Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Drywall entered into a labor agreement with the Union according to which Drywall assigned to a contractors' association authority to bargain on its behalf. After Drywall attempted to terminate the agreement, it discovered that the Union and association had executed a Memorandum of Understanding extending the term of the agreement. An arbitrator held that Drywall was bound by the Memorandum.The district court vacated the arbitration award and held that the arbitrator’s interpretation of the parties’ agreement was not “plausible” and was, moreover, contrary to public policy. The court held that the district court's decision exceeded its narrow authority to determine whether the arbitrator’s award was based on the parties’ contract and whether it violated an “explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy,” and therefore the court reversed the district court's decision. View "SWRCC v. Drywall Dynamics" on Justia Law

ItalFlavors filed suit against Caffe Vergnano, blaming the failure of an Italian cafe venture on Caffe Vergnano's failure to offer support. The parties had entered into an agreement, the Commercial Contract, which appears to be a franchise agreement setting forth the rights and responsibilities of the parties. The second agreement is the Hold Harmless Agreement. Caffe Vergnano filed a petition to compel arbitration and the district granted the petition. The court concluded that the declaration in the Hold Harmless Agreement signed contemporaneously with the Commercial Contract proves that the latter was a mere sham to help Hector Rabellino obtain a visa. Therefore, the court concluded that the Commercial Contract was not a contract and is thus unenforceable. Because the court found that the document the parties described as the Commercial Contract was a sham, the arbitration clause is no more enforceable than any other provision in that document. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Casa del Caffe Vergnano v. ItalFlavors, LLC" on Justia Law

Uthe filed suit against defendants, alleging a conspiracy to unlawfully take over one of Uthe’s overseas subsidiaries. In its original federal court action, Uthe brought claims for, inter alia, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961–68, against both defendants and foreign defendants. A Singapore arbitration resulted in an award against the foreign defendants. Afterwards, Uthe reinstated the present action against defendants requesting relief under RICO's treble damages provision. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that an award of additional damages under RICO would violate the "one satisfaction" rule. The court held, however, that Uthe is entitled to seek treble damages under RICO against defendants because the arbitral award did not constitute full satisfaction of Uthe's pre-existing RICO claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "UTHE Tech. Corp. v. Aetrium, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Luxottica asserting four causes of action arising out of his employment with Luxottica, including (1) unlawful business practices, (2) failure to pay overtime compensation, (3) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and (4) failure to pay wages when due. The district court subsequently granted Luxottica's motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the first amended complaint. This appeal presents issues of first impression regarding the scope of Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preemption, 9 U.S.C. 2 et seq., and the meaning of the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. The court must decide whether the FAA preempts the California rule announced in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, which bars the waiver of representative claims under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Cal. Lab. Code 2698 et seq. The court concluded that the FAA does not preempt the Iskanian Rule because the Rule leaves parties free to adopt the kinds of informal procedures normally available in arbitration. It only prohibits them from opting out of the central feature of the PAGA’s private enforcement scheme–the right to act as a private attorney general to recover the full measure of penalties the state could recover. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s order dismissing the complaint and returned the issue to the district court and the parties to decide in the first instance where plaintiff's representative PAGA claims should be resolved, and to conduct further proceedings. View "Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am." on Justia Law

