Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Iron Triangle, LLC significantly increased its presence in the Malheur National Forest after winning a 2013 competitive bidding process by the U.S. Forest Service, securing an exclusive ten-year stewardship contract and right of first refusal on 70% of federal timberland. Iron Triangle also regularly won bids for the remaining 30% of timber sales. In 2020, it entered a contract with Malheur Lumber Company to supply pine sawlogs and provide logging services. Plaintiffs—loggers, landowners, and a competing sawmill—claimed that Iron Triangle and other defendants used anticompetitive tactics to monopolize and restrain trade across four related product markets in the region.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the antitrust claims with prejudice, finding that plaintiffs failed to allege monopoly power, anticompetitive conduct, or antitrust injury in any of the identified markets. The court also held that federal regulations governing government contracting and timber sales precluded findings of monopoly power. Plaintiffs amended their complaint twice, but each time, the district court found the allegations insufficient and eventually denied further leave to amend.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. While disagreeing that federal regulations categorically preclude monopoly power, the appellate court held that plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead monopoly or monopsony power, anticompetitive conduct, or antitrust injury in any market. The court also found plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege an illegal tying arrangement under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, as logging services and sawlogs were not distinct products and there was no coercion. The Ninth Circuit further affirmed denial of leave to amend, concluding additional amendments would be futile. View "MALHEUR FOREST FAIRNESS COALITION V. IRON TRIANGLE, LLC" on Justia Law

Seagate Technology LLC, a California-based manufacturer of hard disk drives, and two of its foreign subsidiaries (in Thailand and Singapore) brought antitrust claims against NHK Spring Co., Ltd., a Japanese supplier of suspension assemblies—critical hard drive components. NHK pleaded guilty in a separate federal criminal proceeding to conspiring with competitors to fix the prices of these suspension assemblies, which were sold both in the United States and abroad. The majority of the price-fixed assemblies purchased by Seagate’s foreign entities occurred outside the United States, with only finished hard drives being imported into the country.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California initially found that the Sherman Act did not apply to Seagate’s claims related to suspension assemblies purchased abroad, ruling that these were “wholly foreign transactions” outside the reach of U.S. antitrust law. The court also determined that the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) import commerce exclusion did not apply since the assemblies themselves were not directly imported into the United States, and that Seagate could not show the necessary domestic effect giving rise to its foreign injury. The district court granted NHK’s motion for partial summary judgment in full and denied Seagate leave to amend its complaint for indirect purchaser claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment order. The appellate court held that while the import commerce exclusion did not apply, Seagate alleged a viable theory under the FTAIA’s domestic effects exception: NHK’s price-fixing in the United States led to higher prices domestically, which then directly caused Seagate’s foreign entities to pay inflated prices abroad. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to determine whether Seagate had presented sufficient evidence of proximate cause to survive summary judgment. View "SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY LLC V. NHK SPRING CO., LTD." on Justia Law

AliveCor, a medical-technology company, developed a software feature called SmartRhythm to detect atrial fibrillation (Afib) using the Apple Watch. SmartRhythm depended on heart rate data generated by Apple’s original Workout Mode algorithm, known as HRPO. In 2018, Apple updated its Watch operating system and replaced HRPO with a new algorithm, HRNN, which improved exercise monitoring. Apple shared HRNN data with third-party developers but stopped sharing HRPO data, making SmartRhythm ineffective and leading AliveCor to discontinue the feature. Around the same time, Apple launched its own heart rhythm analysis feature, Irregular Rhythm Notification (IRN), using a different algorithm and shared that data as well. AliveCor alleged that Apple’s conduct intentionally disabled competing software features, thereby monopolizing the market for heart rhythm analysis apps on the Apple Watch.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment for Apple, finding that Apple’s changes constituted a lawful product improvement under Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Group LP. The court held that the update to the Workout Mode was a genuine product improvement and that the associated incompatibility with SmartRhythm was not separate anticompetitive conduct.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment, but on different grounds. The Ninth Circuit held that Apple’s refusal to continue sharing HRPO data with third-party developers constituted a “refusal to deal,” which under antitrust law does not impose a duty to share with competitors unless specific exceptions apply. The court found that AliveCor had not shown that an exception, such as the Aspen Skiing exception or the essential-facilities doctrine, applied. Therefore, AliveCor’s Section 2 Sherman Act claims failed as a matter of law, and summary judgment for Apple was affirmed. View "ALIVECOR, INC. V. APPLE INC." on Justia Law

