Gallegos v. Ryan

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Petitioner, convicted of first-degree murder and sexual conduct with a minor, appealed the district court's denial of his federal habeas petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt and penalty phases of trial. Applying a highly deferential standard under the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254, the court concluded that, given the inherently disturbing nature of the technical theory counsel adopted, for lack of an available alternative, to defend against the felony murder charge, as well as its counter-intuitive nature, it was reasonable to tailor the defense as an argument to the court in the form of a motion for acquittal, and, when the motion was denied and closing arguments remained, not press the theory to the jury. Assuming, without deciding, that counsel’s conduct was at times constitutionally deficient, he did not fail entirely to advocate for petitioner. Therefore, the state court reasonably determined that counsel's conduct did not constitute abandonment, and that Strickland v. Washington applies to the question of prejudice. The court also rejected petitioner's claims that counsel at sentencing was ineffective for failing fully to prepare and present mitigating evidence concerning his mental health and personal history. The court concurrently filed an order with this opinion. View "Gallegos v. Ryan" on Justia Law