This case stems from a dispute over a petition to compel arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between IATSE and InSync. The district court granted IATSE’s petition to compel arbitration pursuant to the parties’ initial agreement and “stayed” the case. The court concluded that the district court's arbitration order was final under 28 U.S.C. 1291 because the stay lacked any legal or practical effect. Therefore, the court has jurisdiction to review the order. On the merits, the court concluded that, given the scope of the arbitration provision and the nature of the parties’ dispute, the arbitrator and not the district court must consider IATSE and InSync’s competing interpretations of the evergreen clause and decide whether the 2003–2007 CBA expired or was terminated. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "IATSE Local 720 V. InSync Show Prod." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court’s order dismissing his action in favor of arbitration. Opus Bank cross appealed from the district court’s implicit denial of its motion to seal plaintiff’s complaint, and the district court’s denial of its motion for reconsideration as moot. The court held that federal arbitrability law applies in the present case; that the district court did not err in concluding that these parties’ incorporation of the Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) constituted “clear and unmistakable” evidence of their intent to submit the arbitrability dispute to arbitration; that Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson controls the present case where there are multiple severable arbitration agreements, only one of which is at issue; and that in this case, plaintiff failed to challenge the specific agreement at issue, as Rent-A-Center requires. The court concluded that the district court erred in denying as moot Opus Bank's motion for reconsideration to seal plaintiff's complaint because final judgment and even the filing of a notice of appeal does not divest a district court of its jurisdiction over matters ancillary to the appeal, such as protective orders. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in part. View "Brennan v. Opus Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, Archstone, in California state court alleging, among other claims, unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and equivalent state-law claims. Archstone moved to federal district court. On appeal, Archstone challenged the district court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration pursuant to a Company Policy Manual containing a Dispute Resolution Policy. The court concluded, pursuant to Kummetz v. Tech Mold, Inc., that the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 2, is narrowed by other federal statutes, such as Title VII, which "limit the enforcement of arbitration agreements with regard to claims arising under" the statute. This case is distinguishable from Kummetz and Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp. where the acknowledgment that plaintiff signed explicitly notified plaintiff that the Manual contained a Dispute Resolution Policy. Archstone presented plaintiff the "express" choice lacking in both Kummetz and Nelson and plaintiff knowingly waived his right to judicial forum for claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Ashbey v. Archstone Prop. Mgmt." on Justia Law

Petitioners, purchasers of luxury condominium units, seek a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its grant of a motion, while arbitration was pending, to disqualify an arbitrator for evident partiality under 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(2). The court determined that it had jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651. In determining whether a petitioner has carried the burden of establishing a "clear and indisputable" right to issuance of the writ, the court examined the five factors set out in Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court: (1) the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as a direct appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires; (2) the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal; (3) the district court’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) the district court’s order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules; and (5) the district court’s order raises new and important problems, or issues of law of first impression.The court concluded that the third and fifth Bauman factors, along with the first and second Bauman factors to a lesser extent, weigh in favor of granting the petition for mandamus. In this case, the district court's ruling was clearly erroneous as to the legal standard for "evident partiality" and the nature of the equitable concerns sufficient to justify a mid-arbitration intervention. Accordingly, the court granted the petition. View "Sussex v. U.S. Dist. Court for the District of Nevada" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action suit against Sirius XM after he received three unauthorized phone calls from Sirius XM on his cellphone during his trial subscription. Plaintiff had purchased a vehicle from Toyota that included a 90-day trial subscription to Sirius XM satellite radio. The district court dismissed the action and granted Sirius XM's motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 2. The court, applying well-settled principles of contract law, concluded that no valid agreement to arbitrate exists between plaintiff and Sirius XM because plaintiff never assented to the Customer Agreement. A reasonable person in plaintiff's position could not be expected to understand that purchasing a vehicle from Toyota would simultaneously bind him or her to any contract to Sirius XM, let alone one that contained an arbitration provision without any notice of such terms. Nothing in the record indicated that Sirius XM's offer was clearly and effectively communicated to plaintiff by mailing him the Customer Agreement and his continued use of the service after his receipt of the Customer Agreement did not manifest his assent to the provisions of the Customer Agreement. Further, the Customer Agreement is not a valid "shrinkwrap" agreement. Because the arbitration clause in the Customer Agreement is unenforceable for lack of mutual assent, the court need not decide whether the arbitration provision in the Customer Agreement is unconscionable. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and a putative class of consumers whose Touchpad orders had been cancelled, alleging that Barnes & Noble had engaged in deceptive business practices and false advertising. On appeal, Barnes & Noble challenged the district court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration against plaintiff under the arbitration agreement contained in its website's Terms of Use. The court held that there was no evidence that the website user had actual knowledge of the agreement. The court also held that where a website makes its terms of use available via a conspicuous hyperlink on every page of the website but otherwise provides no notice to users nor prompts them to take any affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the hyperlink to relevant buttons users must click on - without more - is insufficient to give rise to constructive notice. Therefore, the court concluded that there is nothing in the record to suggest that those browsewrap terms at issue are enforceable by or against plaintiff, much less why they should give rise to constructive notice of Barnes & Noble's browsewrap terms. In light of the distinguishing facts, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Barnes & Noble's estoppel argument. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff had insufficient notice of Barnes & Noble's Terms of Use, and thus did not enter into an arbitration agreement. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc." on Justia Law