Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff alleged that a Transportation Security Officer (“TSO”) sexually assaulted her during an airport security screening. At issue is whether Plaintiff may bring claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the United States. The panel held that TSOs fall under the FTCA’s “law enforcement proviso,” which waives sovereign immunity for torts such as assault and battery committed by “investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government.” 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(h). The panel joined the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits in holding that the FTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity applies to certain intentional torts committed by TSOs. The district court, therefore, had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FTCA claims.   The panel considered whether, as officers of the United States, TSOs are “empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(h). The government argued that TSOs do not “execute searches” by conducting screenings. The panel held that the screenings fit the ordinary, contemporary, and common meanings of searches. View "MICHELE LEUTHAUSER V. USA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) Law Enforcement Ranger in Idaho, challenged adverse employment actions taken against him by the Department of the Interior and BLM officials. He sued Defendants, alleging a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process.   In an interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss an action alleging due process violations and seeking damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The panel held that Plaintiff had no claim for money damages under Bivens. Here, Plaintiff’s claims arose in a different context than what the Court has recognized. Congress has also already provided a remedy in this context under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Because this case involves an alternative remedial structure, this case exists in a novel context outside the preexisting Bivens framework. Extending Bivens here would risk impermissible intrusion into the functioning of both the Legislative and Executive Branches. View "DAVID HARPER V. MICHAEL NEDD, ET AL" on Justia Law

The County of Marin (“the County”), at the onset of the pandemic in March 2020, took action to limit the spread of COVID-19 and protect its vulnerable citizens by issuing a public health order that placed certain restrictions on allowable activities. The County continually modified its original health order based on data and increased knowledge of how the virus spreads. During the time that a modified version of the health order was in effect, the County learned of aviation activities by Seaplane Adventures, LLC (“Seaplane”) that violated the applicable health order and began a dialogue with Seaplane regarding its failure to comply with the County’s health order. Seaplane ultimately ceased its operations that were in violation of the County’s health order and filed the suit before us today. Seaplane appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the County.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The panel held that regardless of what the relevant comparison category was for comparing whether the County’s actions were rooted in a rational basis, given that a deadly virus was tearing into the most vulnerable throughout the County, country, and world, the actions of the County met the rational basis standard as it took actions to mitigate the damage of the COVID-19 virus. To the extent that Seaplane was alleging differential treatment between Seaplane and other air carriers providing recreational flights in violation of the health order, the rational basis for the County’s action was also abundantly clear: it simply did not know of the other violators. View "SEAPLANE ADVENTURES, LLC V. COUNTY OF MARIN" on Justia Law

In November 2018, a Cessna Model 525 corporate jet tried to fly from Sellersburg, Indiana, to Chicago, Illinois. It never made it to Chicago. It crashed a few minutes after takeoff in Clark County, Indiana. The pilot of the plane and the two passengers were killed instantly. Representatives for the three decedents brought this wrongful death and product liability suit against Cranfield Aerospace Solutions, LLC, in the District of Idaho. Cranfield is incorporated in and has its principal place of business in England. Appellants alleged that a load alleviation system, the Tamarack Active Winglet Load System—trademarked as the ATLAS system—caused the plane crash. Cranfield helped Tamarack obtain the Federal Aviation Administration supplemental type certification for the ATLAS system.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Idaho federal district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction over. The panel held when considering specific jurisdiction under the first prong, courts should comprehensively evaluate the extent of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state and those contacts’ relationship to the plaintiffs’ claims—which may mean looking at both purposeful availment and purposeful direction. The panel held that under either approach, jurisdiction over Cranfield in Idaho was lacking. The purposeful direction test cannot support jurisdiction here because Appellants failed to allege that Cranfield injured them in Idaho. The panel agreed with the district court that Appellants failed to establish that Cranfield purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of Idaho. The panel declined to proceed to the remaining two prongs of the specific jurisdiction test and held that the district court properly declined to exercise jurisdiction over Cranfield. View "ERICA DAVIS, ET AL V. CRANFIELD AEROSPACE SOLUTIONS" on Justia Law

Nevada enacted Senate Bill 248 (“S.B. 248”), Act of June 2, 2021, ch. 291, 2021 Nev. Stat. 1668, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. S.B. 248 requires debt collectors to provide written notification to debtors 60 days before taking any action to collect a medical debt. Plaintiffs are entities engaged in consumer debt collection. They filed suit in district court against Defendant, Commissioner of the Financial Institutions Division of Nevada’s Department of Business and Industry, bringing a facial challenge to the law. They moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, contending that S.B. 248 is unconstitutionally vague, violates the First Amendment and is preempted by both the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs timely appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The panel first rejected Plaintiffs’ claim that the term “action to collect a medical debt” in S.B. 248 was unconstitutionally vague, noting that the implementing regulations set forth examples of actions that do, and do not, constitute actions to collect a medical debt. The panel held that: S.B. 248 regulates commercial speech and therefore is not subject to strict scrutiny; communications to collect a medical debt “concerned lawful activity” and were not “inherently misleading.” The panel next rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the FCRA expressly preempts S.B. 248 under 15 U.S.C. Section 1681t(b)(1)(F). View "AARGON AGENCY, INC., ET AL V. SANDY O'LAUGHLIN" on Justia Law

