Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff’s claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) was dismissed for lack of standing. Thereafter, the district court considered and granted Malibu Road and Bungalow Lighting’s motion for attorneys’ fees under the ADA’s fee provision. Plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal of his ADA claim for lack of standing, but he appeals the award of attorneys’ fees, arguing that his lawsuit was not frivolous. However, the issue before the court was not whether Plaintiff’s claim was frivolous and therefore justified an award of fees, but rather whether there is a basis to award attorneys’ fees under the ADA’s fee provision after the underlying claim has been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.   The Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated. The panel held that because the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for lack of standing, it lacked jurisdiction to award fees under the Americans with Disabilities Act’s fee provision, 42 U.S.C. Section 12205 View "ANTONIO FERNANDEZ V. 23676-23726 MALIBU ROAD, LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action in May 2018, alleging federal claims under Section 1981 and Section 1983 and state law claims against a building inspector Troy Seguirant, the City and County of Honolulu, and other defendants. Only Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim against Seguirant is at issue in this appeal; the district court dismissed the Section 1983 claims against Seguirant with prejudice.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying qualified immunity on a claim under Section 1981, and remanding, the en banc court held that Section 1981 does not provide an implied cause of action against state actors. Joining other circuits and overruling Federation of African American Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1996), the en banc court held that Section 1981, as amended in 1991, establishes substantive rights that a state actor may violate but does not itself contain a remedy against a state actor for such violations. Thus, a plaintiff seeking to enforce rights secured by Section 1981 against a state actor must bring a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The en banc court remanded with instructions to allow the plaintiff to replead his Section 1981 claim as a Section 1983 claim. View "HITOSHI YOSHIKAWA V. TROY SEGUIRANT, ET AL" on Justia Law

This case is one of many arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiff was hospitalized with a severe case of COVID-19 in the summer of 2020. She and her husband, Robert Kuciemba, claim he was exposed to the virus while working for Victory Woodworks and that he sickened Mrs. Kuciemba in their home. Plaintiffs sued Victory, alleging that the company’s actions “were a substantial factor in causing” Mrs. Kuciemba’s illness and that Victory is liable for negligently failing to protect its employees from the virus and flouting the public health regulations in place at the time.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a diversity action. The panel certified two questions to the Supreme Court of California, which accepted certification and held that (1) California’s derivative injury doctrine—under which workers’ compensation benefits generally provide the exclusive remedy for third-party claims if the asserted claims are collateral to or derivative of the employee’s workplace injury—did not bar Mrs. Kuciemba’s tort claims against Victory; but (2) an employer does not owe a duty of care under California law to prevent the spread of COVID-19 to employees’ household members. Because Victory owed no duty of care to Mrs. Kuciemba, the panel affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the complaint. View "CORBY KUCIEMBA, ET AL V. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a police officer at the Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC) in Honolulu, Hawaii. Prior to his termination, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office alleging sexual and race discrimination, retaliation, and a proposed and later a formal termination. After he was terminated, Plaintiff attempted to file a mixed case appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), seeking to appeal the Army’s termination decision based on the affirmative defense of sexual orientation discrimination. The MSPB upheld Plaintiff’s termination and he filed suit in district court. He alleged that he had been subjected to discrimination based on his sexual orientation (bisexual) and race (Caucasian), retaliated against for protected conduct, and ultimately terminated from his employment.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part and remanded. The panel held that the MSPB lacked jurisdiction to consider the pre-termination claims. Neither the text nor the structure of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) supports the theory that the MSPB has pendent jurisdiction to decide factually related claims of discrimination associated with personnel actions outside the list of “particularly serious” actions set forth in 5 U.S.C. 7512. The panel affirmed the district court’s (1) determination that Plaintiff failed to exhaust before the MSPB any other theories of discrimination for his termination besides sexual orientation; (2) grant of summary judgment to the Army on Plaintiff’s Title VII claim; and (3) grant of summary judgment to the Army on Plaintiff’s CSRA claim, finding that substantial evidence supported the MSPB’s finding that Plaintiff regularly had sex at TAMC during work hours. View "STEVEN CROWE V. CHRISTINE WORMUTH, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant TA Operating LLC (TA) appeals the district court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration of employment-related claims brought by Plaintiff.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. The panel held that the district court erred in finding that the arbitration agreement’s delegation clause was unenforceable because it was substantively unconscionable. The district court properly considered whether an “unrelated” jury waiver provision made the delegation clause unconscionable. Here, though, the jury waiver provision applied only if the Agreement were determined to be unenforceable. As such, it could not support the conclusion that an agreement to arbitrate enforceability (i.e., the delegation clause) was unenforceable. View "KENNETH HOLLEY-GALLEGLY V. TA OPERATING, LLC" on Justia Law

