Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, admitted to the United States on a B2 visitor visa, petitioned for review of the BIA's order dismissing her appeal, contending that the BIA erred in determining that the statutory language of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(h)("212(h) waiver"), excludes her from eligibility to apply for an inadmissibility waiver under section 212(h). The court concluded that the plain language of section 212(h) unambiguously demonstrated that petitioner's post-entry adjustment of status to an LPR after her admission to the United States as a visitor did not constitute an admission in the context of section 212(h). Only noncitizens who entered in the United States as LPRs are barred from eligibility to apply for the 212(h) waiver. Accordingly, petitioner was not barred from applying for the waiver and the court granted the petition for review. View "Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

The State entered into an agreement allowing Big Lagoon to operate a casino on a certain parcel of land. On appeal, the State challenged the district court's order requiring the State to negotiate with Big Lagoon under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701-2721. Under Carcieri v. Salazar, the BIA lacked authority to acquire land in trust for tribes that were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934. The court concluded that the only reasonable construction of section 2710(d)(3)(A) is that a tribe's right to request negotiations depends on its having jurisdiction over Indian lands on which it proposes to conduct class III gaming; the State did not waive the "Indian lands" requirement; the land at issue was not "Indian lands" because there was no family or other group on what is now the Big Lagoon in 1934; and, therefore, pursuant to Carcieri, Big Lagoon was not such a tribe. Accordingly, Big Lagoon cannot demand negotiations to conduct gaming on the land and cannot sue to compel negotiations if the State fails to negotiate in good faith. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Big Lagoon Rancheria v. State of California" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a defamation suit against defendant where defendant published blog posts on several websites that she created accusing plaintiffs of fraud, corruption, money-laundering, and other illegal activities. The court joined its sister circuits in concluding that the protections of the First Amendment did not turn on whether the defendant was a trained journalist, formally affiliated with traditional news entities, engaged in conflict-of-interest disclosure, went beyond just assembling others' writings, or tried to get both sides of a story; therefore, the court held that the Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.'s negligence requirement for private defamation actions was not limited to cases with institutional media defendants; because defendant's blog post addressed a matter of public concern, even assuming that Gertz was limited to such speech, the district court should have instructed the jury that it could not find defendant liable for defamation unless it found that she acted negligently; the district court also should have instructed the jury that it could not award presumed damages unless it found that defendant acted with actual malice; the court rejected defendant's argument that plaintiffs are public officials; and the court found no error in the district court's application of the Unelko Corp. v. Rooney test and rejected plaintiffs' cross-appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Obsidian Finance Group v. Cox" on Justia Law

World Trade petitioned for review of the Commission's Order Sustaining Disciplinary Action Taken by FINRA, which upheld a variety of fines and sanctions against petitioners for their violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77e(a), 77(e)(a), 77e(c), which prohibited the sale or offer of sale of a security without filing a registration statement. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the Commission's finding that World Trade violated Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Act, and the court held that World Trade did not meet their duty of inquiry necessary to claim the Section 4(4) broker's exemption; and the court deferred to the Commission's discretionary determination as to the appropriate fines and sanctions because they were within FINRA's guidelines and were supported by evidence in the record. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "WTFC v. SEC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that the continuous twenty-four-hour illumination of his cell violated the Eighth Amendment. The court reversed, concluding that there were material issues of fact remaining as to the brightness of the continuous lighting in plaintiff's cell, as to the effect on plaintiff of the continuous lighting, and as to whether the defendant officials were deliberately indifferent. Even if it were possible for a defendant to defeat an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim at summary judgment by showing a legitimate penological interest, defendants have failed to make such a showing in this case. Because the district court did not consider the question of qualified immunity, the court left the issue for the district court to determine in the first instance. The court also remanded for the district court to consider the issue of filing fee deductions. View "Grenning v. Miller-Stout, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, in custody of the CDC since 2004, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting twenty actions stemming from his validation as a gang member. The court concluded that the district court properly determined that the claim-preclusive effect of California's denial of plaintiff's habeas petition barred nineteen of his twenty counts; the district court erred, however, by dismissing plaintiff's Eighth Amendment challenge to the debriefing process (process to renounce gang membership) for lack of standing where construed liberally, plaintiff's complaint alleged that he would attempt to debrief, which he is eligible to do, but for the risk of retaliation; and as the condition precedent to plaintiff's motion to amend was not met, the court reversed the district court's denial of that motion and remanded for reconsideration. View "Gonzales v. CDC" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to drug and firearms offenses. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court concluded that defendant's primary contention - that amended U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(b) exceeded the Commission's statutory authority - was foreclosed by United States v. Tercero. The court also concluded that Section 1B1.10(b) did not offend separation of powers principles because it was simply the result of an exercise of Congress's power to control the scope of judicial discretion regarding sentencing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former prison inmate, filed suit alleging deliberate indifference to his mental health needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment (Count I), and violations of his right to freely exercise his religious beliefs and to have access to the courts, in violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendments (Counts II and III). On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on Count I, dismissal of Counts II and III, and denial of appointment of counsel and informa pauperis (IFP) status. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were mooted by his release from prison. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Count I where the record indicated that prison mental healthcare professionals were incredibly responsive to plaintiff's needs and no reasonable trier of fact could find that there was deliberate indifference to plaintiff's complaints; affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's request for counsel where plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits and he has been able to articulate his legal claims; vacated the dismissal of Counts II and III because it was based on the determination that plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies prior to the filing of his initial complaint, rather than his amended complaint; and remanded for the district court to consider plaintiff's attempts to exhaust his administrative remedies. View "Cano v. Taylor" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the sale of the Chronicle Publishing Company. After the Martin Family Trusts formed a tiered partnership structure, the Martin heirs commenced a series of transactions designed to create losses that would offset the taxable gain realized from the Chronicle Publishing sale. On appeal, taxpayers argued that the 2000-A Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) was time-barred by the restrictive language in the extension agreements. The court agreed with the district court that the extension agreements between the IRS and First Step encompassed adjustments made in the 2000-A FPAA that were directly attributable to partnership flow-through items of First Ship; the FPAA to 2000-A extended the limitations period for assessing tax beyond the extension agreements and through the present litigation; however, the agreements did not extend to adjustments in the 2000-A FPAA that were not directly attributable to First Ship; and because the district court held more broadly that "the extension agreements encompass the adjustments made by the IRS in the FPAA issued to 2000-A," the court remanded to the district court to make a determination of which adjustments in the 2000-A FPAA were directly attributable to partnership flow-through items of First Ship. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Candyce Martin 1999 Irrevocable Trust v. United States" on Justia Law

Section 152 First of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 152 First, imposes a duty on all carrier employees to engage in the Act's labor dispute resolution procedures before ceasing to perform their work. ASIG filed suit against the IBT, requesting a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a declaratory judgment for a permanent injunction to enjoin a strike at Sea-Tac airport as unlawful under the Act. Because the employees of ASIG were carrier employees, they must comply with the Act. Because they were subject to this obligation, the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the strike injunction. The injunction did not violate the employees' or other defendants' First Amendment rights; it furthered the important governmental interest of regulating the economic relationship between labor and management and was no greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Aircraft Service Int'l v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters" on Justia Law