Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
HUSAYN V. MITCHELL
Zayn Al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, also known as Abu Zubaydah, was captured in Pakistan in March 2002, suspected of being an Al Qaeda leader. He was transferred to a CIA-operated secret prison where he was subjected to "enhanced interrogation techniques" by James Mitchell and John Jessen, psychologists contracted by the CIA. These techniques included waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and confinement in small boxes, which Zubaydah alleges amounted to torture. He was later transferred to Guantanamo Bay, where he remains detained as an enemy combatant.Zubaydah filed a lawsuit under the Alien Tort Statute seeking damages for the injuries he suffered during his detention and interrogations. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington dismissed the case, citing lack of jurisdiction under the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006, which denies federal courts jurisdiction over certain actions relating to the detention and treatment of enemy combatants by the United States and its agents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the MCA deprived the district court of jurisdiction because Zubaydah's claims related to his detention and treatment by the defendants, who were considered agents of the United States. The court found that the CIA had authorized, controlled, and ratified the defendants' actions, thereby establishing an agency relationship. Consequently, the MCA barred the court from hearing Zubaydah's claims. The decision was affirmed. View "HUSAYN V. MITCHELL" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
COSTAR GROUP, INC. V. COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE EXCHANGE, INC.
CoStar Group, Inc. and CoStar Realty Information, Inc. (collectively, “CoStar”) and Commercial Real Estate Exchange, Inc. (“CREXi”) are online platforms competing in the commercial real estate listing, information, and auction markets. CoStar sued CREXi for copyright infringement, alleging that CREXi listed images and information hosted by CoStar without permission. CREXi counterclaimed on antitrust grounds, asserting that CoStar engaged in monopolistic practices to exclude competition.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed CREXi’s antitrust counterclaims and directed entry of final judgment on those claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The district court held that CREXi failed to show CoStar had monopoly power and that the agreements at issue were not exclusive. CREXi appealed the dismissal of its antitrust counterclaims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal of the antitrust counterclaims. The Ninth Circuit held that CREXi successfully stated claims under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, California’s Cartwright Act, and the Unfair Competition Law. The court found that CREXi plausibly alleged CoStar had monopoly power in the relevant markets and engaged in anticompetitive conduct by entering into de facto exclusive deals with brokers and imposing technological barriers to entry. The court concluded that a monopolist using its power to exclude competitors and maintain monopoly power violates § 2 of the Sherman Act, and using exclusive deals to do so violates § 1 of the Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act. The court also held that CREXi stated claims under the “unfair” and “unlawful” prongs of the Unfair Competition Law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of CREXi’s tortious interference claims as they were improperly raised. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "COSTAR GROUP, INC. V. COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE EXCHANGE, INC." on Justia Law
Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admissions v. United States
A public benefit corporation, Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admissions (LFRA), challenged local rules of federal district courts in the Ninth Circuit. These rules require attorneys seeking general admission to be members in good standing of the bar of the state where the district court is located. LFRA argued that these rules prevent its members, who are barred in states outside the Ninth Circuit and do not wish to join another state bar, from seeking general admission to these federal district courts.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed LFRA’s amended complaint with prejudice. The court found that LFRA had standing to bring claims on behalf of its members, except for the Sixth Amendment claim, which lacked standing. The court dismissed the remaining claims for failure to state a claim, concluding that the Admission Rules did not violate constitutional, statutory, or procedural grounds as alleged by LFRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice. The Ninth Circuit held that the Admission Rules are constitutional and do not violate separation of powers, federalism principles, the Privileges and Immunities Clauses, the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, the Full Faith and Credit Act, the Rules Enabling Act, or procedural due process. The court also found that Rules 1 and 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create a private right of action. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the amended complaint without leave to amend, as the complaint could not be saved by amendment. The court also upheld the denial of LFRA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as procedurally premature. View "Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admissions v. United States" on Justia Law
Spencer v. Milan
