Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a practicing attorney, sued a municipal court judge, a prosecutor, and the City of St. Helens, Oregon, in state court. After Defendants removed the case to federal court, Plaintiff moved to remand to state court, claiming that, although his complaint referenced federal law, it was poorly drafted, and he did not intend to bring federal claims. The district court severed and remanded the state-only claims and dismissed the retained claims with prejudice. On appeal, Plaintiff filed an informal pro se brief and argued that he should have been granted leave to amend his complaint to exclude any mention of a federal claim and to seek a remand to state court.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that, although there is a good reason for awarding leeway to pro se parties who presumably are unskilled in the law and more prone to make pleading errors, that logic does not apply to practicing attorneys. The panel determined that his attempt to backtrack seemed aimed at robbing the government of its removal option and ensuring another bite at the apple in state court. The panel held that a sophisticated attorney like Plaintiff should not be allowed to jettison his own complaint when it is beneficial yet avoid the consequences of that renunciation. The panel held that because Plaintiff facially alleged a violation of his federal rights, the district court had federal question jurisdiction. In view of the immunity of the government defendants, the complaint could not be saved by amendment, and therefore the district court’s dismissal without leave to amend was proper. View "JAMES HUFFMAN V. AMY LINDGREN, ET AL" on Justia Law

In early 2020, following the outbreak of COVID-19, Los Angeles County passed the “Resolution of the Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles Further Amending and Restating the Executive Order for an Eviction Moratorium During Existence of a Local Health Emergency Regarding Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19)” (the “Moratorium”). The Moratorium imposed temporary restrictions on certain residential and commercial tenant evictions. It provided tenants with new affirmative defenses to eviction based on nonpayment of rent, prohibited landlords from charging late fees and interest, and imposed civil and criminal penalties to landlords who violate the Moratorium. Id. Section V (July 14, 2021). Plaintiff, a commercial landlord, sued the County, arguing that the Moratorium impaired his lease, in violation of the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court found that Plaintiff had not alleged an injury in fact and dismissed his complaint for lack of standing.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that Plaintiff had standing to bring his Contracts Clause claim. Plaintiff’s injury for Article III purposes did not depend on whether Plaintiff’s tenant provided notice or was otherwise excused from doing so. Those questions went to the merits of the claim rather than Plaintiff’s standing to bring suit. Plaintiff alleged that the moratorium impaired his contract with his tenant because it altered the remedies the parties had agreed to at the time they entered into the lease. The panel held that these allegations were sufficient to plead an injury in fact and to state a claim under the Contracts Clause, and remanded to the district court. View "HOWARD ITEN V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

Two police officers were dispatched to a gym after a man reportedly threatened gym patrons and assaulted a security guard. The suspect then violently attacked the officers and refused to stop after they repeatedly deployed their tasers. One officer eventually resorted to lethal force to end the aggression. Plaintiff, the man’s mother, filed this lawsuit against Defendant and the City of Los Angeles. She claimed a violation of Section 1983 based on the officer’s allegedly unreasonable use of deadly force. She also sought to hold the City liable under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services. Plaintiff further brought wrongful death actions against the officer and the City under California law. The court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims for similar reasons. Defendant appealed.   The Ninth Circuit reversed. The panel held that because Defendant did not challenge the district court’s determination that a reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant violated the man’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, this appeal turned solely on the second step of the qualified immunity analysis. The panel held that Defendant’s use of deadly force, including his failure to give a warning that he would be using such force, did not violate clearly established law given the specific circumstances he encountered. The court wrote that there was no basis to conclude that Defendant’s use of force here was obviously constitutionally excessive. View "PAULETTE SMITH V. EDWARD AGDEPPA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Lead Plaintiff E. Öhman J:or Fonder AB and others (“Plaintiffs”) brought this putative class action on behalf of all persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired common stock of NVIDIA Corporation (“NVIDIA”) during the proposed Class Period. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ first complaint with leave to amend, holding that it failed to plead sufficiently that defendants’ statements were materially false or misleading, and that the statements were made knowingly or recklessly.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that Section 20(a) assigns joint and several liability for any person who controls any person liable under Section 10(b). Because the panel held that the amended complaint did not sufficiently plead a cause of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 against defendants Kress and Fisher, the only alleged primary violation was that committed by NVIDIA through defendant Huang. The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ Section 20(a) claims against Kress and Fisher, vacated the dismissal of the Section 20(a) claims as to Huang, and remanded for further proceedings as to those claims. View "E. OHMAN J:OR FONDER AB, ET AL V. NVIDIA CORPORATION, ET AL" on Justia Law

When Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee and a patient at Patton State Hospital in California, he was twice attacked by a fellow patient. He sued Defendant, the psychiatrist in charge of his unit, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for injuries from the second attack, alleging that Defendant violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel determined that both tests ask whether Defendant’s conduct was reasonable, and both require Alexander to show that Defendant’s conduct was worse than negligent. The panel held that under either test, Plaintiff offered no evidence that Defendant failed to act reasonably, let alone that he was “more than negligent” in not transferring Plaintiff or the other patient after the first attack. Although Plaintiff was attacked a second time, the evidence showed that Defendant’s responses to both incidents were thorough and careful. Accordingly, the panel found no violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. View "SURIE ALEXANDER V. DAU NGUYEN" on Justia Law

