Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mano appealed the district court's holding, under 11 U.S.C. 550, that Mano was the initial transferee of $311,065.25 paid by debtor in connection with the sale of a six-acre shopping plaza in Raymondville, Texas. Applying the proper standard in the In re Incomnet dominion test, the court concluded that the district court did not err in determining that Mano was the initial transferee of the disputed funds and in declining to address Mano's alternative argument because it was waived. The court held that In re Presidential is no longer good law in this Circuit insofar as it conflicts with the pure dominion test articulated in In re Incomnet. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "MANO-Y&M, Ltd. v. Field" on Justia Law

Mortgages Ltd. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and ML Manager subsequently managed and operated the loans left in Mortgages Ltd.'s portfolio. After confirmation of the plan, Rev Op Group, a group of pass-through investors, moved for an order in the bankruptcy court ruling that ML Manager could not act as agent for their interests, and that objecting investors like Rev Op Group should not be obligated to pay any share of the exit financing loan. The bankruptcy court rejected these arguments in its Clarification Order and Rev Op Group appealed. ML Manager subsequently filed a notice of its intent to distribute proceeds according to an allocation model and a motion to approve distributions. Rev Op Group objected, but the bankruptcy court issued a Distribution Order overruling the objections and granting ML Manager's motion to approve the distributions. The district court affirmed both orders and Rev Op Group appealed. The court concluded, pursuant to In re Roberts Farms, that Rev Op Group's appeals are moot because it never moved to stay the appealed orders before the bankruptcy court or district courts. Even if the court were to extend its analysis beyond Roberts Farms, Rev Op Group would still not prevail. Any relief the court granted to Rev Op Group would require overturning previous distributions and allocations to third parties not before this court. Further, Rev Op Group's appeals must be dismissed under the four considerations from In re Thorpe Insulation Co. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeals. View "In the Matter of: Mortgages Ltd." on Justia Law

Mortgages Ltd. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and ML Manager subsequently managed and operated the loans left in Mortgages Ltd.'s portfolio. After the bankruptcy court confirmed the bankruptcy plan, ML Manager sought to sell some of the loans in Mortgages Ltd.'s portfolio. Rev Op Group, pass-through investors, objected to the sales. The bankruptcy court ruled that Rev Op Group's denials of allegations in ML Manager's complaint were implausible and held that Rev Op Group investors had executed the agency agreement at issue with ML Manager. The bankruptcy court denied Rev Op Group's motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that ML Manager had an agency coupled with an interest and that ML Manager was properly assigned the agency agreements at issue. ML Manager subsequently moved to sell two other properties and the bankruptcy court overruled Rev Op Group's objections, approving the property sales. Rev Op Group appealed and the district court affirmed. The court concluded that the Declaratory Judgment is not equitably moot where Rev Op Group diligently pursued its rights by seeking a stay of the Declaratory Judgment Order, even though it was unable to obtain the stay. Modification of the order would not inequitably affect innocent third parties although substantial consummation of the bankruptcy plan has occurred. The court also concluded that both the bankruptcy and district court erred by effectively resolving factual allegations in Rev Op Group's denials on the merits, instead of reviewing them for legal sufficiency. Accordingly, absent bad faith, the court reversed the bankruptcy court's determination in its Declaratory Judgment that each member of the Rev Op Group had executed the agency agreements, and was to be bound to those agreements. View "In the Matter of: Mortgages Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a qui tam action against their bankruptcy trustee and others under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, alleging that the trustee presented fraudulent claims to the bankruptcy court in order to obtain payment of the $60 trustee's fee. The court held that the deposition of the trustee's realtor, James Grace, constitutes a public disclosure as to plaintiffs where plaintiffs were outsiders to the administrative investigation conducted by the Trustee's Office, which was entirely independent of plaintiffs' own investigation. Subject matter jurisdiction did not exist because plaintiffs were not the original source of the information under section 3730(e)(4)(B). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "Malhotra v. Steinberg" on Justia Law