Edward B. Spencer, an indigent and incarcerated individual, filed multiple lawsuits against various California prison officials. He initially proceeded in forma pauperis (IFP) in each case. Spencer had previously filed numerous lawsuits while incarcerated, and he conceded that two of those actions resulted in strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). However, he disputed whether two other actions, which he voluntarily dismissed, should count as strikes.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California revoked Spencer's IFP status in four cases, finding that he had four strikes, including the two voluntary dismissals. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations, which concluded that the voluntary dismissals counted as strikes under the PLRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's revocation of Spencer's IFP status. The Ninth Circuit held that voluntary dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) do not constitute strikes under the PLRA. The court reasoned that the "on the grounds that" clause in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) requires grounds to be decided by a court, and voluntary dismissals do not have grounds decided by a court. Therefore, Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissals cannot count as strikes because they are never "on the grounds that" the case was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's revocation of Spencer's IFP status in each of the four cases on appeal and remanded for further proceedings. The court did not address any other issues urged by the parties. View "Spencer v. Milan" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights
Mooney v. Roller Bearing Company of America
Richard Mooney sued his former employer, Roller Bearing Company of America (RBC), alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Washington Family and Medical Leave Act (WFMLA). Mooney claimed his termination was due to his age, depression, and decision to take leave under the FMLA, while RBC argued it was due to a reduction in force in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Mooney filed the lawsuit in King County Superior Court, and RBC removed the case to federal court under federal question and diversity jurisdiction. The jury found RBC liable and awarded Mooney $160,000 in damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington calculated prejudgment interest based on a fluctuating federal rate. Mooney appealed, arguing that the higher state rate should have applied. The district court concluded it had discretion to select the appropriate rate and chose the federal rate, finding it the most accurate way to compensate Mooney for the lost use of his wages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that when a judgment is based equally on both state and federal claims, the district court has discretion to select a proper prejudgment interest rate. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the fluctuating federal rate was appropriate given the circumstances, including Mooney's litigation strategy and the combined nature of the state and federal claims. The court found no error in the district court's application of the federal rate and affirmed the judgment. View "Mooney v. Roller Bearing Company of America" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law
YELP INC. V. PAXTON
Yelp, a company that publishes consumer reviews, introduced a notification on its business pages for crisis pregnancy centers (CPCs) in 2022, stating that these centers typically offer limited medical services. After objections from several state Attorneys General, including Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, Yelp replaced the notice with one stating that CPCs do not offer abortions or abortion referrals. Despite this change, Paxton initiated an investigation and sent Yelp a notice of intent to file suit, alleging that the original notice violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices – Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). Yelp then filed a lawsuit in federal court, claiming First Amendment retaliation, and sought to enjoin Paxton from further action. The next day, Paxton filed a state court action against Yelp.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Yelp’s federal case based on the Younger abstention doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering with ongoing state judicial proceedings. The district court found that the requirements for Younger abstention were met and that the bad faith exception did not apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Younger’s bad faith exception did not apply because Yelp had not sufficiently established that the Texas civil enforcement action was brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid judgment or was facially meritless. The court also found that Yelp failed to show that Paxton’s enforcement action was motivated by a desire to harass or retaliate against Yelp for its support of abortion rights. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Yelp’s request for discovery and an evidentiary hearing. View "YELP INC. V. PAXTON" on Justia Law
MIROTH V. COUNTY OF TRINITY
County officials in Trinity County, California, obtained warrants to take Patricia and Stanley Miroth's children into protective custody, leading to the termination of their parental rights by a state court. The Miroths alleged that the officials failed to provide required social services and committed fraud in the state child custody proceedings, which led to the termination of their parental rights. After unsuccessful appeals in state court, the Miroths filed a federal lawsuit seeking money damages for these alleged wrongs.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed the federal claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. The district court found that the Miroths were essentially seeking relief from the state court judgments and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because the Miroths' claims did not seek relief from or reversal of the state court's order. Instead, they sought money damages for alleged legal wrongs by adverse parties that preceded the state court's order. The court emphasized that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is limited to cases where the federal plaintiff asserts injury caused by a state court judgment and seeks relief from that judgment. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings. View "MIROTH V. COUNTY OF TRINITY" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Family Law
