Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case concerned allegations of corruption by a representative of the Railway during mandatory arbitration of a dispute relating to the discharge of a Railway employee, who was represented by the Union. The Union subsequently filed a petition for review in federal district court under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153(q). The district court granted the Railway's motion to dismiss. The court held that the district court erred with respect to jurisdiction because it failed to properly apply section 153(q). The district court also erred with respect to the merits because it evaluated the Railway's conduct as fraud - not corruption, and failed to draw inferences in the light most favorable to the Union. The court reversed and remanded the case to allow the Union to attempt to prove its allegations of corruption by clear and convincing evidence. View "United Transportation Union, et al v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of providing material support to terrorists, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339A, and of making false statements to government officials, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001. On appeal, defendant argued that he was denied a fair trial because the jury's foreperson was biased against him; the district court imposed an unconstitutional limitation on his cross-examination of the government's key witness; and the district court erred in admitting expert testimony offered by the government and excluding expert testimony offered by the defense. Defendant also sought review of the district court's dismissal without prejudice of his motion to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The court affirmed the judgment; dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the appeal of the dismissal of the section 2255 motion; and denied the government's motion to strike portions of the opening brief that cited to materials outside the record as moot. View "United States v. Hayat" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Greenpeace's public campaign to stop Shell from driling in the Arctic. Greenpeace appealed the district court's grant of Shell's motion for a preliminary injunction, which prohibited Greenpeace from coming within a specified distance of vessels involved in Shell's Arctic Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) exploration and from committing various unlawful and tortious acts against those vessels. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the action presented a justiciable case or controversy, that the district court had jurisdiction to issue its order, and that it did not abuse its discretion in doing so. View "Shell Offshore, Inc., et al v. Greenpeace, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who has difficulty walking because of certain health problems, alleged that United did not provide her with adequate assistance moving through the airport on two airplane trips and that she suffered physical and emotional injuries as a result. The court held that the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA), 49 U.S.C. 40101 et seq., and its implementing regulations preempted state and territorial standards of care with respect to the circumstances which airlines must provide assistance to passengers with disabilities in moving through the airport. The ACAA did not, however, preempt any state remedies that could be available when airlines violated those standards. The court also held that the ACAA and its implementing regulations did not preempt state-law personal injury claims involving how airline agents interact with passengers with disabilities who requested assistance in moving through the airport. Finally, the court held that a terminal used for transportation by aircraft was excluded from definition as a Title III-covered place of public accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12181 et seq. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. View "Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

In this copyright infringement suit, SOFA claimed that Dodger infringed its copyright in using a seven-second clip of Ed Sullivan's introduction of the Four Seasons on "The Ed Sullivan Show" and could not justify its unlicensed use of the clip as "fair use." The clip was used in Dodger's musical about the Four Seasons, "Jersey Boys," to mark a historical point in the band's career. The court held that, by using the clip for its biographical significance, Dodger has imbued it with new meaning and did so without usurping whatever demand there was for the original clip. Dodger was entitled to prevail on its fair use defense as a mater of law and to retain the attorney's fees award granted by the district court. View "SOFA Entertainment, Inc. v. Dodger Productions, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA's decision holding that there was no "realistic probability" that California would apply California Penal Code 243.4(e) to conduct that was not normally turpitudinous and the BIA's decision denying his motion to reconsider. The court held that section 243.4(e)(1)'s requirement that defendant specifically intended to damage his victim psychologically evidenced the malicious intent that was the essence of moral turpitude. The BIA's decision that this kind of behavior was per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong was persuasive. Because the court agreed that there was no "realistic probability" that California courts would apply section 243.4(e) to conduct falling outside the generic federal definition of moral turpitude, the court denied the petitions. View "Gonzalez-Cervantes v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Respondent (the Warden) appealed the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 to petitioner. The court held that the California Supreme Court necessarily decided that it was not reasonably probable that either petitioner's conviction or sentence would have turned out differently had counsel objected to the brace (knee restraint) petitioner wore beneath his clothing during the trial. Given what "prejudice" means in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, the strength of the evidence, the nature of the brace, the atrociousness of petitioner's crimes, and the quality of the mitigation, the court could not say that the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Walker v. Martel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants enforced two local ordinances in violation of the Eighth Amendment. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants. The court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for retrospective relief because those claims were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; the court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief because those claims have not been mooted by defendants' voluntary conduct; the court did not reach the merits of plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment challenges; and the court held that jurisdiction existed as to plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims and remanded for a consideration of the merits in the first instance. View "Bell, et al v. City of Boise, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a now-retired member of Local 166, filed suit under section 101(a)(3) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(3), to challenge the legality of an organizing fee and a dues increase imposed on Local 166 members by the local union's umbrella organizations. The court held that the plain text of the LMRDA authorized a labor organization, other than a local labor organization or a federation of national or international labor organizations, to levy assessments or increase dues or initiation fees payable by its members by any of the procedures enumerated in section 101(a)(3)(B), provided that union members' rights were adequately protected in the approval process. Because Defendant LIUNA satisfied both prerequisites in this case, the court concluded that it complied with the LMRDA when it enacted an organizing fee, applicable to all of its members working in the construction industry, following a majority vote of its delegates at a general convention. The court held, however, that Defendant NCDCL lacked the statutory authority to ratify such an increase because Local 166 members were not members of the NCDCL. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Corns v. Laborers Int'l Union, et al" on Justia Law

Alaska Rent-A-Car sued Avis claiming that Avis had breached a settlement agreement causing Alaska business to be switched to Budget Rent-A-Car, its local competitor. The district court granted a partial summary judgment, establishing that Alaska Rent-A-Car was a party to the settlement agreement, and that Avis had breached the agreement by using the same personnel to sell and market both Avis and Budget cars. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Alaska Rent-A-Car for $16 million and Avis appealed. The court held that the district court was correct in ruling that Alaska Rent-A-Car was a party to the settlement agreement by virtue of its sufficiently timely joinder. The court rejected Avis's peremptory challenge claim under Batson v. Kentucky. The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the jury to listen to Alaska Rent-A-Car's expert as well as Avis's. The evidence sufficed to establish reasonable certainty for the damages awarded. The district court did not err by applying Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82 to the attorney's fee award. The parties agreed that the amount of prejudgment interest was awarded in error, double counting, and that the judgment should be reduced. View "Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Avis Budget Group, Inc., et al" on Justia Law