Debtors, William M. "Trip" Hawkins - the cofounder of EA and his wife, filed a declaratory action against the IRS and the FTB seeking a determination that their unpaid taxes were covered by the bankruptcy plan discharge. The IRS and FTB counterclaimed, alleging that the tax debts were excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(1)(c). The district court and the bankruptcy court held that specific intent to evade taxes was not required in order to except a tax debt from discharge under section 523(a)(1)(C) and the courts relied in large part on debtors' spending beyond their income as the basis for denying tax debt discharge. The court held that the denial of discharge for willfully attempting, in any manner to evade or defeat a tax debt requires that the acts be taken with the specific intent to evade the tax. In this case, neither the district court nor the bankruptcy court had the benefit of the court's holding and therefore, the court vacated and remanded for the courts to reanalyze the case using a specific intent standard.View "Hawkins v. FTB" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from debtor's listing of a $575 payday loan from CIC. Debtor filed a motion for sanctions in the Bankruptcy Court, alleging that CIC willfully violated the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. 362, and seeking a return of the funds and overdraft fees, emotional distress and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. On appeal, CIC challenged the district court's emotional distress and punitive damages awards, and debtor cross-appealed the attorneys' fees and sanctions rulings. The court concluded that the district court did not err in confirming the emotional distress award where debtor suffered significant and emotional distress as a result of CIC's actions in cashing the check and in continuing to call her post-petition. The award of punitive damages was not an abuse of discretion where the bankruptcy court reasonably concluded that CIC demonstrated reckless and callous disregard for the law. The court held that a bankruptcy petitioner, such as debtor, could collect attorneys' fees incurred litigating the violation of an automatic stay after the violator sends an e-mail conditionally offering partial reimbursement under section 362(k)(1) where the bankruptcy laws do not permit a stay violator to undermine the remedies available under section 362(k) by forcing a bankruptcy petitioner to accept a conditional offer in lieu of pursuing fair compensation and attorney's fees. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying sanctions under its inherent authority when it declined to find that CIC acted in bad faith. View "In re: Snowden" on Justia Law

The Debtors were account holders at Wells Fargo. When Wells Fargo discovered that the Debtors had filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, it placed a “temporary administrative pledge” on their accounts and requested instructions from the Chapter 7 trustee regarding the distribution of account funds, a portion of which the Debtors claimed as exempt under Nevada Revised Statutes 21.090(1)(g). The Debtors brought an adversary proceeding, which the bankruptcy court dismissed. The district court affirmed, holding that they did not state a claim for a willful violation of 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(3), which prohibits “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.” Before the account funds revested in the Debtors, they remained estate property, and the Debtors had no right to possess or control them. The administrative pledge could cause the Debtors no injury before the account funds revested. After the account funds revested in the Debtors, they lost their status as estate property and thus were no longer subject to section 362(a)(3). View "In re: Mwangi" on Justia Law

In this fraudulent conveyance action, Linda Mastro, a nonclaimant to the bankruptcy estate, appealed the district court's judgment. The court held that the bankruptcy court had authority to enter judgment based on the parties' consent. However, the court concluded that the district court erred as a matter of law when it determined that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine applied to Linda's civil bankruptcy appeal; the district court's dismissal of Linda's civil bankruptcy appeal was based solely on Linda's blatant disregard for the authority of the judicial system; but disregard for the authority of a different court does not constitute a "necessity" capable of justifying the rule of disentitlement in these circumstances; the court declined to consider the merits of Linda's appeal in the first instance where the district court dismissed the bankruptcy appeal without reaching the merits; and therefore, the court reversed and remanded with instructions.View "Mastro v. Rigby, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs commenced this action against their attorney and his law firm in state court for legal malpractice, alleging that the attorney was negligent in the performance of his duties as counsel to the unsecured creditors' committee. At issue was whether the bankruptcy court properly exercised jurisdiction over the malpractice action for the committee and correctly dismissed the claim. The court concluded that the district court properly concluded that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the removed legal malpractice action because it was a core proceeding. In this case, the employment of the attorney was approved by the bankruptcy court and was governed by 11 U.S.C. 1103; the attorney's duties pertained solely to the administration of the bankruptcy estate; and the claim asserted by plaintiffs was based solely on acts that occurred in the administration of the estate. The court also concluded that the district court correctly concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err in dismissing the complaint because the attorney did not owe an individual duty of care. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case on the merits. View "Schultze, et al. v. Chandler, Sr., et al." on Justia Law

The Diaz Defendants challenged the bankruptcy court's and district court's orders invalidating the transfer to them of a Mexican coastal villa owned by debtors and requiring them to convey the property to Kismet for the benefit of debtors' bankruptcy estate. The court concluded that, notwithstanding the local action doctrine, 28 U.S.C. 1334(e) granted the bankruptcy court exclusive in rem jurisdiction over the Villa interest; given the court's ruling that H&G was debtors' alter ego and its substantive consolidation of H&G with the bankruptcy estate, the Villa interest was property of the estate as of the petition date; the bankruptcy court properly declined to honor the forum selection clauses in the Mexican contracts and declined to abstain from ordering recovery of the property based on international comity; Mexico was not a necessary party and the bankruptcy court could enter judgment without Mexico; the bankruptcy court properly applied U.S. law rather than Mexican law; and the bankruptcy properly found that Martha Barba de la Torre purchased the property in bad faith. Accordingly, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment with respect to the postpetition transfer action; the fraudulent conveyance action is moot as a result; and the district court granted Kismet's and the Diaz Defendants' requests for judicial notice. View "In re: Icenhower" on Justia Law