A Christian ministry in Washington State, organized as a private nonprofit, operates various social service programs such as shelters, health clinics, and meal services, with a central mission to spread the Gospel. The organization requires all employees to adhere to its religious beliefs and practices, including those regarding marriage and sexuality. When hiring for non-ministerial positions (such as IT technician and operations assistant), it screens applicants for agreement with its religious tenets and only hires co-religionists. Anticipating the need to fill numerous non-ministerial roles, the ministry faced applicants who disagreed with its faith-based requirements.After the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Woods v. Seattle’s Union Gospel Mission, which interpreted the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) exemption for religious organizations as limited to ministerial positions, the ministry filed a pre-enforcement federal action against the Washington State Attorney General and Human Rights Commission. The Eastern District of Washington initially dismissed the case for lack of standing, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding the ministry had standing. On remand, the district court granted a preliminary injunction, holding the ministry was likely to succeed on its First Amendment claim and enjoining the State from enforcing WLAD against it for hiring only co-religionists in non-ministerial positions. The State appealed.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction. The court held that the church autonomy doctrine, rooted in the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, protects religious organizations’ decisions to hire co-religionists for non-ministerial roles when those decisions are based on sincerely held religious beliefs. The holding does not extend to discrimination on other grounds and is limited to religious organizations. The Ninth Circuit found all preliminary injunction factors favored the ministry and affirmed the injunction. View "UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WASHINGTON V. BROWN" on Justia Law

Joneca Company, LLC, and InSinkErator, LLC, are direct competitors in the garbage disposal market. InSinkErator alleged that Joneca marketed its disposals using horsepower designations that misrepresented the actual output power of the motors, thereby misleading consumers. InSinkErator claimed that industry and consumer standards understood horsepower to refer to the motor’s mechanical output, not merely the electrical input, and that Joneca’s advertising was causing it to lose sales and goodwill. InSinkErator tested Joneca’s products and found the output horsepower to be substantially less than advertised, prompting it to seek injunctive relief.The United States District Court for the Central District of California reviewed these allegations in the context of a motion for a preliminary injunction. After considering expert declarations and industry standards, the district court found that Joneca’s horsepower claims were literally false by necessary implication, as consumers would interpret horsepower designations as referring to output. The court also found that these claims were material to consumer purchasing decisions and that InSinkErator was likely to suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction. As a result, the court ordered Joneca to place disclaimers on its packaging and sales materials and required InSinkErator to post a $500,000 bond. Joneca appealed, challenging the district court’s findings on falsity, materiality, irreparable harm, balancing of hardships, and public interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that InSinkErator was likely to succeed on the merits of its Lanham Act false advertising claim, that Joneca’s horsepower claims were materially misleading, and that InSinkErator faced irreparable harm. The Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s balancing of equities, bond requirement, or determination that the injunction served the public interest. View "INSINKERATOR, LLC V. JONECA COMPANY, LLC" on Justia Law

Epic Games, a developer and operator of the Epic Games Store, sued Apple over its App Store practices, alleging violations of federal and California competition law. The dispute centered on Apple’s rules requiring developers to use Apple’s in-app payment system, which imposed a 30% commission, and its prohibition of developers directing users to other purchasing options outside the App Store. After a bench trial, the district court found Apple’s anti-steering provisions violated California’s Unfair Competition Law by preventing informed consumer choice but upheld Apple’s in-app payment system requirement for digital goods. The court issued an injunction barring Apple from restricting developers from including in their apps buttons, links, or other calls to action that direct users to alternative purchasing mechanisms.Following the injunction, Apple implemented a compliance plan involving a 27% commission on linked-out purchases and a series of restrictions on how developers could present external payment options, including limitations on button design, link placement, and user flow. Epic contested Apple’s compliance, arguing these measures still effectively prohibited alternative purchases. After holding multiple evidentiary hearings, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California found Apple in civil contempt for failing to comply with the injunction, citing Apple’s bad faith and pretextual justifications. The district court imposed broad sanctions, including prohibiting any commission on linked-out purchases, restricting Apple’s ability to limit external links, and referring Apple for criminal investigation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s contempt findings and most of the resulting sanctions but found portions of the sanctions—particularly the blanket ban on commissions—overbroad and more punitive than coercive. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded those parts for further tailoring, clarified the scope of permissible developer link prominence, and declined to vacate the injunction or reassign the case. The court otherwise affirmed the district court’s orders. View "EPIC GAMES, INC. V. APPLE INC." on Justia Law

