Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The California Court of Appeal had found that the custodial confession at issue was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, but that it was harmless error. The district court conditionally granted the petition, finding that the California Court of Appeal's harmless error determination conflicted with the clearly established Supreme Court precedent of Harrison v. United States. Harrison held that when a defendant's trial testimony was induced by the erroneous admission of a confession into evidence, the trial testimony could not be introduced in a subsequent prosecution, nor could it be used to support the initial conviction on harmless error review. Harrison outlined a clear exclusionary rule that applied to the States; Harrison did not conflict with Motes v. United States; and Harrison remained clearly established law subsequent to Oregon v. Elstad. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's determination that federal habeas corpus relief under section 2254(d)(1) was warranted. The court affirmed the district court's and state appellate court's conclusion that law enforcement's communications with petitioner did not comply with the clearly established Supreme Court precedent in Miranda v. Arizona and its progeny. The court vacated portions of the district court's order and judgment that concluded second-degree murder convictions were an appropriate remedy, remanding to the district court to issue a conditional writ. View "Lujan v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Ralphs alleging violations of the California Labor Code and California Business and Professions Code 17200 et seq. On appeal, Ralphs challenged the district court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that Ralphs' arbitration policy was unconscionable under California law. The court concluded that Ralphs' arbitration was procedurally unconscionable where, among other things, agreeing to Ralphs' policy was a condition of applying for employment and the terms were not disclosed to plaintiff until three weeks after she had agreed to be bound by it. In regards to substantive unconscionability, the court concluded, among other things, that Ralphs' terms required that the arbitrator impose significant costs on the employee up front, regardless of the merits of the employee's claims, and severely limited the authority of the arbitrator to allocate arbitration costs in the award. Further, the state law supporting such a conclusion was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 2. Accordingly, the court affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chavarria v. Ralphs" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit on behalf of current and former students, alleging that Corinthian engaged in a deceptive scheme to entice the enrollment of prospective students in violation of California law. Corinthian moved to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration clauses in plaintiffs' enrollment agreements. The court concluded that the Broughton-Cruz rule, which exempted claims for "public injunctive relief" from arbitration, was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 2. In the alternative, the court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were within the scope of their arbitration agreements and plaintiffs were required to arbitrate their public injunction claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order denying Corinthian's motion to compel arbitration and remanded. View "Ferguson, et al. v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plant, a California corporation that sold Fiberboard-manufactured asbestos-based insulation, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. At issue on appeal was whether Plant's bankruptcy plan, which allegedly left a group of insurers paying more than their fair share on a large number of asbestos personal injury claims, complied with the Bankruptcy Code. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court erred in confirming the plan where the Trust, in connection with which the plan's injunctions were to be implemented, failed to satisfy the requirements of section 524(g). Accordingly, the court vacated the order of the bankruptcy court affirming Plant's Restated Second Amended Plan of Reorganization and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re: Plant Insulation Co." on Justia Law

APAC petitioned for review of a settlement agreement between the BPA and a large number of its customers. The settlement set terms for refunding customers who were previously over-charged, as well as setting terms for the next seventeen years. APAC alleged that the settlement violated several provisions of the Pacific Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Act (NWPA), 16 U.S.C. 839c(c), 839e(b); the Bonneville Project Act, 16 U.S.C. 832d(a); regulations of the Federal Energy Commission, 18 C.F.R. 300.1(b)(6), 300.21(e)(1); and the court's decision in Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. BPA and Golden NW. Aluminum, Inc. v. BPA. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that APAC had standing to challenge the settlement because of the "pass-through" contracts under which its members pay rates that directly reflect the rates BPA charged its direct customers. On the merits, the court concluded that the settlement complied with the relevant statutory requirements and with the court's prior decisions. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "APAC v. BPA" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Russia, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that petitioner was denied due process when the government was allowed to introduce its forensic report on a medical document without prior notice and by refusing a continuance to allow petitioner to investigate the report; the court concluded that petitioner had suffered past persecution; but the court rejected petitioner's contention that the government improperly disclosed information contained in his asylum application. The court granted the petition, remanding to allow petitioner a reasonable opportunity to investigate the forensic report on the medical report and to present additional evidence. View "Bondarenko v. Holder Jr." on Justia Law

Arizona filed suit against ASARCO on behalf of Angela Aguilar and the state. Aguilar later filed her own suit, alleging sexual harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. These proceedings were consolidated and removed to federal court. The jury found ASARCO liable on the sexual harassment claims only and the jury did not find any compensatory damages for Aguilar, instead awarding her one dollar in nominal damages for the sexual harassment claim. The jury also awarded Aguilar $868,750 in punitive damages. The district court subsequently ordered that the punitive damages be reduced to $300,000, which was the statutory maximum under Title VII for an employer of ASARCO's size. The court concluded that the punitive damages award was outside of constitutional limits and must be vacated. The court concluded that the requirement of a reasonable relationship between compensatory and punitive damages suggested that these damages should be reduced. However, given ASARCO's highly reprehensible conduct and the presence of a comparable civil penalty in the form of the Title VII damages cap, the court concluded that the Constitution did not bar the imposition of a substantial punitive award. Therefore, on remand, the district court could reorder a new trial unless plaintiff accepted a remittitur of $125,000. View "State of Arizona v. ASARCO" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that officers in the Army caused his infant son's death by ordering his pregnant wife, a servicewoman on active duty, to perform physical training in contravention of her doctors' instructions, which ultimately induced premature labor. The district court held that the suit was barred by the Feres doctrine and dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Feres doctrine immunizes the United States from liability for tort claims arising out of activities incident to military service. The court concluded that, under its own precedent, Feres barred plaintiff's wrongful death claim. The court employed the "genesis test," by asking whether the family member's Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., claim had its genesis in injuries to members of the armed forces. In this case, the infant's injury derived from his mother's military service. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that genetic injuries differed from claims based upon injuries incurred in utero. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Ritchie v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder-for-hire and victim tampering. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred by denying his pre-judgment motion for new trial without reaching the merits of his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The court concluded that the district court did not err in this case by deferring consideration of defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim to collateral review, when a complete record would be available. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order denying the motion for a new trial. View "United States v. Steele" on Justia Law

137 named plaintiffs filed suit against 25 financial institutions alleging, among other things, that the institutions' deceptive mortgage lending and securitization practices decreased the value of their homes, impaired their credit scores, and compromised their privacy. The court concluded that the action was properly removed from state court to federal court because more than 100 named plaintiffs proposed a joint trial and because the other prerequisites of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, were satisfied. However, the court reversed and remanded to the district court to dismiss without prejudice the claims of all plaintiffs but the first named plaintiff because, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a), the First Amended Complaint did not present common questions of law. View "Visendi v. Bank of America" on Justia Law