The United States Forest Service oversees livestock grazing in the Colville National Forest in Eastern Washington, but it does not regulate or participate in the killing of wolves by the Department. Environmental organizations concerned about the wolves sued the Forest Service, challenging its grazing decisions. They alleged that those decisions will lead to an increase in the number of wolf attacks on livestock, which in turn will cause the Department to kill more wolves. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of standing.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel explained to establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show it has suffered an injury in fact, the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. The Service did not dispute that Plaintiffs had a concrete interest in the welfare of gray wolves in the Colville National Forest. The key issues were whether any injury to the wolves would be caused by the allegedly unlawful conduct of the Service and whether a change in that conduct would redress that injury. Here, the claimed injury arose from the actions of a third party that is two steps removed from the Service. The Service does not kill wolves, nor does it regulate those that do. Rather, Plaintiffs object to grazing because it may lead to depredations, which may, in turn, lead the Department to consider and, in some cases, exercise its discretion to lethally remove wolves. Accordingly, the panel held that Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claims against the Service. View "WILDEARTH GUARDIANS, ET AL V. USFS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of Federal contractor employees and Federal employees working for the Department of Energy, challenged two Executive Orders, Executive Orders 14,042 and 14,043 (EOs), issued in September 2021. 1 Those EOs mandated COVID-19 vaccination for Federal contractor employees and Federal employees, respectively. They also provided for legally required medical or religious exemptions. Plaintiffs challenged the EOs as ultra vires exercises of presidential power in violation of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (Procurement Act), the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (Procurement Policy Act), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA), the major questions doctrine, and general constitutional federalism constraints. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief to address their allegedly “imminent and wrongful terminations” for failure to comply with the vaccination requirements. The district court held that Plaintiffs who had submitted religious and medical exemptions but who had not yet completed the exemption request process did not have claims ripe for adjudication. The district court then dismissed the operative Second Amended Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim and without leave to amend.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and dismissed as moot in part. The panel concluded that the case was moot as to all non-RFRA claims. The vaccine mandate exemption processes that the Plaintiffs challenged were premised on the revoked EOs. The panel held that it could not provide relief from EOs and exemption processes that no longer exist. Accordingly, no live controversy remained between the parties. The panel further concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims for damages under RFRA were precluded by sovereign immunity. View "DAVID DONOVAN, ET AL V. BRIAN VANCE" on Justia Law

The United States (“the Government”) initiated a civil forfeiture suit in federal district court against a $380 million arbitration award fund, the majority of which is held in the United Kingdom. The fund belongs to PetroSaudi Oil Services (Venezuela) Ltd. (“PetroSaudi”), a private oil company incorporated in Barbados. PetroSaudi won the award in an arbitration proceeding against Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”), a Venezuelan state energy company. The portion of the fund held in the United Kingdom (“the fund”) is held in an account controlled by the High Court of England and Wales (“the High Court”). The Government seeks forfeiture of the fund on the ground that it derives from proceeds of an illegal scheme to steal one billion dollars from the Malaysian sovereign wealth fund 1Malaysia Development Berhad (“1MDB”). PetroSaudi challenged two orders entered by the district court.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s interlocutory orders. The panel held that PetroSaudi’s appeal from the district court’s protective order under 18 U.S.C. Section 983 fell within this exception. Accordingly, the court had jurisdiction to consider the appeals of the two orders. The panel concluded that the sovereign immunity of the United Kingdom, as codified in the FSIA, did not protect the arbitration award fund from the two orders issued by the district court. The panel held that because the district court had in rem jurisdiction over the fund, it did not need in personam jurisdiction over PetroSaudi to issue an order preserving the fund. View "USA V. PETROSAUDI OIL SERV. (VENEZUELA) LTD., ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant and his attorney created publicly-traded shell corporations and sold them to privately-held companies. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed suit against Defendants for violations of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), and SEC Rule 10b5. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that Defendant had violated the securities laws and imposed equitable statutory remedies, including a civil penalty of $1,757,000. The district court found that, as a matter of undisputed fact, Defendant had received $1,757,000 in gross pecuniary gain from his violations and used that amount for the civil penalty. On appeal, Defendant challenged the amount of that penalty.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s imposition of the civil penalty. The panel held that Defendant’s declaration that legal fees of $287,500 were paid from the proceeds from the sale of five shell companies established a genuine issue of material fact whether such proceeds should be attributed to his—rather than his attorney’s—gross pecuniary gain. Because Defendant established a genuine issue of material fact whether he received or controlled the entire amount of the proceeds, the district court erred in finding on summary judgment that his gross pecuniary gain was $1,757,000. The panel further held that Defendant identified genuine issues of material fact on two additional factors that the district court considered in imposing the civil penalty: the degree of Defendant’s scienter and his recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct. View "USSEC V. IMRAN HUSAIN, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment reversing the bankruptcy court’s order requiring a standing Chapter 13 trustee to return her percentage fee when the case was dismissed prior to confirmation. Joining the Tenth Circuit, the panel held that the trustee was not entitled to a percentage fee of plan payments as compensation for her work in the Chapter 13 case. 28 U.S.C. Section 586(e)(2) provides that the trustee shall “collect” the percentage fee from “payments . . . under plans” that she receives. 11 U.S.C. Section 1326(a)(1) provides for the debtor to make payments in the amount “proposed by the plan to the trustee.” Section 1326(a)(2) provides that the trustee shall retain these payments “until confirmation or denial of confirmation.” This section further provides that if a plan is not confirmed, the trustee shall return to the debtor any payments not previously paid to creditors and not yet due and owing to them. Section 1326(b) provides that, before or at the time of each payment to creditors under the plan, the trustee shall be paid the percentage fee under Section 586(e)(2).   The panel held that, reading these statutes together, “payments . . . under plans” in § 586 refers only to payments under confirmed plans. Prior to confirmation a trustee does not “collect” or “collect and hold” fees under Section 586 but instead “retains” payments “proposed by the plan” pursuant to Section 1326(a)(2). If a plan is not confirmed, then Section 1326(a)(2) requires a return to the debtor of payments “proposed by the plan.” View "IN RE: ROGER EVANS, ET AL V. KATHLEEN MCCALLISTER" on Justia Law