initially effective to place Clevo and Hecny Transportation in direct contractual privity, without any contractually-created statute of limitations. But that initial relationship was modified when the Bills of Lading issued. By operation of the Himalaya Clause, the benefit of the one-year statue of limitations in the Bills of Lading extended beyond Hecny Shipping to Hecny Transportation as well. Because Hecny Transportation had asserted that provision in defense to suit, Clevo's claims were time-barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Clevo Co. v. Hecny Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

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Petitioner challenged the district court's ruling that he was not a United States citizen pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(5). The court held that Lim v. Mitchell, which required de novo review, was no longer good law, and the court must review the district court's finding of fact for clear error. The court concluded that the district court did not err in placing the burden on petitioner to prove his citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence and then shifting the burden of proof to the government, nor did it err in selecting the "clear and convincing" formulation when assigning the level of proof that the government had to meet. In view of the many undisputed facts and the additional non-erroneous subordinate findings, the court held that the district court's key finding, that petitioner is Salvador Mondaca-Vega, was not clearly erroneous under the "clear and convincing" standard of proof. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Mondaca-Vega v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs sued the Agencies, challenging changes to the Survey and Manage Standard (Standard) of the Northwest Forest Plan. Plaintiffs and the Agencies negotiated a settlement which the district court approved and entered in the form of a consent decree. D.R. Johnson appealed, contending that the district court's approval of the consent decree was an abuse of discretion. At issue was whether a district court could approve resolution of litigation involving a federal agency through a consent decree, which substantially and permanently amended regulations that the agency could only otherwise amend by complying with statutory rulemaking procedures. Because the consent decree allowed for substantial permanent amendments to the Standard, it impermissibly conflicted with laws governing the process for such amendments. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in approving it in its current form. Finally, D.R. Johnson waived its C & O Act, 28 U.S.C. 1291, argument. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Conservation Northwest v. Sherman" on Justia Law

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The Commissioner appealed the tax court's determination related to a deficiency in petitioners' federal income tax involving distributions from petitioners' variable universal life insurance policy. The Commissioner asserted that surrender charges could never be considered under I.R.C. 402(b)(2), and maintained that petitioners actually received the full stated policy values of their respective policies. The court affirmed the tax court's determination that the "amount actually distributed" when petitioners received ownership of the policies after their employer wound down their employees' benefit trust was "the fair market value of what was actually distributed." Further, the surrender charges associated with a variable universal life insurance policy could permissibly be considered as part of the general inquiry into a policy's fair market value. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision. View "Schwab v. CIR" on Justia Law

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Petitioner was convicted of receiving stolen property. On appeal, the state challenged the district court's grant of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition based on Batson v. Kentucky. At issue was whether the California courts' determination that a prosecutor had genuine, race-neutral reasons for striking four black jurors during voir dire was an unreasonable application of federal constitutional law. As a threshold matter, the court held that Cullen v. Pinholster allowed the court to consider photographs that showed the racial composition of a jury venire to the extent that those photographs merely constructed facts visible to the state trial court that ruled on petitioner's Batson challenge. Overall, the evidence presented, including comparative analysis, did not persuade the court that habeas relief was warranted under the court's doubly deferential standard of review. Although some of the prosecutor's justifications appeared thin at first glance, a more searching review revealed nothing in the record suggesting that the state court unreasonably found these reasons to be genuine and not pretextual. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief to petitioner. View "Jamerson v. Runnels" on Justia Law

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This case stemmed from plaintiffs' allegations that defendants issued consumer credit reports with negative entries for debts already discharged in bankruptcy. On appeal, plaintiffs and objectors challenged the district court's approval of a class-action settlement that granted incentive awards to the class representatives for their services to the class. The settlement agreement conditioned payment of incentive awards on the class representatives' support for the settlement. These conditional incentive awards caused the interests of the class representatives to diverge from the interests of the class because the settlement agreement told class representatives that they would not receive incentive awards unless they supported the settlement. Moreover, the conditional incentive awards significantly exceeded in amount what absent class members could expect to get upon settlement approval. Because these circumstances created a patent divergence of interests between the named representatives and the class, the court concluded that the class representatives and class counsel did not adequately represent the absent class members. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's approval of the settlement. View "Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Solutions" on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed his conviction pursuant to a conditional plea agreement for one count of felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant contended that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the handgun that formed the basis for his conviction because the discovery of that handgun was the product of an illegal search and seizure. The court rejected defendant's claim and affirmed the judgment of the district court because defendant was not seized before discarding the handgun and the handgun was not a fruit of the illegal backpack search. View "United States v. McClendon" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs claimed that PacifiCare was not entitled to any reimbursement payments out of the wrongful death benefits paid by an insurance policy to them. PacifiCare counterclaimed, arguing that it was entitled to reimbursement under both the terms of its contract with the deceased (Count I) and directly under the Medicare Act (Count 11), 42 U.S.C. 1395. At issue was whether a private Medicare Advantage Organization (MAO) plan could sue a plan participant's survivors, seeking reimbursement for advanced medical expenses out of the proceeds of an automobile insurance policy. Because interpretation of the federal Medicare Act presented a federal question, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether that act created a cause of action in favor of PacifiCare against plaintiffs. The district court properly dismissed the causes of action arising under the Medicare Act for failure to state a claim where section 1395y(b)(2) did not create a federal cause of action in favor of a MAO and where, under section 1395y(b)(3)(A), the Private Cause of Action applied in the case of a primary plan which failed to provide for primary payment, which was not applicable in this instance. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Count II for failure to state a claim as well as its decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count 1. View "Parra v. Pacificare of Arizona" on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed his conviction for distribution of controlled substances. At issue was the denial of defendant's motion to suppress statements he made to FBI agents during a meeting with his parole officer. The court concluded that, because the meeting was a custodial interrogation, Miranda warnings were required to allow the prosecution to use defendant's statements at trial. The agents engaged in a two-step interrogation prohibited by Missouri v. Seibert, deliberately delaying the giving of warnings to induce defendant's cooperation in an ongoing investigation. Although the target of the agents' inquiry was another suspect, the questioning necessarily elicited information that incriminated defendant. The mid-stream warnings provided after defendant incriminated himself were too little, too late. Therefore, the district court's failure to suppress the statements was in error. The confession was central to the conviction. Because the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the court reversed the conviction. View "United States v. Barnes" on Justia Law