Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A hotel guest, who was staying at a lodge as part of a cruise package, fell in his bathroom after tripping over a raised shower ledge situated close to the toilet. He alleged that the bathroom’s configuration was unreasonably dangerous, and that the cruise line and hotel operator were negligent in constructing or maintaining that configuration. The guest asserted both a traditional maritime negligence claim and an alternative theory of negligence per se, arguing that the bathroom violated applicable plumbing codes.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment for the defendants on both theories. Regarding the negligence claim, the district court ruled that the plaintiff had not provided evidence that the defendants had actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition. On the negligence per se theory, the district court found that there was insufficient evidence that a plumbing code violation caused the plaintiff’s injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that, because the defendants owned and constructed the lodge’s bathroom, there was no dispute that they knew or should have known the configuration existed. It found that the plaintiff’s expert evidence created a genuine dispute about whether the defendants knew or should have known that the configuration was unreasonably dangerous. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment on the maritime negligence claim. However, the appellate court agreed with the district court that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the negligence per se theory, concluding that a movable shower curtain did not violate the cited plumbing code. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on negligence per se and remanded the general negligence claim for further proceedings. View "PETREY V. PRINCESS CRUISE LINES, LTD." on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident that occurred at Lake Mead, where Bryce Tyrone Verhonich operated a jet ski with a passenger, Lily Hatcher, in the early morning hours. After taking a detour to view the sunrise, both Verhonich and Hatcher fell into the water under rough conditions. Verhonich, who was not wearing a life jacket or engine cut-off lanyard, was rescued, but Hatcher drowned. Subsequent investigation revealed that neither individual was wearing a personal flotation device and the engine cut-off switch lanyard was not attached to Verhonich. Surveillance and body camera footage confirmed these facts. Hatcher’s body was later recovered, and an autopsy found drowning as the cause of death, with drugs as contributing factors.The case was first tried before a United States magistrate judge, who found Verhonich guilty of negligent operation of a vessel, failure to wear a personal flotation device, and failure to attach the engine cut-off switch lanyard—all in violation of National Park Service regulations. The magistrate judge sentenced him to six months in custody and two years of probation. Verhonich appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, arguing improper admission of evidence, insufficient evidence for conviction on negligent operation, and sentencing error. The district court affirmed the convictions and sentence.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that failure to wear a life jacket and failure to attach a safety lanyard may both be considered in determining negligent operation under 36 C.F.R. § 3.8(b)(8). The court found sufficient evidence to support Verhonich’s conviction, determined that evidentiary objections did not survive plain error review, and upheld the sentence as reasonable. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA V. VERHONICH" on Justia Law

A former ship captain was prosecuted after a fire broke out on his vessel, resulting in the deaths of thirty-four passengers and crew members. The ship, used for recreational diving, had multiple fire safety features and regulatory requirements, including the need for a roving night patrol and crew training in fire response. The captain had extensive maritime experience, but his crew was relatively inexperienced and had not been adequately trained in emergency procedures. On the night of the incident, no one was assigned to patrol for fires, and when the fire was discovered, the crew was unprepared to respond effectively. The captain contacted the Coast Guard but did not use the ship’s public address system to warn those below deck or attempt a rescue, ultimately abandoning ship along with other crew members. All individuals below deck died from smoke inhalation and asphyxiation.The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over the initial criminal case. The first indictment tracked the language of the seaman’s manslaughter statute but was dismissed by the district court for not alleging gross negligence, which the court believed was required based on prior interpretations of a different manslaughter statute. The government reindicted, alleging gross negligence, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury was instructed that conviction could follow if the captain engaged in “misconduct and/or acted with gross negligence.” The jury found the captain guilty.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the seaman’s manslaughter statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1115, requires only ordinary negligence, not gross negligence. The court further concluded that, even if the jury instruction’s use of “misconduct” was erroneous, any such error was harmless because the instructions repeatedly referenced the higher gross negligence standard, the prosecution did not argue for a lower standard, and overwhelming evidence supported the conviction. The judgment was affirmed. View "USA V. BOYLAN" on Justia Law

