Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Thomas Eugene Creech, who has been on death row for over four decades for the 1981 murder of fellow inmate David Dale Jensen, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. Creech alleged that the Ada County Prosecutor’s Office introduced fabricated or misleading evidence at his clemency hearing. He sought to recuse U.S. District Judge Amanda K. Brailsford from presiding over his underlying § 1983 suit, arguing that Judge Brailsford and Ada County Prosecutor Jan Bennetts are close friends, which could affect the judge's impartiality.The U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho denied Creech’s motion to preliminarily enjoin his execution, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Creech continued to litigate his § 1983 claim, alleging prosecutorial misconduct. He then moved to disqualify Judge Brailsford, citing her friendship with Bennetts. Judge Brailsford denied the recusal motion, stating that although she and Bennetts were close during their clerkship, they had since lost touch and a reasonable person would not question her impartiality.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Creech’s petition for a writ of mandamus. The court found that the longstanding friendship between Judge Brailsford and Bennetts, combined with the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct involving Bennetts, could lead a reasonable person to question the judge’s impartiality. The court emphasized that public confidence in the judiciary requires that any appearance of bias be addressed promptly. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and remanded the case for reassignment to a different judge. View "Creech v. United States District Court for the District of Idaho, Boise" on Justia Law

A Californian plaintiff purchased several bottles of Banana Boat sunscreen between 2017 and 2020, including Ultra Sport SPF 100, SPF 50, and SPF 30. She later discovered that the SPF 50 bottle contained 0.29 parts per million (ppm) of benzene, a known carcinogen. She alleged that the products were falsely advertised as safe and that the presence of benzene was not disclosed on the labels. The plaintiff claimed she would not have purchased the products, or would have paid less for them, had she known about the benzene contamination.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the plaintiff’s suit for lack of Article III standing, concluding that she did not demonstrate a non-speculative increased health risk or actual economic harm. The court relied on FDA guidelines permitting up to 2 ppm of benzene in sunscreen, determining that the plaintiff’s allegations did not establish that 0.29 ppm of benzene posed a credible risk of harm or economic injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the district court erred by resolving disputed facts in favor of the defendants and prematurely addressing merits issues intertwined with the jurisdictional question of standing. The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff adequately established an injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing, as she alleged economic harm from purchasing a product she would not have bought, or would have paid less for, absent the defendants’ misrepresentations. The court also determined that the plaintiff met the causation and redressability elements of standing, as her injury was likely caused by the defendants' alleged misrepresentations and could be redressed by judicial relief. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "BOWEN V. ENERGIZER HOLDINGS, INC." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jay and Siv Bennett, along with their corporation Kesha Marketing, Inc., were long-time associates of Isagenix International LLC, a multi-level marketing company. In May 2023, Isagenix informed the Bennetts that it would not renew their accounts, which were set to expire in June 2023. The Bennetts, whose sole income came from Isagenix commissions, sued the company and obtained a preliminary injunction to prevent the termination of their business relationship.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted the preliminary injunction, finding that the Bennetts were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The court concluded that the contracts between the Bennetts and Isagenix were likely bilateral and that the modifications allowing Isagenix to terminate the contracts at will were not valid under Arizona law. The district court also found that the Bennetts would suffer irreparable harm due to the contractual limitation on consequential damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the district court that the Bennetts had shown a likelihood of success on the merits. The Ninth Circuit held that the contracts were likely bilateral and that the modifications were not validly executed under Arizona law. However, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court erred in its analysis of irreparable harm. The appellate court held that a contractual limitation on consequential damages does not constitute irreparable harm for purposes of equity. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the Bennetts' other theories of irreparable injury. View "BENNETT V. ISAGENIX INTERNATIONAL LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff alleged that a Montana Probation Officer used excessive force during an encounter in a parking lot. The incident was captured by surveillance footage, which was later auto-deleted. Despite efforts to preserve the footage, the State failed to do so, leading to the plaintiff's motion for sanctions against the State for the loss of evidence.The United States District Court for the District of Montana found that the State acted recklessly in failing to preserve the footage but did not act with gross negligence or willfulness. Invoking its inherent authority, the district court sanctioned the State by instructing the jury that it was established as a matter of law that the officer used excessive force. The jury awarded the plaintiff $75,000 in damages for the excessive-force claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court committed legal error by relying on its inherent authority to impose sanctions. The appellate court determined that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) governs the loss of electronically stored information and the sanctions imposed. Rule 37(e)(2) allows for severe sanctions only if the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information's use in litigation. The district court's findings confirmed that no such intent was present, making the sanctions unlawful.As a result, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's sanctions orders, reversed the verdict and judgment against the probation officer, vacated the award of attorneys' fees to the plaintiff, and remanded the case for a new trial on the excessive-force claim. View "GREGORY V. STATE OF MONTANA" on Justia Law