Appellants, the Law Offices of Ben C. Martin and the law firm Martin Baughman, PLLC (collectively, BCM), argued that the district court in this multidistrict litigation (MDL), In re Bard IVC Filters Products Liability Litigation, lacked authority to order common benefit fund assessments against the recoveries of claimants who were not involved in cases that were part of the MDL—that is, those with claims that were not filed in any court, or were filed in state court, or were filed in federal court after the MDL closed (collectively, non-MDL cases). After settling their clients’ claims against C.R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. (collectively, Bard), BCM moved to exempt the recoveries of their clients in non-MDL cases from common benefit fund assessments. The district court denied the motion.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The panel held that the district court’s order requiring common benefit fund assessments in the non-MDL cases was within the scope of the district court’s authority. A district court properly exercises its authority to order common benefit fund holdback assessments from claimants’ recoveries in non-MDL cases when (1) counsel for claimants voluntarily consents to the district court’s authority by signing, or otherwise entering into, a participation agreement requiring contributions in exchange for access to common benefit work product, (2) that participation agreement is incorporated into a court order, and (3) as a result of entering the participation agreement, counsel receives access to common benefit work product. The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying claimants’ motion to exempt non-MDL cases from common benefit fund assessments. View "IN RE: LAW OFFICES OF BEN C. MARTIN V. BABBITT & JOHNSON PA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the appointment and removal process for Immigration Judges and members of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). These officials exercise significant authority within our immigration system, making them officers under the Appointments Clause.   The Ninth Circuit denied the petition. The panel rejected Petitioner’s suggestion that Immigration Judges and BIA members are principal officers who, under the Appointments Clause of Article II, must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Rather, the panel concluded that they are inferior officers (whose appointment may be vested in the head of a department) because the Attorney General ultimately directs and supervises their work. Thus, the panel held that the Appointments Clause allows Congress to vest their appointment in the Attorney General. The panel next held that the removal process for Immigration Judges and BIA members satisfies Article II, which requires that officers remain accountable to the President by limiting restrictions on the removal of the President’s subordinates. The panel explained that Attorney General has the power to remove Immigration Judges and BIA members, and that nothing restricts the Attorney General’s ability to remove them. Thus, these officers remain dependent on the Attorney General for their positions—and by extension, on the President. View "FORTUNATO AMADOR DUENAS V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Vitol, Inc.’s motion to dismiss, as untimely under the applicable statute of limitations, a complaint filed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that sought an order affirming the assessment of a civil penalty against Vitol and one of its traders for making unlawful manipulative trades in the California energy market.   The court explained that in measuring the limitations period, the critical question is when FERC’s claim “accrues.” Vitol contended that FERC’s federal district court action was untimely because FERC’s claim accrued as soon as the allegedly unlawful trading occurred. The panel rejected Vitol’s contention and held that FERC’s claim accrued on the date that FERC assessed a civil penalty. The panel reasoned that FERC’s claim arises under 16 U.S.C. Section 823b(d)(3)(B), which gives the agency a cause of action in federal court for “affirming the assessment of the civil penalty,” and that claim does not accrue until FERC has assessed a penalty. The panel also agreed with the district court’s conclusion that FERC’s administrative process for assessing a civil penalty is itself a “proceeding” that is subject to the five-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. Section 2462, and therefore FERC must initiate the proceeding by issuing a notice of proposed penalty within five years of any alleged wrongdoing. View "FERC V. VITOL INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

Columbia Basin College officials terminated R.W. from the nursing program after learning that he had sought medical treatment for homicidal thoughts about three instructors. R.W. filed suit seeking damages, reinstatement in the nursing program, and expungement of his failing grades.   On interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit  (1) affirmed the district court’s order determining that Plaintiff’s suit for injunctive relief against Columbia Basin College officials in their official capacity could proceed under the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; and (2) dismissed in part defendants’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction in plaintiff R.W.’s action alleging First Amendment violations and other claims arising from his termination from a nursing program at Columbia Basin College.   The panel held that R.W.’s complaint alleged an ongoing violation of his constitutional rights given the uncertainty as to whether he could reenroll in the nursing program or qualify for financial aid; his claim for prospective relief was not moot; and the Dean of Student Conduct was a proper defendant because he was directly involved with the alleged constitutional violations and there was a question of fact as to whether he had authority to implement injunctive relief if so ordered.   the panel held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s order declining to reconsider its prior partial summary judgment for R.W. on his 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim for violation of the First Amendment. The merits of R.W.’s First Amendment claim were severable from, and neither necessary to nor necessarily resolved by, the district court’s ruling on the Ex parte Young issue and were reviewable upon entry of final judgment. View "R. W. V. COLUMBIA BASIN COLLEGE, ET AL" on Justia Law

Two putative class actions are at issue in these appeals: Nacarino v. Kashi Co., No. 22-15377, and Brown v. Kellogg Co., No. 22-15658. The complaints were filed in the Northern District of California, and they asserted materially identical state-law consumer protection claims for unfair business practices, unjust enrichment, and fraud. Both complaints alleged that the front labels on several of Defendants’ products are “false and misleading” under state and federal law. At issue is whether food product labels that advertise the amount of protein in the products are false or misleading.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed on different grounds the district court’s dismissal of the two complaints. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that the protein claims on Defendants’ labels were false because the nitrogen method for calculating protein content overstated the actual amount of protein the products contained. The panel held that FDA regulations specifically allow manufacturers to measure protein quantity using the nitrogen method.   The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that the protein claims on Defendants’ labels were misleading because the “amount of digestible or usable protein the Products actually deliver to the human body is even lower” than the actual amount of protein the products contain. The panel held that Defendants’ protein claims could be misleading under FDA regulations if they did not accurately state the quantity of protein or if the products did not display the quality-adjusted percent daily value in the Nutritional Facts Panel. However, Plaintiffs’ complaints did not allege that the challenged protein claims were misleading within the meaning of the federal regulations. View "ELENA NACARINO, ET AL V. KASHI COMPANY" on Justia Law