Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Banking
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Freddie Mac and M&T in a quiet title action over a foreclosed property in Nevada. At issue was whether a first deed of trust in favor of Freddie Mac, which had been placed under the conservatorship of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), survived a non-judicial foreclosure sale of a Nevada residential property to satisfy an HOA superpriority lien. The panel held, and the parties agree, that the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) statute of limitations, 12 U.S.C. 4617(b)(12)(A), controls.The panel held that, under 12 U.S.C. 4617(b)(12), a quiet title action is a "contract" claim that is subject to a statute of limitations of at least six years; Freddie Mac and M&T Bank timely filed their quiet title action within six years of the foreclosure sale; and Freddie Mac's deed of trust, which had been placed under the conservatorship of FHFA, survived a non-judicial foreclosure sale of a Nevada residential property to satisfy a homeowners association superpriority lien. The panel also held that, although Freddie Mac and the Bank were not assignees of the FHFA, Freddie Mac was under the FHFA conservatorship, and the FHFA thus had all the rights of Freddie Mac with respect to its assets. Furthermore, although there was no contract between the purchaser and plaintiffs, the quiet title claims were entirely "dependent" upon Freddie Mac's lien on the property, an interest created by contract. View "M&T Bank v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC" on Justia Law

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Citi filed suit against Corte Madera Homeowners Association for wrongful foreclosure, breach of the statutory duty of good faith by Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.1113, and quiet title. Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(1) allows HOAs to pursue liens on members' homes for unpaid assessments and charges. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling regarding the adequacy of the lender's tender, holding that BANA's offer did not constitute valid tender. The panel held that 7510 Perla Del Mar Ave Tr. v. Bank of America, N.A., 458 P.3d 348, 350-51 (Nev. 2020) (en banc) -- which held that a mere offer to pay at a later time, after the superpriority amount was determined, does not constitute a valid tender -- did not alter the validity of Citi's tender because BANA insisted on the same condition that Perla Del Mar prohibited. The panel held that the district court did not err when it concluded that Citi was obligated to satisfy the superpriority portion of the lien in order to protect its interest. Furthermore, the district court did not err by observing that Citi's offer to pay nine months' assessments was not the equivalent of an offer to pay the superpriority portion of Corte Madera's lien. Therefore, in light of Perla Del Mar, the district court did not err by ruling that Citi's tender was impermissibly conditional. The panel rejected Citi's alternative arguments. However, the panel remanded for reconsideration of the complaint's allegation that Corte Madera's foreclosure notices violated the homeowner's bankruptcy stay. View "CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Corte Madera Homeowners Ass'n" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed two pre-foreclosure actions against MERS and the banks holding their mortages, challenging their authority to foreclose on plaintiffs' properties. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district courts' dismissal of the complaints for failure to state plausible claims for relief under California law. The panel followed the decisions of the California appellate courts in holding that California law does not permit preemptive actions to challenge a party's authority to pursue foreclosure before a foreclosure has taken place.The panel held that plaintiffs' pre-foreclosure judicial actions preemptively challenging the banks' authority to foreclose on the their properties in the future are not viable under California law. The panel also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs leave to amend where the proposed amendments would not have changed the determination. View "Perez v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit certified to the Nevada Supreme Court the following questions: (1) When a lienholder whose lien arises from a mortgage for the purchase of a property brings a claim seeking a declaratory judgment that the lien was not extinguished by a subsequent foreclosure sale of the property, is that claim exempt from statute of limitations under City of Fernley v. Nevada Department of Taxation, 366 P.3d 699 (Nev. 2016)? (2) If the claim described in (1) is subject to a statute of limitations: (a) Which limitations period applies? (b) What causes the limitations period to begin to run? View "U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Thunder Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a Truth in Lending Act (TILA) claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). In this case, plaintiff sought rescission of a mortgage loan under TILA, claiming that the lender provided him with defective notice of the right to cancel when the loan was signed.The panel held that FIRREA's administrative exhaustion requirement applied, and plaintiff had a claim under FIRREA because his cause of action gave right to an equitable remedy of rescission and was susceptible of resolution by FIRREA's claims process. The panel agreed with the Fourth Circuit and concluded that there was no requirement that the loan have passed through an FDIC receivership. The panel also held that plaintiff's claim related to an act or omission, the lender failed to comply with TILA, and the FDIC was appointed as receiver.However, the panel held that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the FDIC because his complaint included no allegations that he presented his TILA claim to the FDIC before filing suit. Furthermore, because subject matter jurisdiction was lacking when this action was filed, plaintiff's later communications with the FDIC did not prevent dismissal of his TILA claim. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s request for further discovery. View "Shaw v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