FALLON V. DUDEK
The plaintiff, Mya Noelia Fallon, applied for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under the Social Security Act, citing epileptic seizures and cognitive and behavioral limitations. Her application included assessments from her neurologist, Dr. Joseph Drazkowski, and licensed professional counselor (LPC) Terry Galler, who noted significant cognitive impairments and anxiety disorders. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Fallon not disabled, giving minimal weight to the opinions of Dr. Drazkowski and LPC Galler, and discrediting other medical and lay testimony.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona partially reversed the ALJ's decision, finding errors in the discounting of some witnesses but agreeing with the ALJ's assessment of Dr. Drazkowski's and LPC Galler's opinions. The case was remanded for further consideration. On remand, the ALJ again found Fallon not disabled, incorporating the prior evaluations. Fallon appealed, and the district court affirmed the ALJ's decision, refusing to revisit its prior conclusions about the medical opinions based on the law-of-the-case doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies in the social security context, meaning that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to reconsider the evaluations of Dr. Drazkowski and LPC Galler. The court explained that a social-security applicant has two options to preserve the right to appeal: immediately appeal the remand order or proceed on remand, understanding that the district court may decline to revisit settled issues. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, noting that Fallon forfeited her ability to challenge the evaluations by not raising the issue in her first appeal. View "FALLON V. DUDEK" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Public Benefits
TESLA MOTORS V. BALAN
Cristina Balan, an automotive design engineer, filed a defamation lawsuit against Tesla, Inc. and Elon Musk, alleging that Tesla made defamatory statements about her, including accusations of theft, after an article about her was published in the Huffington Post. Tesla moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement in Balan's employment contract. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington partially granted Tesla's motion, compelling arbitration for part of the defamation claim. Balan then amended her arbitration demand to include a defamation claim against Musk.The Western District of Washington initially denied Tesla's motion to compel arbitration in part, but the Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, ruling that the entire defamation claim was subject to arbitration. Consequently, the district court dismissed the case. The arbitrator applied California law and dismissed Balan's defamation claims against Tesla and Musk based on the statute of limitations, issuing an award in favor of Tesla and Musk.Tesla and Musk petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to confirm the arbitration award. The district court granted the petition, confirming the award. Balan appealed, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award. The Ninth Circuit cited the Supreme Court's decision in Badgerow v. Walters, which prohibits looking past the face of a petition under 9 U.S.C. § 9 to establish jurisdiction. Since Tesla's petition to confirm a zero-dollar award did not meet the amount in controversy requirement, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "TESLA MOTORS V. BALAN" on Justia Law
AirDoctor, LLC v. Xiamen Qichuang Trade Co., Ltd
Plaintiff AirDoctor, LLC, sells air purifiers and replacement air filters, while Defendant Xiamen Qichuang Trade Co., Ltd., sells replacement air filters primarily through Amazon.com. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant falsely advertised its air filters as compatible with Plaintiff’s air purifiers and offering equivalent filtration, which diverted sales from Plaintiff and harmed its reputation. Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging violations of the Lanham Act, California’s Unfair Competition Law, and California’s False Advertising Law, seeking various forms of relief, including actual damages to be determined at trial, attorney’s fees, and an injunction.The United States District Court for the Central District of California entered default judgment in favor of Plaintiff after Defendant failed to appear or respond. However, the district court denied Plaintiff’s request for actual damages, reasoning that awarding damages would exceed what was demanded in the pleadings under Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as the Complaint did not specify an amount of damages sought. The district court also denied attorney’s fees based on its local rules, which tied fees to the amount of damages awarded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Rule 54(c) does not prohibit awarding actual damages in a default judgment when the pleadings sought such damages in an amount to be determined at trial. The court referenced its decision in Henry v. Sneiders, which allowed for damages to be awarded even if the exact amount was not specified in the complaint. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of damages and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "AirDoctor, LLC v. Xiamen Qichuang Trade Co., Ltd" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Consumer Law