Mendez-Garcia v. Lynch

Petitioners Mendez-Garcia and Rivera-Baltazar claim in separate applications that removal would result in hardship to their respective sons, who were United States citizens under 21 years of age at the time of the application pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(D). While these applications were pending, petitioners’ sons turned 21 and no longer met the statutory definition of “child,” pursuant to section 1101(b)(1). The BIA denied relief. The court concluded that, because the BIA offered a reasonable interpretation of section 1229b, the IJ in each case did not err in considering whether Mendez-Garcia and Rivera-Baltazar had a qualifying relative for purposes of the hardship requirement as of the time of the decision on the application for cancellation of removal; even assuming that Matter of Isidro-Zamorano and the precedents on which it relies are factually distinguishable from the situations here, the BIA’s interpretation of the hardship requirement in section 1229b(b)(1)(D) would nonetheless be binding; the statutory definition of "child" controls because section 1101(b)(1) includes an explicit definition of the term; the decisionmaking process here did not violate Mendez-Garcia’s and Rivera-Baltazar’s due process rights; the court rejected petitioners' argument that their due process rights were violated because they had “settled expectations” that they could apply for and receive cancellation of removal, and these settled expectations were upset by the change in the status of their qualifying relatives; and the court rejected Mendez-Garcia's claim that his due process rights were violated based on the cap on grants of cancellation of removal. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions. View "Mendez-Garcia v. Lynch" on Justia Law