Three nonprofit organizations challenged two Arizona election law amendments: one allowing the cancellation of a voter’s registration if they move to another county (the “Cancellation Provision”) and another making it a felony to provide a voting mechanism to someone registered in another state (the “Felony Provision”). The plaintiffs argued these laws would jeopardize voting rights in Arizona.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of both provisions, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the laws could harm voters and were likely unconstitutional. The defendants, including the Arizona Attorney General and the Yuma County Republican Committee, appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to challenge the Cancellation Provision because they only alleged a frustrated mission and diverted resources, failing to show direct harm to their core activities. The court emphasized that organizational standing requires more than just a diversion of resources; it requires a direct impact on the organization’s core activities.Regarding the Felony Provision, the court found that the plaintiffs had standing because they faced a realistic possibility of prosecution, which could chill their voter outreach activities. However, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their vagueness challenge. The court interpreted the phrase “mechanism for voting” narrowly, determining it referred only to unlawful acts of voting, not voter outreach or registration.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS V. MAYES" on Justia Law

Gasoline consumers alleged that various oil producers colluded with the U.S. government, including then-President Trump, to negotiate with Russia and Saudi Arabia to cut oil production, limit future oil exploration, and end a price war on oil. Plaintiffs claimed this agreement fixed gas prices in violation of Sherman Act § 1, suppressed competition in violation of Sherman Act § 2, and involved anticompetitive mergers in violation of Clayton Act § 7.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the case, finding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the political question and act of state doctrines. The court also found that Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead an antitrust conspiracy. Additionally, the court dismissed Defendant Energy Transfer for lack of personal jurisdiction and denied Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, as well as requests for additional discovery and oral argument.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the political question doctrine barred judicial review of the President’s foreign policy decisions, as these decisions are committed to the political branches of government. The court also found no judicially manageable standards to resolve the claims under antitrust laws. Additionally, the act of state doctrine barred the claims because they involved evaluating the petroleum policies of foreign nations. The court further held that Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible antitrust conspiracy claim regarding Defendants’ private conduct. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s procedural rulings. View "D'Augusta v. American Petroleum Institute" on Justia Law

Jonathan Corbett, an attorney specializing in civil litigation against the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), submitted two Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to TSA. The first request, made on June 13, 2021, sought incident reports and video footage related to a pat-down search of Kelly Joyner. TSA responded by asking Corbett to complete a "Certification of Identity" form, which he did not do, leading TSA to close the request. The second request, submitted on March 6, 2022, sought records regarding an alleged search of an unnamed client. TSA again asked for the form, which Corbett did not provide, and the request was closed.Corbett filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California after TSA missed its twenty-day deadline to respond to his FOIA requests. TSA issued final responses after the lawsuit was filed, stating that they could neither confirm nor deny the existence of the requested records without the third-party subject’s consent. TSA moved for summary judgment, arguing that Corbett’s claims were moot and that he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not appealing within the agency. The district court granted TSA’s motion, construing it as a motion to dismiss, and held that Corbett should have pursued administrative appeals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that once a FOIA suit is properly initiated based on constructive exhaustion, an agency’s post-lawsuit response does not require dismissal for failure to exhaust. The court emphasized that exhaustion under FOIA is a prudential consideration rather than a jurisdictional one, and district courts have limited discretion to require exhaustion only if an agency shows exceptional circumstances. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "CORBETT V. TSA" on Justia Law