A fire broke out on the passenger dive boat M.V. Conception during a scuba diving excursion in September 2019, resulting in the deaths of thirty-four people who were trapped below deck. The Coast Guard had inspected the vessel multiple times before the incident and had found it fit for service, not identifying any safety hazards related to electrical wiring, plastic trash cans, or plastic chairs. Personal representatives of the deceased and one injured survivor filed suit against the United States, alleging that the Coast Guard’s negligent inspection and failure to identify these hazards caused the tragedy.The United States District Court for the Central District of California was the first to review the case. The government moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the discretionary function exception to the Suits in Admiralty Act (SIAA) applied. The district court agreed, finding that the relevant statutes and regulations gave Coast Guard inspectors discretion in how to conduct vessel inspections and in determining what constituted hazardous conditions. As a result, plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the discretionary function exception, and the suit was dismissed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that its prior precedent, Earles v. United States, which applies the discretionary function exception from the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) to the SIAA, remained binding and had not been overruled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Thacker v. Tennessee Valley Authority. The court further found that no specific statute, regulation, or policy required the Coast Guard to identify the hazards alleged by plaintiffs, and that the inspection process involved discretionary, policy-based decisions. Accordingly, the discretionary function exception barred the suit, and dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was proper. View "Fiedler v. United States" on Justia Law

A jurisdictional dispute arose between the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) over maintenance work at SSA Terminals in the Port of Seattle. Both unions claimed the right to perform the work under their respective collective bargaining agreements. SSA initially assigned the work to ILWU, but IAM threatened economic action, prompting SSA to seek a resolution from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB assigned the work to IAM, leading ILWU to pursue a grievance against SSA, which an arbitrator upheld.SSA then filed an unfair labor practice charge against ILWU, alleging that ILWU's pursuit of the grievance violated section 8(b)(4)(D) of the National Labor Relations Act. ILWU defended itself by invoking the work-preservation defense, which protects primary union activity. The NLRB rejected this defense, stating it was not applicable in pure jurisdictional disputes where multiple unions have valid contractual claims. The NLRB ordered ILWU to cease and desist from pursuing the maintenance work at Terminal 5.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the NLRB's position was foreclosed by its previous decision in International Longshore and Warehouse Union v. NLRB (Kinder Morgan), which established that a valid work-preservation objective provides a complete defense against alleged violations of section 8(b)(4)(D). The court vacated the NLRB's order and remanded the case for the NLRB to evaluate the merits of ILWU's work-preservation defense. The court also denied the petitions for review by IAM and the NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement. View "International Longshore and Warehouse Union v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

A longshoreman, Robert Tower, who worked at the Port of Seattle, experienced hearing loss in one ear and bilateral tinnitus due to occupational noise exposure. An audiogram revealed a 9.375% hearing loss in his left ear and 0% in his right ear, with additional tinnitus. Tower sought compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, claiming benefits for hearing loss in both ears due to the tinnitus.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled that Tower was only entitled to compensation for hearing loss in one ear under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(A), rejecting the claim for bilateral hearing loss compensation. The Benefits Review Board vacated this decision, holding that Tower should be compensated for hearing loss in both ears under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(B) due to the tinnitus, which the AMA Guides suggest should be added to a binaural hearing impairment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Longshore Act does not permit monaural hearing loss to be compensated under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(B) for bilateral hearing loss, even when the claimant also has tinnitus. The court emphasized that the Act distinguishes between monaural and binaural hearing loss and that tinnitus, while a significant condition, does not convert a monaural hearing loss into a binaural one for compensation purposes. The court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, noting that Tower should be compensated under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(A) for his monaural hearing loss. The court did not express a view on whether tinnitus might be compensable under the catch-all provision, 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(21). View "TOTAL TERMINALS INTERNATIONAL, LLC V. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION PROGRAMS" on Justia Law

The case involves Denys Korotkiy, the Chief Engineer of a foreign-flagged ship, who was charged with violating U.S. regulations by failing to maintain accurate records of bilge-water operations in the ship's Oil Record Book. The ship, MV Donald, dumped oily bilge water on the high seas and made misleading entries in the Oil Record Book to cover it up. Upon arriving in the U.S., the Coast Guard inspected the ship and found the records to be inaccurate and incomplete.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California denied Korotkiy's motion to dismiss the indictment. Korotkiy argued that the regulation did not require accurate records, that Congress and the international community did not intend for such prosecutions, and that only shipmasters, not chief engineers, should be charged. The district court, relying on precedents from other circuits, found that Korotkiy could be charged for failing to maintain an accurate Oil Record Book while in U.S. waters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that 33 C.F.R. § 151.25 requires ships to maintain accurate records in their Oil Record Books while in U.S. waters. The court joined other circuits in interpreting the regulation to impose a duty on foreign-flagged vessels to ensure the accuracy of their records upon entering U.S. territorial waters. The court also rejected Korotkiy's argument that only shipmasters could be charged, noting that chief engineers can be prosecuted for aiding and abetting the failure to maintain accurate records. The court concluded that the regulation's plain language and the legislative purpose of preventing oceanic pollution supported the prosecution. View "USA V. KOROTKIY" on Justia Law

