Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to the sole count of illegal reentry under a written fast-track plea agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). On appeal, defendant challenged his twenty-one month prison term. The court concluded that the government breached the plea agreement by implicitly advocating for a sentence other than the stipulated one. The government also breached the express terms of the plea agreement not to seek, argue, or suggest in any way that the district court impose a sentence other than what had been stipulated by the parties. Even if the court concluded that the government's offending language had no practical purpose but to argue implicitly for a harsher than stipulated punishment, the court held that the government breached the express terms of the plea agreement. Further, the government's breach of the plea agreement was neither cured nor curable before the district court. When a defendant timely objects, moves for specific performance, and successfully appeals the district court's post-breach order rejecting a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the conviction and sentence and remand for further proceedings before a different judge. In this case, defendant appealed only his sentence and did not seek vacatur of his conviction. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Morales Heredia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging Idaho and Nevada statutes and enacted amendments preventing same-sex couples from marrying and refusing to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed elsewhere. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that, in Sevcik v. Sandoval, a live case and controversy still exists even though Nevada's officials have ceased to defend their laws constitutionality where the Governor and Clerk-Recorder remain parties and continue to enforce the laws at issue. Further, the Supreme Court's summary dismissal in Baker v. Nelson is not controlling precedent that precludes the court from considering plaintiffs' claims. On the merits, the court held that the Idaho and Nevada laws violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they deny lesbian and gays who wish to marry persons of the same sex a right they afford to individuals who wish to marry persons of the opposite sex. The laws do not satisfy the heightened scrutiny standard the court adopted in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs. The court rejected defendants' essential contention that bans on same-sex marriage promote the welfare of children by encouraging good parenting in stable opposite-sex families. Defendants' other contentions are without merit. Because defendants failed to demonstrate that these laws further any legitimate purpose, they unjustifiably discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in Latta v. Otter. The court reversed and remanded the judgment in Sevcik.View "Latta v. Otter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the NPS's enforcement of a regulation banning the operation of hovercrafts on the Nation River. Alaska intervened, challenging the NPS's authority to require its researchers to obtain a permit before engaging in studies on the Alagnak River. Plaintiff and Alaska argued that section 103(c) of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act precludes NPS from regulating activities on state-owned lands and navigable waters that fall within the boundaries of National Park System units in Alaska. The district court granted summary judgment to appellees. The court concluded that plaintiff had Article III standing, but that his interpretation of section 103(c) is foreclosed by the plain text of the statute. NPS's hovercraft ban applies to federally owned lands and waters administered by NPS nationwide, as well as navigable waters within national parks. The court rejected plaintiff's two additional arguments, that the Secretary exceeded her statutory authority in promulgating the regulation at issue and that her action raises serious constitutional concerns. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff. The court held that Alaska lacked standing to bring its challenge and vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss.View "Sturgeon v. Masica" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's judgment dismissing her claims against Fannie Mae, contending that the district court lacked jurisdiction over their claims. The court affirmed, concluding that, under the rule announced in American National Red Cross v. S.G., the sue-and-be sued clause in Fannie Mae's federal charter confers federal question jurisdiction over claims brought by or against Fannie Mae. Accordingly, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims.View "Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of his application for special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193-2201. The application was denied based on petitioner's false testimony which prevented him from establishing good moral character. The court held that an application for special rule cancellation of removal under NACARA is not a continuing application, and that the seven-year period during which good moral character is required under NACARA ends on the date of the filing of the application. If petitioner, in this case, gave false testimony, he did so after the requisite seven-year period. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings.View "Aragon-Salazar v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, purchasers of NVIDIA's stock, filed suit alleging that the company violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and corresponding SEC Rule 10b-5, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' amended complaint because they failed to adequately allege scienter. The court held that Item 303 of Regulation S-K did not create a duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Such a duty to disclose must be separately shown according to the principles set forth in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson and Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano. Further, neither the collective scienter doctrine nor the core operations doctrine alone gives rise to a strong inference of scienter in this case. There is no allegation that the issue of an inherent defect in NVIDIA's Material Set was ever publicly raised prior to NVIDIA's disclosure, nor is there any allegation that NVIDIA knowingly issued a false press release, attempting to discount any public discussion regarding its chips' defects. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "In Re: Nvidia Corp. Sec. Litig." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of domestic assault by a habitual offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. 117(a). On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that using his tribal court convictions to satisfy an element of section 117(a) violates his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The court concluded that the government waived its argument that defendant failed to make an evidentiary showing that his tribal court convictions were uncounseled. The court held, under United States v. Ant, that the government may not rely on tribal court convictions as predicate offenses in section 117(a) prosecutions unless the tribal court afforded the same right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment in federal and state prosecutions. In this case, defendant's relevant tribal convictions do not meet this standard and the charges against him must be dismissed. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.View "United States v. Bryant, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, non-profit organizations representing the manufacturers and distributors of pharmaceutical products, filed suit challenging the Alameda County Safe Drug Disposal Ordinance, which requires that prescription drug manufacturers, who either sell, offer for sale, or distribute "Covered Drugs" in Alameda, operate and finance a "Product Stewardship Program." The court concluded that the Ordinance, both on its face and in effect, does not discriminate because it applies to all manufacturers that make their drugs available in Alameda County - without respect to the geographic location of the manufacturer; the Ordinance does not directly regulate interstate commerce where it does not control conduct beyond the boundaries of the county; under the balancing test in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., the court concluded that, without any evidence that the Ordinance will affect the interstate flow of goods, the Ordinance does not substantially burden interstate commerce; and therefore, the Ordinance does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants.View "PRMA v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen. Immigration officials had failed to properly record petitioner's correct address and, instead, recorded another outdated address. Petitioner's notice to appear for her deportation hearing was sent to the outdated address. Consequently, petitioner failed to appear and was ordered removed in absentia. Upon learning about the order, petitioner moved to reopen. The court concluded that the BIA abused its discretion when it decided that petitioner was not entitled to notice under the immigration statutes. The BIA concluded that petitioner "did not" provide her current address after acknowledging that she claims she did. The BIA acted arbitrarily because it gives not reason for discounting petitioner's claim where the claim was facially plausible and supported by her declaration. Further, the BIA abused its discretion in concluding that petitioner was required to "ensure that the correct address was written down" instead of that she was required to "ensure that the correct address was supplied." Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review.View "De Jesus Velasquez-Escovar v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted in state court of one count of an attempted lewd act upon a child under the age of 14, sought review of the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition. Petitioner alleged that the prosecutorial misstatements during rebuttal closing argument deprived him of a fair trial. The court concluded that the prosecutor's misstatements were not inadvertent or isolated. Rather, it is clear that the erroneous assertions of law in the prosecutor's closing rebuttal argument were not mere "stray words," and that they were a direct response to the central theory of petitioner's case. Further, the trial court did not correct the prosecutor's misstatements and the evidence concerning the temporal aspect of petitioner's intent was not overwhelming. The court expressed grave doubt as to whether the error had a substantial or injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions.View "Deck v. Jenkins" on Justia Law