Debbie O'Gorman, facing foreclosure by creditor Grant Reynolds, transferred her property to the Lovering Tubbs Trust for no consideration. This transfer was intended to hinder Reynolds' foreclosure efforts. The Lovering Tubbs Trust and other entities involved in the transfer argued that the Chapter 7 Trustee lacked Article III standing to bring a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 548 because O'Gorman's creditors were not harmed by the transfer.The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment to the Trustee, finding that O'Gorman's transfer was fraudulent under § 548(a)(1)(A). The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirmed this decision, noting that the Trustee had established a prima facie case of fraudulent transfer and that the appellants failed to present any admissible evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BAP's decision. The court held that the Trustee had Article III standing because the transfer depleted the estate's assets, causing an injury-in-fact that was redressable by the avoidance sought. The court also clarified that actual harm to creditors is not an element of a fraudulent transfer claim under § 548. The court found that the bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment, as the Trustee provided direct and circumstantial evidence of O'Gorman's fraudulent intent, and the appellants failed to present any evidence to dispute this.The Ninth Circuit also upheld the bankruptcy court's denial of the appellants' request for a continuance to conduct discovery, noting that the appellants did not comply with the requirements of Rule 56(d) by failing to submit an affidavit or declaration specifying the facts they hoped to elicit through further discovery. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. View "IN RE: THE LOVERING TUBBS TRUST V. HOFFMAN" on Justia Law

Raizel Blumberger filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Ian Tilley, alleging that he failed to provide proper medical care during childbirth, resulting in her injuries. Dr. Tilley was an employee of Eisner Pediatric and Family Medical Services, a federally funded health center deemed a Public Health Service (PHS) employee for 2018. The Attorney General appeared in state court, stating that Dr. Tilley's status was under consideration. A year later, the Attorney General advised that Dr. Tilley was not a deemed employee, leading Dr. Tilley to remove the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 and 42 U.S.C. § 233(l)(1).The United States District Court for the Central District of California remanded the case, finding Dr. Tilley's removal untimely under § 1442 and concluding that the Attorney General satisfied its advice obligations under § 233(l)(1). Dr. Tilley appealed, arguing that the Attorney General failed to properly advise the state court of his deemed status, thus making removal appropriate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court analyzed the timeliness of Dr. Tilley's § 1442 removal under the wrong legal standard and remanded on that basis. The court determined it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s § 233 analysis, despite potential untimeliness. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Attorney General was obligated under § 233(l)(1) to advise the state court that Dr. Tilley had been a deemed employee during the relevant period. The court reversed the district court’s conclusion that the Attorney General’s notice satisfied § 233(l)(1) and held that the government was obligated to remove the case to federal court. The case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "BLUMBERGER V. TILLEY" on Justia Law

In this case, several plaintiffs challenged Hawaii and California laws that restrict the carrying of firearms in various locations, arguing that these laws violate their Second Amendment rights. The laws in question generally prohibit carrying firearms in places such as parks, beaches, bars, restaurants that serve alcohol, financial institutions, and private property without explicit consent from the property owner.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii granted a preliminary injunction against Hawaii's law, enjoining the enforcement of the firearm restrictions in parking lots shared by government and non-government buildings, financial institutions, public beaches, public parks, bars, and restaurants that serve alcohol. The court also enjoined the new default rule for private property open to the public. The United States District Court for the Central District of California similarly granted a preliminary injunction against California's law, enjoining the enforcement of firearm restrictions in hospitals, playgrounds, public transit, parks, athletic facilities, places of worship, financial institutions, and private property open to the public.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed these decisions. The court affirmed the preliminary injunctions in part and reversed them in part. The Ninth Circuit held that some places specified by the Hawaii and California laws likely fall within the national tradition of prohibiting firearms at sensitive places, such as bars and restaurants that serve alcohol, parks, and similar areas. However, the court found that other places, such as financial institutions and places of worship, do not fall within this tradition. The court also held that the new default rule prohibiting the carry of firearms onto private property without consent is likely unconstitutional in California but not in Hawaii.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunctions to the extent that they enjoin restrictions on firearms at financial institutions, parking lots adjacent to financial institutions, and parking lots shared by government and non-government buildings. The court reversed the preliminary injunctions to the extent that they enjoin restrictions on firearms at bars and restaurants that serve alcohol, beaches, parks, and similar areas, and the new default rule prohibiting the carry of firearms onto private property without consent in Hawaii. View "WOLFORD V. LOPEZ" on Justia Law