Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and use of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. As part of a reverse sting operation, an ATF undercover agent, working with a confidential informant, recruited defendants to carry out an armed robbery of a fictional cocaine stash. Defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the fake robbery was the product of outrageous government conduct. The court affirmed the denial of defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that defendants have not met the extremely high standard of demonstrating that the facts underlying their arrest and prosecution were so extreme as to violate fundamental fairness or were so grossly shocking as to violate the universal sense of justice. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in rejecting their sentencing entrapment arguments were any error was harmless. View "United States v. Black" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico and lawful permanent resident, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's finding that petitioner was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Petitioner was charged with seventeen counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon children in violation of various provisions of the California Penal Code. The court denied the petition, holding that petitioner was an alien convicted of an aggravated felony within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) because petitioner's state crime of conviction, California Penal Code section 288(c)(1), was a categorical crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b) where it posed a substantial risk of the use of physical force. View "Rodriguez-Castellon v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Arizona death row prisoner, appealed from the district court's order dismissing his motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). Petitioner alleged three ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims that were neither presented in state post-conviction proceedings nor included in his initial federal habeas corpus petition. The court concluded that none of petitioner's arguments amounted to an allegation of a "defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings" that constituted grounds for a legitimate Rule 60(b) motion. Rather, petitioner was arguing in essence that he deserved "a second chance to have the merits determined favorably" in the context of a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. The court held that the district court was without jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's successive section 2254 habeas petition. Even if petitioner's motion was permissible under Rule 60(b), petitioner failed to satisfy the standards for relief from judgment under that rule. Likewise, petitioner failed to meet the stringent standards of a section 2254 habeas petition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion in No. 13-16928 and denied petitioner's motion to seek relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). The court denied petitioner's as construed application in No. 13-16928 and his separate application in No. 13-73647 to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition. View "Jones, Jr. v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q, seeking to compel the Agencies to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from the state's five oil refineries under the CAA. On appeal, Intervenor WSPA argued that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the parties' dispositive motions on the merits because plaintiffs have not met their burden in satisfying the "irreducible constitutional minimum" requirements for Article III standing under either the causality or redressability prong discussed in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order on the parties' dispositive motions and remanded with instructions that the action be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of wire fraud. On appeal, defendant challenged his sentence of 60 months in prison. The court concluded that the district court did not commit procedural error by engaging in impermissible double-counting where the district court was not prohibited from considering the extent to which the Guidelines did not sufficiently account for the nature and circumstances of defendant's offense. Further, the court had no basis for questioning whether the district court did, both in word and in fact, award defendant a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The court also concluded that the district court did not plainly err as to defendant's remaining contentions that he failed to preserve. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Christensen" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for conspiring to import marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. 963 and importation of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. 952 and 960. The court concluded that the district court's decision to give a deliberate ignorance instruction to the jury was not "illogical, implausible, or without support in inference that may be drawn from facts in the record." The court also concluded that the district court correctly denied Defendant Ramos's Rule 29 motion where a rational jury could believe Ramiro Gallegos's testimony, concluded that it was consonant with that of the border patrol agents, and concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Ramos knew, or was deliberately ignorant of, the objective of importing marijuana. Further, the district court did not err in admitting evidence of Defendant Ramos-Atondo's prior smuggling crime where the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice. View "United States v. Ramos-Atondo" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of bank robbery and sentenced to life in prison, appealed the district court's dismissal of part of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner argued that, because he was raising a Brady claim, he was not bound by the holdings of Coleman v. Thompson, which precluded relief when a claim was not exhausted during the post-conviction review process on account of lack of counsel or ineffective assistance of counsel. In Martinez v. Ryan, the court declared that where ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction relief proceeding resulted in a failure to assert that there was ineffective assistance of counsel in the trial proceedings, the claim would be cognizable. The court rejected petitioner's claim and concluded that the court was bound by Coleman and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hunton v. Sinclair" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine (Count 1), conspiracy to affect commerce by robbery and extortion (Count 2), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting (Count 3). The court held that the district court erred in its characterization of the United States v. Spentz holding where the district court should have told the jury that the amount of drugs or the profit that would be derived from their sale could not on its own establish an inducement supporting entrapment. Accordingly, the court reversed Count 1 and remanded for a retrial. The court also held that, under certain circumstances, a sentencing entrapment instruction must be given to the jury. The court offered suggested entrapment and sentencing entrapment instructions that it believed would provide greater clarity. The court affirmed Count 2, rejecting the argument that the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, was limited to the stealing of lawful property and excluded contraband. The court did not reach the remaining challenges, which were moot in light of the remand. View "United States v. Cortes" on Justia Law

Arizona’s 2010 Senate Bill 1070 includes various immigration-related provisions, passed in response to the growing presence of unauthorized aliens in Arizona. The stated purpose of S.B. 1070 is “to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and government agencies in Arizona” by creating “a variety of immigration-related state offenses and defin[ing] the immigration-enforcement authority of Arizona’s state and local law enforcement officers.” Section 13-2929 of the Bill attempts to criminalize transporting, concealing, harboring, or attempting to transport, conceal, or harbor an unauthorized alien under certain circumstances and to criminalize inducing or encouraging an unauthorized alien to come to or reside in Arizona. The district court entered a preliminary injunction with respect to 13-2929 on the basis that it is preempted by federal law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the statute, as written, is void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause because one of its key elements—being “in violation of a criminal offense”—is unintelligible. The provision is also preempted by federal law and invalid under the Supremacy Clause. View "Valle del Sol, Inc. v. State of Arizona" on Justia Law

Schad is scheduled to be executed in Arizona on October 9, 2013, in Arizona for a 1978 murder. The Ninth Circuit previously affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. Schad also unsuccessfully sought to enjoin a clemency hearing and to stay his execution, claiming that the Clemency Board was biased and subject to undue pressure by the Governor in violation of due process. The Arizona Clemency Board is appointed by the Governor and issues recommendations to the Governor, who may grant clemency only when the Board recommends it. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 31-402(A). The Ninth Circuit upheld denial of the injunction, stating that the record and the district court’s “well-reasoned decision” did not support challenges to the Board’s fairness. View "Schad v. Brewer" on Justia Law