Bloom Energy, a company specializing in fuel-cell servers, entered into Managed Services Agreements (MSAs), which are sale-leaseback arrangements involving banks and customers. The company initially classified these MSAs as operating leases, based on its assessment that the lease terms were less than 75% of the servers’ estimated useful lives and that the servers were not “integral equipment.” This classification affected how Bloom Energy reported revenue and liabilities in its financial statements. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC) was engaged to audit Bloom Energy’s 2016 and 2017 financial statements, which were prepared by Bloom Energy’s management, and PwC issued an audit opinion stating that the financial statements were fairly presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.After Bloom Energy went public in 2018, it later restated its financial statements, reclassifying certain MSAs as capital leases following a review prompted by PwC’s identification of an accounting issue. This restatement led to a significant drop in Bloom Energy’s stock price. Plaintiffs, consisting of shareholders, filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against Bloom Energy, its officers, directors, underwriters, and later added PwC as a defendant. They alleged violations of § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, claiming that PwC was liable for material misstatements in the registration statement due to its audit opinion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against PwC. The Ninth Circuit held that under § 11, an independent accountant is not strictly liable for information in a registration statement or financial statements merely because it certified them. PwC’s audit opinion was a statement of subjective judgment, protected as an opinion under Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund, and did not contain actionable misstatements or omissions. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against PwC. View "HUNT V. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP" on Justia Law

After the Washington Medical Commission adopted a policy to discipline physicians for spreading COVID-19 “misinformation,” several plaintiffs—including physicians who had been charged with unprofessional conduct, physicians who had not been charged, and advocacy organizations—filed suit. The Commission’s actions included investigating and charging doctors for public statements and writings about COVID-19 treatments and vaccines. Some plaintiffs, such as Dr. Eggleston and Dr. Siler, were actively facing disciplinary proceedings, while others, like Dr. Moynihan, had not been charged but claimed their speech was chilled. Additional plaintiffs included a non-profit organization and a public figure who alleged their right to receive information was affected.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington dismissed the plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. The court found that the claims were constitutionally and prudentially unripe, and that the doctrine of Younger abstention required federal courts to refrain from interfering with ongoing state disciplinary proceedings. The district court also addressed the merits, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible First Amendment or due process claim, but the primary basis for dismissal was abstention and ripeness.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Younger abstention barred claims challenging ongoing state disciplinary proceedings (including as-applied and facial constitutional challenges, and due process claims) for all plaintiffs subject to such proceedings. The court also held that Younger abstention did not apply to claims for prospective relief by plaintiffs not currently subject to proceedings, but those claims were constitutionally and prudentially unripe because no concrete injury had occurred and further factual development was needed. The Ninth Circuit thus affirmed the dismissal of all claims. View "STOCKTON V. BROWN" on Justia Law

A group of former executives from an investment management company were prosecuted after the company collapsed and was placed in receivership. The company, which raised hundreds of millions of dollars from private investors, primarily through promissory notes and other investment vehicles, experienced severe financial distress following the default of a major asset. Despite this, the executives continued to solicit investments, representing to investors that their funds would be used to purchase secure receivables and that the company was financially healthy. In reality, most new investor funds were used to pay prior investors and cover operating expenses. The executives were accused of making material misrepresentations and misleading half-truths about the use of investor funds, the security of investments, and the company’s financial health.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the trial. The jury found all three defendants guilty of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and multiple counts of wire fraud; one defendant was also convicted of making a false statement on a loan application. The defendants argued that they were improperly convicted on an omissions theory of fraud and that they were prevented from presenting a complete defense based on disclosures in offering documents and financial statements. They also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the materiality of their statements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government’s theory at trial was based on affirmative misrepresentations and misleading half-truths, not mere omissions, and that the jury instructions fairly stated the law. The court found that evidence of what was not disclosed was relevant to materiality, and that disclaimers in offering documents did not render other representations immaterial in a criminal fraud prosecution. The convictions were affirmed. View "USA V. JESENIK" on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated a civil enforcement action against Ongkaruck Sripetch and several other defendants, alleging that they engaged in fraudulent schemes involving at least 20 penny stock companies. The SEC claimed that the defendants obtained over $6 million in illicit proceeds through violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including securities fraud and the sale of unregistered securities. The SEC sought various remedies, including an order requiring the defendants to disgorge all ill-gotten gains.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California presided over the case. Sripetch consented to the entry of judgment, agreeing that the court could order disgorgement and prejudgment interest, and that the complaint’s allegations would be accepted as true for the purposes of the SEC’s motion. The district court ordered Sripetch to disgorge $2,251,923.16 in net profits, plus prejudgment interest. Sripetch appealed, arguing that disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) requires a showing of pecuniary harm to investors, which he claimed the SEC had not demonstrated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s disgorgement order for abuse of discretion. The Ninth Circuit held that the SEC is not required to show that investors suffered pecuniary harm as a precondition to a disgorgement award under § 78u(d)(5) or (d)(7). The court reasoned that disgorgement is a profits-based remedy focused on depriving wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains, not compensating victims for losses. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. SRIPETCH" on Justia Law