This is a putative class action by three truck drivers against their employer, Domino’s Pizza. The court previously affirmed the district court’s denial of Domino’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that because the drivers were a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” their claims were exempted from the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) by 9 U.S.C. Section 1.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Domino Pizza’s motion to compel arbitration in a putative class action brought by three Domino truck drivers, alleging violations of California labor law. The panel stated that its prior decision squarely rested upon its reading of Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2020), which concerned Amazon delivery drivers. The panel found no clear conflict between Rittmann and Saxon and nothing in Saxon that undermined the panel’s prior reasoning that because the plaintiff drivers in this case, like the Amazon package delivery drivers in Rittmann, transport interstate goods for the last leg to their final destinations, they are engaged in interstate commerce under Section 1. View "EDMOND CARMONA, ET AL V. DOMINO'S PIZZA, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her friend, both dressed in “sexy cop” costumes, posed with pedestrians on the Strip and accepted tips in exchange for photos. Defendant police officers, working a plain-clothes Strip enforcement assignment, arrested Plaintiff and her friend for doing business without a license after the officers were asked to pay a tip or delete a photo. The charges against Plaintiff were ultimately dropped. Plaintiff sued various people involved in her arrest, asserting eleven federal and state causes of action. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages for injuries suffered during detention and attorney’s fees. The district court granted the Officers’ summary judgment motion and denied Plaintiff’s.   The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order denying a petition for panel rehearing, denying a petition for rehearing en banc, and amending the opinion filed on May 24, 2017; and (2) an amended opinion reversing in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The panel concluded that the First Amendment protections accorded to Plaintiff’s own activities did not lapse because of what her friend said or did without Plaintiff’s direct participation. There was no evidence at all, for example, of a prior agreement between the women to require a quid-pro-quo payment for posing in photos, nor of a demonstrated pattern of demanding quid-pro-quo payments during performances together. The panel held that the district court erred by deciding that the officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff despite the First Amendment protections afforded to her expressive association. View "MICHELE SANTOPIETRO V. CLAYBORN HOWELL, ET AL" on Justia Law

From 2003 to 2007, Plaintiff took out ten student loans to attend college in Washington state. Defendants National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts (collectively, “the Trusts”) ultimately purchased Plaintiff’s loans. The Trusts appointed Defendant U.S. Bank as their special servicer. The Trusts also hired Defendant Transworld Systems, Inc. (“Transworld”), to collect the defaulted loans, and hired Defendant Patenaude & Felix (“Patenaude”), a law firm specializing in debt collection, to represent them in debt collection actions. Several years after taking out the loans, Plaintiff filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s action alleging that Defendants’ attempts to collect debts that were discharged in bankruptcy violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Bankruptcy Code. Affirming the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims that were based on a violation of his bankruptcy discharge order, the panel reiterated that Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, 276 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 2002), precludes FDCPA claims and other claims based on violations of Bankruptcy Code Section 524. The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal, as barred by the one-year statute of limitations, of Plaintiff’s remaining FDCPA claim based on the theory that Defendants knowingly brought a meritless post-discharge debt collection lawsuit because they knew they could not prove ownership of Plaintiff’s debts. The panel concluded that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged one post-filing FDCPA violation in the filing of an affidavit that presented a new basis, not contained in the complaint, to show that Defendants owned the debts. View "OSURE BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision ordering him to pay a $100 partial filing fee in his civil action. Plaintiff, an unemployed non-prisoner with approximately $1,000 in cash, filed a pro se complaint against the United States Department of Interior (DOI) asserting violations of federal contracting law and financial assistance law. Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), i.e., without prepaying fees or costs. A magistrate judge granted Plaintiff’s application in part and ordered Plaintiff to pay a partial filing fee totaling $100. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation, which recommended denying the motion to reconsider. The district court adopted the report and recommendation and ordered Plaintiff to pay the $100 partial filing fee within fourteen days. Plaintiff appealed. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that district courts may either make a plaintiff pay the full fee or waive the fee entirely but may not impose a partial fee.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The panel held that district courts have the authority to impose partial filing fees on non-prisoner civil litigators under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(1). The panel rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the holding in Olivares v. Marshall, 59 F.3d 109, 111 (9th Cir. 1995), was limited to IFP applications brought by prisoners. The panel also rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the Prison Litigation Reform Act superseded the holding in Olivares. View "JAY HYMAS V. USDOI" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed individual and class claims in Montana state court against GEICO after GEICO failed to advance pay Plaintiff’s medical bills and lost wages following a car accident caused by GEICO’s insured. GEICO removed the lawsuit to federal court, asserting jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Neither Plaintiff nor the district court questioned whether CAFA jurisdiction was proper.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for the district court to conduct the necessary evidentiary inquiry and determine whether GEICO can sufficiently establish that more than $5 million is in dispute. The panel held that it could sua sponte question a defendant’s allegation of CAFA jurisdiction. The panel further concluded that the current record did not sufficiently demonstrate that CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement was met because it was not evident from the face of the complaint and the nature of the class claims that this controversy involved more than $5 million, nor did GEICO’s notice of removal and supporting declaration satisfactorily establish that more than $5 million was in dispute. View "BRANDON MOE V. GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY, ET AL" on Justia Law