Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After the Department denied Memorial's application for a Certificate of Need to perform elective percutaneous coronary interventions (PCIs), Memorial filed suit alleging that the PCI regulations were an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and unreasonably discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court concluded that the requirements did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause where the minimum procedure requirement did not burden interstate commerce and the minimum procedure requirement protected public safety. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of all of Memorial's remaining claims. View "Yakima Valley Mem'l Hosp. v. Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Apple alleging federal and state antitrust claims. Plaintiff alleged that Apple encoded iTS music files with its proprietary Digital Rights Management (DRM), called FairPlay, which rendered iTS music and the iPod compatible only with each other. Plaintiff also alleged claims that through certain software updates, Apple excluded competitors and obtained a monopoly in the portable digital media player (PDMP) and music download markets, which inflated Apple's music prices and deflated the value of the iPod. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's July 2009 order denying her motion to certify a class of indirect purchasers of the iPod under Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that, because plaintiff abandoned the individual claim for which she sought class certification, the issue of whether the district court erred in denying her motion to certify that claim for class treatment was waived. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's monopolization claim for damages based on the theory of diminution in iPod value on the ground that it was barred by Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois; properly dismissed plaintiff's claim for damages based on supracompetitive music prices; and properly dismissed plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief where plaintiff's alleged inability to play her music freely was not an "antitrust injury" that affected competition and could, therefore, not serve as the basis for injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of class certification and dismissal of plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. View "Somers v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

Gorlick sued Allied, a competitor in the auto parts market, alleging that Allied was receiving favorable prices from a manufacturer. The court concluded that Gorlick failed to show that Allied had actual knowledge, trade knowledge or a duty to inquire whether the favorable prices it received might be prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 13(f). The court also concluded that Gorlick failed to provide a plausible explanation for how the alleged agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor, concerning a product line without market dominance, caused harm to competition in the entire automotive exhaust product market. Even assuming that a vertical agreement existed and that it affected the price of the products at issue, there's no plausible showing of harm to competition in the market for automotive exhaust products as a whole. Therefore, the court concluded that Gorlick's claim under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Allied. View "Gorlick Distrib. Ctrs. v. Car Sound Exhaust Sys." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that they purchased billions of dollars worth of mobile handsets containing defendants' LCD panels and that the prices they paid for those handsets were artificially inflated because defendants had orchestrated a global conspiracy to fix the prices of LCD panels. The district court certified to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) "the question whether the application of California antitrust law to claims against defendants based on purchases that occurred outside California would violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution." Because the underlying conduct in this case involved not just the indirect purchase of price-fixed goods, but also the conspiratorial conduct that led to the sale of those goods, the court answered in the negative. To the extent a defendant's conspiratorial conduct was sufficiently connected to California, and was not "slight and casual," the application of California law to that conduct was "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair," and the application of California law did not violate that defendant's rights under the Due Process Clause. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order dismissing plaintiffs' California law claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "AT&T Mobility LLC, et al v. AU Optronics Corp., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, cigarette vendors, appealed the district court's dismissal of their antitrust action against defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs challenged taxes imposed by the virtue of the authority vested in an Indian tribe. The court held that the tribe did not implicitly waive its sovereign immunity by agreeing to dispute resolution procedures nor by ceding its authority to Washington State when entering into a cigarette tax contract. The court also held that federal antitrust law did not explicitly abrogate tribal immunity, and the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, was not a law of general applicability vis-a-vis the tribe. The court further held that tribal officials were protected by the tribe's sovereign immunity because they acted pursuant to the tribe's authority. The court affirmed the district court's alternative ruling that the action was barred by res judicata in light of the prior litigation in state and tribal courts. View "Miller, et al v. Wright, et al" on Justia Law

These thirteen consolidated appeals brought by class counsel and six groups of objectors (collectively, Objectors) challenged the district court's decisions regarding attorney fee awards after the settlement of an antitrust class action against West Publishing Corp. and Kaplan, Inc. In this opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed nine separate appeals challenging the propriety of the district court's decision to deny attorneys' fees to class counsel McGuireWoods on account of a conflict of interest and to deny fees to objectors for their efforts in securing that decision. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that because the district court's decisions were not legally erroneous, the respective fee orders were affirmed, with the exception of the order denying fees to the Schneider Objectors, which the Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rodriguez v. Disner" on Justia Law

In a class action, any settlement must be approved by the court to ensure that class counsel and the named plaintiffs do not place their own interests above those of the absent class members. In this false advertising case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals confronted a class action settlement, negotiated prior to class certification, that included cy pres distributions of money and food to unidentified charities. The settlement also included $2 million in attorneys' fees, the equivalent of a $2,100 hourly rate, while offering class members a sum of $15. The Court set aside the class settlement, holding (1) the district court did not apply the correct legal standards governing cy pres distributions and thus abused its discretion in approving the settlement; and (2) the settlement failed because the negotiated attorneys' fees were excessive. Remanded. View "Dennis v. Berg" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were automated teller machine (ATM) cardholders, who alleged horizontal price fixing of fees charged to the ATM owners by the banks when cardholders retrieve cash from an ATM not owned by their bank. Plaintiffs did not directly pay the allegedly fixed fee. The district court entered summary judgment against Plaintiffs and dismissed the suit for lack of antitrust standing. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) as indirect purchasers, Supreme Court precedent established in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois prohibited Plaintiffs from bringing this suit; (2) Plaintiffs did not qualify for the narrow exception to the Illinois Brick rule; and (3) Plaintiffs did not have standing under the Clayton Act to proceed with their Sherman Act suit. View "Brennan v. Concord EFS, Inc. " on Justia Law

Hexcel sued BP Amoco on November 26, 2008 for antitrust injuries it allegedly suffered as a result of a carbon fiber price-fixing scheme, beginning in 1992. To avoid the effect of the applicable four-year statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C. 15b, Hexcel contended that the statute of limitations was tolled due to fraudulent concealment by BP Amoco. The court held, however, that based upon the overwhelming evidence of Hexcel's knowledge in the record, the court held that Hexcel's claims were time-barred and affirmed the judgment.

The Attorneys General of Washington and California filed parens patriae actions in their states' courts alleging that defendants engaged in a conspiracy to fix the prices of thin-film transistor liquid crystal display (TFT-LCD) panels, and that state agencies and consumers were injured by paying inflated prices for products containing TFT-LCD panels. At issue was whether parens patriae actions filed by state Attorneys General constituted class actions within the meaning of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). The court held that under the plain text of section 1332(d), the parens patriae suits were not class actions within the meaning of CAFA. Therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the actions and properly remanded them to state court. Given this conclusion, the court need not, reach any other issue raised by the party.