Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

FHFA, the regulator and conservator of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (the Enterprises), issued a "directive" preventing the Enterprises from buying mortgages on properties encumbered by liens made under so-called property-assessed clean energy (PACE) programs. Plaintiffs contended that FHFA was acting as a regulator, and not a conservator. As a regulator, plaintiffs contended that FHFA must issue a regulation to effectuate its order. The court concluded that FHFA's decision to cease purchasing mortgages on PACE-encumbered properties was a lawful exercise of its statutory authority as conservator of the Enterprises. Because the courts have no jurisdiction to review such actions, the court vacated the district court's order and dismissed the case. View "County of Sonoma, et al v. FHFA, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Arizona capital prisoner convicted of murdering his ex-girlfriend, appealed from the denial of his first habeas petition and sought authorization to file a second or successive habeas petition. The court rejected defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland v. Washington; the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's requests for evidentiary hearings on his various ineffective assistance claims; the Arizona Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law when it denied petitioner's Eight Amendment claim regarding victim impact evidence; and because petitioner had not been able to demonstrate either due diligence or actual innocence as to his claims that where not presented in his first habeas petition, his application to file a second or successive application for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the petition and denied his application to file a second or successive habeas petition. View "Gulbrandson v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the district court's denial of restitution and filed a petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3771. The court held that the district court did not err in imposing a proximate cause requirement when applying 18 U.S.C. 2259(b)(3) and, in this respect, the petition was denied. The court's review of the record demonstrated that petitioners provided sufficient evidence to establish a causal connection between defendant's offense and petitioner's losses. Accordingly, the court granted the petition in part. View "Amy & Vicky v. USDC-SAC" on Justia Law

The underlying action was brought in California state court by plaintiff, who sued the Bank, a federally-insured, FDIC-supervised bank, for wrongful termination stemming from her complaints about the Bank's lending practices. At issue on appeal was the construction of 12 U.S.C. 1819(b)(2)(B), a statute that gave the FDIC the right to remove actions from state court to federal court. Here, in the underlying case in state court, the FDIC had neither been sued nor was it a party. The court concluded that Congress granted the FDIC far broader access to the federal courts than was available to ordinary litigants, but that access was not unlimited. Whether the FDIC's access should be broader was a question for Congress, not the court. As drafted, the statute did not authorize removal by the FDIC where it was not a party to the state court action and its role in the litigation was limited to a prospective, would-be intervenor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order remanding the case to state court. View "Allen v. One United Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a subrogation suit against defendants for recovery of insurance payments to its insured, Taube-Koret, for environmental response costs Taube-Koret incurred in cleaning up pollutants released on its property. The court concluded that plaintiff had no standing to bring suit under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675, section 107(a) because it did not incur any "costs of response" related to the removal or remediation of a polluted site, and because the common law principle of subrogation did not apply to section 107(a); plaintiff could not bring a subrogation claim under section 112(c) because it did not allege that Taube-Koret was a "claimant"; and plaintiff's state law claims were time-barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's third amended complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). View "Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Systems/ Loral, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Armenian native, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, injunctive and declaratory relief, and mandamus (District Court Petition) seeking to enjoin her imminent removal, reverse the USCIS's denial of her first adjustment-of-status application, and order USCIS to approve her then-pending second and third adjustment-of-status applications. On appeal, petitioner challenged the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and, in the alternative, sought to convert her appeal into a petition challenging the USCIS's denial of her adjustment-of-status applications pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(D). The court affirmed and declined to convert petitioner's appeal into a petition to the court. The court held that district courts had jurisdiction to hear cases challenging determinations made on nondiscretionary grounds respecting eligibility for the immigration benefits enumerated in section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), provided there were no pending removal proceedings in which an alien could apply for such benefits. The district court did not have jurisdiction over the petition because there had been no final agency action by USCIS on her pending adjustment-of-status applications at the time she filed her petition. However, because USCIS has since denied all of petitioner's applications, barring the discovery of new facts, the district court would now have jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704, to hear petitioner's claim that her application was improperly denied. View "Mamigonian v. Biggs, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his jury conviction and sentence for assault resulting in serious bodily injury on an Indian reservation. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion when it determined that the Certificate of Indian Blood was a self-authenticating document under Fed. R. Evid. 902(2). Because the error was not harmless, the court reversed the conviction and remanded for further proceedings. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion in limine, thus it did not deny defendant's right to present a defense. Finally, the district court's application of the sentencing enhancement for serious bodily injury was not clearly erroneous. View "United States v. Alvirez, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of her 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. Petitioner was convicted of murdering her child and sentenced to death. At trial, petitioner protested her innocence and denied confessing to the murder while the detective who interviewed her shortly after the murder testified that she had confessed to committing the murder. There were no other witnesses or direct evidence linking petitioner to the crime. The judge and jury believed the detective but they did not know that the detective had a long history of lying under oath and other misconduct. The court concluded that the state violated the requirements of Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States because it knew about this misconduct but didn't disclose it. The court held that petitioner was entitled to habeas relief and therefore, reversed and remanded to the district court with instructions to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus setting aside her convictions and sentences. View "Milke, et al v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of his mandamus petition, where he sought to compel the DOE to issue him a Stafford Loan. While plaintiff's immigration status was still pending, he obtained valid employment authorization, graduated from college, and was accepted to law school. Plaintiff then filed a Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) and requested a Stafford Loan to pay his tuition. The law school declined to find him eligible for any form of federal student aid and plaintiff was unable to obtain a Stafford Loan. The court held that, in these circumstances, the jurisdictional question merged with the merits question. Plaintiff's mandamus petition fell within the scope of the sue-and-be-sued clause of 20 U.S.C. 1082(a)(2). Notwithstanding that clause, however, section 1082(a)(2)'s ani-injunction clause barred the suit for declaratory relief. The Larson-Dugan exception to sovereign immunity did not bar plaintiff's petition under 28 U.S.C. 1361. When plaintiff's Stafford Loan eligibility was reviewed, he did not provide any evidence from the INS or USCIS that he was in the United States for other than a temporary purpose. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's petition on the merits. View "Mashiri v. Dept. of Education, et al" on Justia Law

The state filed a civil petition against petitioner under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 6600 et seq., just before petitioner's confinement was expected to end. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se habeas corpus petition in the Superior Court, claiming that his exceedingly lengthy detention violated his constitutional rights. However, that court denied the petition and the California appellate courts agreed. Meanwhile, petitioner remained in custody and his SVPA petition made no progress. Petitioner then filed a federal pro se habeas petition. The district court concluded that the doctrine of Younger abstention applied and dismissed petitioner's case. The court held that the district court's abstention and denial of the writ were inappropriate where the state's counsel indicated that a trial on the commitment petition could be completed within 90 days and that the state would not oppose an order granting an alternative writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to the district court to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus. View "Knight v. Ahlin" on Justia Law