In 2020, Milos Product Tanker Corporation transported approximately 40,000 tons of jet fuel belonging to Valero Marketing and Supply Company. Milos had a maritime transportation contract (Charter Party) with GP Global PTE Ltd., which arranged the voyage. Valero purchased the fuel from Koch Refining International PTE Ltd. on "cost and freight" terms, meaning Koch paid for the transportation. Upon delivery, Valero refused to pay Milos, arguing it had already paid Koch. GP Global, facing financial difficulties, also did not pay Milos, leading Milos to sue Valero for breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Milos, concluding that Valero breached an express or implied contract to pay Milos for the transportation. The court reasoned that Valero's conduct showed its consent to be bound by the Charter Party between Milos and GP Global. The court also found that Valero was alternatively liable under an implied promise to pay, based on its acceptance of the fuel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that under maritime law, the shipper (GP Global) is primarily liable for freight charges, even if a bill of lading suggests otherwise. The court found no express contract between Milos and Valero that would rebut this presumption. The Charter Party specifically stated that GP Global would pay the freight. The court also determined that Valero's conduct did not imply an agreement to be bound by the bills of lading or to pay freight. Additionally, the court found no basis for an implied obligation for Valero to pay under the principles established in States Marine International, Inc. v. Seattle-First National Bank. The court concluded that Valero was not unjustly enriched, as it had paid Koch for the freight charges. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "MILOS PRODUCT TANKER CORPORATION V. VALERO MARKETING AND SUPPLY COMPANY" on Justia Law

A maintenance diver, Eduardo Loaiza, suffered severe injuries while servicing the sailboat Allora in Marina Del Rey, California. Loaiza was injured when the propeller was activated, causing significant harm to his hands. The shipowners, Live Life Bella Vita LLC, Gary Dordick, and Nava Dordick, sought to limit their liability under the Limitation of Liability Act by filing an action in the Central District of California. The district court enjoined all related suits, including those in state courts.Loaiza filed a complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court and counterclaims in the federal limitation proceeding. He also filed a third-party complaint against several entities, including S and K Dive Service, Inc. The district court granted Loaiza's motion to stay the limitation proceeding, allowing him to pursue his claims in state court under the "single claimant" exception, despite the Vessel Owners' argument that multiple claims were likely. Subsequently, S and K Dive filed counterclaims in federal court for indemnity, contribution, and attorney’s fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that parties seeking indemnity or contribution are separate claimants under the Limitation Act, creating a multiple claimant situation. The court also held that claims for attorney’s fees constitute separate claims. The court vacated the district court’s dissolution of the injunction, reinstating the injunction against all related suits. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to resume the limitation proceeding and review all claims and stipulations to ensure the shipowners' right to limit liability is protected. View "LIVE LIFE BELLA VITA, LLC V. CRUISING YACHTS, INC." on Justia Law

Catherine Berry sued her employer, Air Force Central Welfare Fund, and its insurer, Air Force Insurance Fund, to enforce administrative default orders for disability benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. After Berry filed her lawsuit, the defendants voluntarily paid her the full amount owed, including penalties and interest. Berry then sought attorneys’ fees under 33 U.S.C. § 928(a), arguing that her case was not moot due to her pending fee request.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied Berry’s motion for attorneys’ fees and dismissed her complaint as moot. The court held that Berry did not “successfully prosecute” her claim under § 928(a) because the defendants’ voluntary payment mooted the case, and Berry obtained no judicially sanctioned relief. Berry appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that Berry’s claim was moot because she received the full amount owed and sought no other compensation. The court also rejected Berry’s argument that her lawsuit was the catalyst for the defendants’ payment, stating that the catalyst theory is unavailable under § 928(a). The court concluded that Berry did not “successfully prosecute” her claim in the district court, as she obtained no judicially sanctioned relief. Therefore, Berry was not entitled to attorneys’ fees under § 928(a). The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case as moot. View "BERRY V. AIR FORCE CENTRAL WELFARE FUND" on Justia Law