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A consumer suffers a concrete injury in fact when a third-party obtains her credit report for a purpose not authorized by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA); a consumer-plaintiff need allege only that her credit report was obtained for a purpose not authorized by the statute to survive a motion to dismiss; and the defendant has the burden of pleading it obtained the report for an authorized purpose.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim under the FCRA for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The panel held that plaintiff pleaded facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the Bank obtained her credit report for an unauthorized purpose. In this case, she pleaded that she did not have a credit relationship with the Bank of the kind specified in 15 U.S.C. 1681b(a)(3)(A)–(F), the Bank submitted numerous credit report inquires to Experian, and plaintiff put forth factual assertions which negative each permissible purpose for which Capital One could have obtained her credit report and for which she could possibly have personal knowledge. View "Nayab v. Capital One Bank" on Justia Law

Posted in: Banking, Consumer Law
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Chase in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging claims under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). In a prior appeal, the panel held that plaintiff gave proper, timely notice of rescission and vacated the district court's judgment, remanding for further proceedings. On remand. the district court granted summary judgment on a different ground, holding that plaintiff had no right of rescission.The panel held that the district court properly considered defendants' new argument on remand and properly granted summary judgment, because plaintiff obtained the mortgage in order to reacquire a residential property in which his prior ownership interest had been extinguished. Therefore, the right of rescission did not apply. View "Barnes v. Chase Home Finance, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the Bank's motion for a preliminary injunction against arbitration by FINRA. The panel held that the Bank was likely to succeed on the question of whether the Bank or its Corporate Trust Department (CTD) was a municipal securities dealer and therefore subject to compelled arbitration before FINRA under MSRB Rule G-35. The panel held that neither the CTD or the Bank was a "municipal securities dealer" as defined in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Bank of Oklahoma, NA v. Estes" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the HOA in an action brought by the bank after the HOA conducted a foreclosure on residential property. Under Nevada law, HOAs are granted a lien with superpriority status on property governed by the association and the portion of the lien with superpriority status consists of the last nine months of unpaid HOA dues and any unpaid maintenance and nuisance abatement charges.Under Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, the panel held that the bank's tender of nine months of HOA dues ($423) satisfied the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien. The panel also held that the HOA had no good faith basis for believing that the bank's tender was insufficient. The panel held that Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, was no longer controlling and rejected the bank's argument that the Nevada HOA lien statute violated the Due Process Clause, in light of SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon. The panel held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116 et seq. was not facially unconstitutional on the basis of an impermissible opt-in scheme, and the bank received actual notice in this case. Finally, the panel agreed with Nevada precedent that Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116 et seq. was not preempted by the federal mortgage insurance program. View "Bank of America v. Arlington West Twilight Homeowners Assoc." on Justia Law

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If a creditor fails to make required disclosures under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), borrowers are allowed three years from the loan's consummation date to rescind certain loans. However, TILA does not include a statute of limitations outlining when an action to enforce such a rescission must be brought.The Ninth Circuit applied the analogous state law statute of limitations -- Washington's six year contract statute of limitations -- to TILA rescission enforcement claims. The panel held that plaintiff's TILA claim was timely under Washington's statute of limitations. In this case, the cause of action arose in May 2013 when the Bank failed to take any action to wind up the loan within 20 days of receiving plaintiff's notice of rescission. The panel also held that the district court improperly denied plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. View "Hoang v. Bank of America NA" on Justia Law