Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their first amended complaint and the district court's denial of leave to further amend their complaint. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants improperly initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings after plaintiffs failed to comply with the mortgage obligations financing their residence. Because the provisions of the deed of trust foreclosed the pleading of a plausible "show me the note" claim by plaintiffs, the district court appropriately dismissed this claim; the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims premised on the unauthorized appointment of a successor trustee and/or the lack of proof of ownership of the note where these claims lacked legal and factual plausibility; because Arizona law countenances the trustee sale as conducted, plaintiffs failed to allege any plausible claims premised on the PEB Report or the UCC; plaintiffs' constitutional challenges of A.R.S. 33-811(b) were rejected by the court; plaintiffs' fraud and misrepresentation claims were barred by A.R.S. 12-543(3); and denial of leave to amend was within the district court's discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Zadrozny, et al. v. Bank of New York Mellon, et al." on Justia Law

FHFA, the regulator and conservator of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (the Enterprises), issued a "directive" preventing the Enterprises from buying mortgages on properties encumbered by liens made under so-called property-assessed clean energy (PACE) programs. Plaintiffs contended that FHFA was acting as a regulator, and not a conservator. As a regulator, plaintiffs contended that FHFA must issue a regulation to effectuate its order. The court concluded that FHFA's decision to cease purchasing mortgages on PACE-encumbered properties was a lawful exercise of its statutory authority as conservator of the Enterprises. Because the courts have no jurisdiction to review such actions, the court vacated the district court's order and dismissed the case. View "County of Sonoma, et al v. FHFA, et al" on Justia Law

The underlying action was brought in California state court by plaintiff, who sued the Bank, a federally-insured, FDIC-supervised bank, for wrongful termination stemming from her complaints about the Bank's lending practices. At issue on appeal was the construction of 12 U.S.C. 1819(b)(2)(B), a statute that gave the FDIC the right to remove actions from state court to federal court. Here, in the underlying case in state court, the FDIC had neither been sued nor was it a party. The court concluded that Congress granted the FDIC far broader access to the federal courts than was available to ordinary litigants, but that access was not unlimited. Whether the FDIC's access should be broader was a question for Congress, not the court. As drafted, the statute did not authorize removal by the FDIC where it was not a party to the state court action and its role in the litigation was limited to a prospective, would-be intervenor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order remanding the case to state court. View "Allen v. One United Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Wells Fargo under California state law for engaging in unfair business practices by imposing overdraft fees based on a high-to-low posting order and for engaging in fraudulent practices by misleading clients as to the actual posting order used by the bank. The district court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and Wells Fargo subsequently appealed, raising issues of federal preemption. The court concluded that federal law preempted state regulation of the posting order as well as any obligation to make specific, affirmative, disclosures to bank customers. The court held, however, that Federal law did not preempt California consumer law with respect to fraudulent or misleading representations concerning posting. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gutierrez, et al v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that defendant, the servicer of their home loan, violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2605, because it did not respond adequately to three letters in which they challenged the monthly payment due on their loan. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the claim because a servicer must receive a valid "qualified written request" to incur the duty to respond under section 2605, and it determined that the letters were not qualified written requests that triggered the statutory duty. Because plaintiffs' letters to defendant challenged the terms of their loans and requested modification of various loan and mortgage documents, they were not qualified written requests relating to the servicing of plaintiffs' loan. Because section 2605 did not require a servicer to respond to such requests, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' claim and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Medrano, et al v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a realtor, filed suit under the California False Claims Act (CFCA), Cal. Gov't Code 12650-12655, against defendants on behalf of numerous California counties, alleging that defendants made false representations in naming MERS as a beneficiary in recorded mortgage documents in order to avoid paying recorded fees. Defendants moved to dismiss the qui tam action under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in dismissing his claims as jurisdictionally barred, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Bates v. Mortgage Electronic Registration, et al" on Justia Law

As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said, "This case lends credence to the old adage that bad things comes in threes." Plaintiff was a cancer survivor who required experimental leukemia treatment. During his treatment, Plaintiff's identity was stolen by a hospital worker. When Plaintiff attempted to remedy the identity theft, the banks and credit rating agencies were allegedly uncooperative and continued to report the fraudulently opened accounts. In the case of Chase Bank (Chase), the thief's address was tagged as Plaintiff's. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Chase on Plaintiff's false-reporting claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) reversed the judgment as to Chase's alleged violations of the FCRA, as issues of material fact remained on this issue; (2) reversed the district court's dismissal of similar claims against FIA Card Services on statute of limitations grounds; and (3) affirmed the denial of Plaintiff's motion to amend to reinstate his claims under California law. View "Drew v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

After Lender failed to respond to Plaintiff's correspondence regarding ownership of his loan, Lender foreclosed on Borrower's property. Plaintiff filed suit against all the actors involved (Defendants), alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) , seeking injunctive relief against foreclosure, and claiming breach of contract, failure to act in good faith, and wrongful foreclosure under Nevada law. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's Nevada law claims with prejudice. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint claiming a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court dismissed the amended complaint without leave to amend. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's TILA and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, as Lender was not legally required to respond to Plaintiff's correspondence in its capacity as loan servicer; and (2) vacated the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's state law claims regarding the foreclosure of Plaintiff's property and remanded those remaining claims to the district court. View "Gale v. First Franklin Loan Servs." on Justia Law

This case required the court to determine whether a mortgage company violated Hawaii state law when it did not publicly announce the postponement of a foreclosure sale of property owned by appellant, and if so, to ascertain the proper remedy for that violation. The court held that the lack of public announcement did violate Hawaii's nonjudicial foreclosure statute, and this defect was a deceptive practice under state law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's avoidance of the foreclosure sale. However, the court remanded to the bankruptcy court for a proper calculation of attorney's fees and damages under Hawaii Revised Statute 480-13.

Plaintiffs, a group of investors defrauded by the "Millennium Ponzi scheme," sought recourse against JPMorgan, alleging that WaMu aided and abetted the Ponzi scheme by providing banking services to several companies controlled by the scheme's principals despite actual knowledge of the fraud. JPMorgan, they argued, was liable as successor in interest of WaMu and was liable because it continued WaMu's problematic processes following assumption. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' complaints for failure to exhaust the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183. The court concluded that litigants could not avoid FIRREA's administrative requirements through strategic pleading. Accordingly, the court concluded that a claim asserted against a purchasing bank based on the conduct of a failed bank must be exhausted under FIRREA. Claims based on a purchasing bank's post-purchase actions are not governed by FIRREA. They could not, and accordingly need not, be exhausted before the FDIC. Although the court agreed with plaintiffs' legal argument on this score, the court concluded that it had no application to the case at bar. Plaintiffs did not adequately plead a claim based on JPMorgan's independent conduct; they relied instead solely on conclusory allegations. Therefore, the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims, along with its subsequent denial of plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion was proper.