Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, applied for an order granting him authorization to file a second or successive habeas corpus motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to Alleyne v. United States. Alleyne created a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that the Supreme Court has not made Alleyne expressly retroactive to cases on collateral review. Petitioner failed to show that Alleyne was made retroactive by multiple Supreme Court holdings. Accordingly, the court denied the application. View "Hughes v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, challenging the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence that was found at his residence. Defendant argued, pursuant to Georgia v. Randolph, that the search of the residence was unlawful because, even though his fiancee consented to the search of their joint residence, he was present at the residence and did not consent. The court held that the district court correctly determined that the search of defendant's residence did not violate the Fourth Amendment where Randolph requires that the resident who is refusing to consent both be present at the house and expressly refuse to allow the search. In this case, defendant refused to come to the door and agreed to let his fiancee, who also lived there, deal with the police. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of one count of false imprisonment and one count of forcible sexual penetration by a foreign object, appealed the denial of federal habeas relief on the basis that the state trial court's misstatement that he had pled guilty violated his constitutional rights. The court concluded that the trial court's misstatement deprived petitioner of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights to the presumption of innocence. Viewed in the context of the trial as a whole, the initial misstatement and the trial court's ineffective attempts to cure it were devastating to petitioner. Accordingly, the constitutional error was manifest and not harmless. The court reversed the denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus and remanded with instructions to grant the writ. View "Williams v. Swarthout" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of making false, fictitious, and fraudulent claims to the United States Treasury, assisting in the filing of false tax returns, criminal contempt, and mail fraud. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions and the district court's supervised release conditions. The court concluded that the district court did not commit reversible error under the Sixth Amendment when it did not prompt defendant to present a closing argument to the jury and where defendant simply chose to remain silent; nothing in Herring v. New York or the court's precedents gives a self-represented defendant a right to be affirmatively and individually advised that he or she has a right to present a closing argument; Herring and the court's precedent held that a court may not prevent a litigant from making a closing argument; the government provided sufficient evidence to prove that defendant assisted another in the filing of fraudulent tax returns; but the district court did abuse its discretion by requiring defendant to abstain from alcohol and drug consumption and participate in treatment as conditions of his supervised release where the record contains no evidence showing that defendant abused alcohol or other substances and the district court made no relevant findings during the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions and sentences for drug conspiracy and use of a minor to commit a drug trafficking offense. At issue was the testimony of two case agents at defendants' joint trial where one agent testified as a gang expert and the other testified as an expert in drug jargon who translated wiretapped phone calls into drug quantities and amounts. The court affirmed the admission of the gang testimony. In regards to the testimony interpreting the recorded calls, the court concluded that the testimony intermingled lay and expert opinion and the district court plainly erred when it failed to explain the distinction to the jury; the district court also plainly erred where the intermingling resulted in the admission of improper expert and lay opinions; and because such errors affected defendants' substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings, the court vacated the drug quantity findings and defendants' sentences. The court also addressed the appropriate remedy when trial errors affect the jury's drug quantity findings but not the underlying conspiracy convictions. The court need not vacate defendants' conspiracy convictions because drug quantity is not an element of the conspiracy offense. The court also held that, in this case, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude retrial of the drug quantity issue. The court vacated the special verdict only and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Vera" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and his sentence was enhanced under section 1326(b)(2) after the sentencing judge found defendant's prior California conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm qualified as an aggravated felony. In the court's recent decision in United States v. Aguilera-Rios, the court held that, in the immigration context, California's felon in possession firearm statute is not a categorical match for the federal firearms offense. In this case, the court held that the same analysis in Aguilera-Rios applies in the sentencing context. Because the state felony in possession of a firearm statute under which defendant was convicted criminalizes more conduct than the federal felon in possession of a firearm statute, there is no categorical match. California does not prosecute cases involving antique firearms under California Penal Code 12021(a)(1). Consequently, the court concluded that the district court erred in applying an eight-level sentencing enhancement. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Donna and Gerald Young and their minor daughter filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(a), against the United States for negligently failing to warn visitors at Mount Rainier National Park of a hazard that the National Park Service both knew of and created. Donna had fallen into a twelve-foot-deep hole that formed underneath the snow, which was created by the heat of a transformer, near the Park's main visitor center and sustained several injuries. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that the Service's decision not to warn of the latent dangers associated with the transformer was a decision "totally divorced" from the policies that the government has identified as the basis for its decision. Where, as here, warning against a hazard known to and created by the Service would not implicate concerns for access, visitor enjoyment, or environmental preservation, the only policy the Service must consider is one it appears to have ignored: visitor safety. The court concluded that the Service's decision not to warn of a hazard that it knew of and created - that it placed near a visitor center serving 1 million visitors annually - cannot be shielded by the FTCA's discretionary function exception. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Young v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was adjudicated a sexually violent predator under California Welfare and Institutions Code 6600(a)(1) and has been reporting to his local police station every 90 days to fill out a registration form pursuant to the requirements of California Penal Code 290.012(b). At issue on appeal is the constitutionality of section 290.012(b). The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim that the registration requirement violates the fundamental right to be free from physical restraint by requiring sexually violent predators to appear in person every 90 days to register. Applying rational basis review, the court concluded that the registration requirement is rationally related to California's interest in deterring recidivism and promoting public safety. The district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim that the registration requirement violates the Ex Post Facto Clause; plaintiff's equal protection challenge failed because neither mentally disordered offenders nor mentally disordered sex offenders are similarly situated to sexually violent predators; plaintiff waived his claim that section 290.012(b) is unconstitutionally vague; and plaintiff failed to state a claim under California's Administrative Procedure Act, Cal. Gov't Code 11340 et seq. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Litmon v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant, Former Arizona Congressman Richard Renzi, appealed his conviction and sentence for conspiracy, honest-services fraud, extortion, money laundering, making false statements to insurance regulators, and racketeering. Co-defendant, James Sandlin, also appealed his conviction and sentence. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict Renzi of extortion and honest-services fraud and rejected Renzi's claim that the parties engaged in an equal value exchange; neither the pattern jury instruction nor any controlling precedent requires the district court to identify the thing of value, especially where variance from the indictment is not at issue; and, in this case, there was no error in the uncontested jury instructions. The court held that, if a member of Congress offers evidence of his own legislative acts at trial, the government is entitled to introduce rebuttal evidence narrowly confined to the same legislative acts, and such rebuttal evidence does not constitute questioning the member of Congress in violation of the Speech and Debate Clause; because Renzi was not impermissibly questioned in violation of the Clause, there was no Clause violation; Renzi's right to present a defense cannot override the Speech and Debate privilege of another Congressman; and the court carefully reviewed the classified materials filed with this case and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding them, pursuant to the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. App.3, section 6(a). The court rejected Renzi's claim under Napue v. Illinois where there is no "reasonable likelihood" that the statements at issue affected the jury's judgment; the court rejected Renzi's contentions regarding his insurance-fraud conviction and his Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961, conviction; the court upheld the district court's calculation under U.S.S.G. 2C1.1(b)(2) of the value of a payment Renzi received in exchange for influence exerted to the sale of property; and the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support Sandlin's convictions for conspiracy to engage in wire fraud, Hobbs Act extortion, and engaging in monetary transactions with criminally derived funds. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Renzi" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murdering a law enforcement officer in the line of duty, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. The court concluded, in light of the "doubly deferential" standard, that it was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington for the state court to determine that petitioner's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to preserve explicitly the issue of observation evidence. Likewise, counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a reevaluation of petitioner's competency. Finally, the court held that petitioner's claim of ineffective appellate counsel is procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Clark v. Arnold" on Justia Law