Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp. (Sonner I), 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020), the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal without leave to amend of Plaintiff's class action complaint. This court held that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply federal equitable principles to claims for equitable restitution brought under California law and that, under such principles, dismissal was appropriate because Plaintiff could not show that she lacked an adequate remedy at law. After Sonner I was issued, Plaintiff filed a virtually identical complaint in California state court. Premier Nutrition responded by returning to the district court and seeking a permanent injunction against the state court action. The district court denied the injunction.The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the permanent injunction regardless of Sonner I’s preclusive effect. The panel did not determine the preclusive effect of Sonner I.The Ninth Circuit held that there was a strong presumption against enjoining a state court proceeding under the relitigation exception. Premier did not point to any clearly erroneous factual findings in the district court’s order, and the panel detected none. Res judicata principles are of high importance, but they can be addressed by the state court, and do not compel resorting to the heavy artillery of a permanent injunction. View "KATHLEEN SONNER V. PREMIER NUTRITION CORPORATION" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of the murder of an Oregon Department of Corrections Director. However, since trial, another man has confessed to the killing and nearly all the witnesses who directly implicated Petitioner have recanted their testimony. Petitioner sought federal habeas relief making various claims including constitutional violations based on the trial court’s exclusion of the other man's confession. The constitutional claims are procedurally defaulted because Petitoner failed to raise them in state court as required.The Ninth Circuit held that Petitioner's procedural default is excused under the “actual innocence” exception set forth in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). The panel wrote that other man's detailed and compelling confessions, when considered with the recantations of nearly all the State’s key witnesses, are more than sufficient to satisfy Schlup’s standard, as it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted Petitioner in light of the new evidence.Reaching the merits of Petitioner's claim, the Ninth Circuit found that the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by excluding evidence of the confessor's guilt. View "FRANK GABLE V. MAX WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

Defendants are GoSmith, Inc., Porch.com, Inc. (which acquired GoSmith), and three individual corporate officers. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) prohibits calls using automatic telephone dialing systems (“ATDS”) to cell phones, see 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b), and telephone solicitations sent to residential telephone subscribers who have registered their phone numbers on the national donot-call registry, see 47 U.S.C. Section 227(c). Both provisions provide private causes of action for damages and injunctive relief. The complaint alleges that Defendants’ use of ATDS to plaintiffs’ cell phones violated (and continues to violate) Section 227(b); and that Defendants’ text messages to Plaintiffs’ cell phones that were (and are) registered on the national do-not-call registry violated (and continue to violate) Section 227(c). The district court assumed that plaintiffs have Article III standing but held they lack statutory standing.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint. The panel held that Plaintiffs have statutory standing under Section 227(b) and (c) of the TCPA. Defendants argued that the TCPA protects only individuals from unwanted calls, and that plaintiffs, as home improvement contractors, fall outside of TCPA’s zone of interest. The panel concluded that all of the Plaintiffs have standing to sue under Section 227(b) of the TCPA. The panel, therefore, concluded that these Plaintiffs have standing to sue under Section 227(c). The panel wrote that after discovery, Defendants may seek to argue that they have rebutted the presumption by showing that Plaintiffs’ cell phones are used to such an extent and in such a manner as to be properly regarded as business rather than “residential” lines. View "NATHAN CHENNETTE, ET AL V. PORCH.COM, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

City of Reno’s complaint and declaratory relief under Nevada’s Video Service Law (“VSL”) and the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, respectively. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim of Reno’s complaint alleging that Netflix, Inc. and Hulu, LLC failed to pay franchise fees for the video streaming services they provide.   Specifically, the panel first addressed the VSL. The VSL does not expressly create a private right of action for cities to sue for unpaid franchise fees. The test under Nevada law for whether a statute creates an implied right of action is set forth in Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 194 P.3d 96 (Nev. 2008). The panel held that all three Baldonado factors weigh against recognition of an implied right of action here. Concerning the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, the panel held that it does not provide a cause of action when a party, such as Reno, lacks a cause of action under a separate statute and seeks to use the Act to obtain affirmative relief. Here, Reno’s suit was offensive, not defensive, and Reno lacked an independent cause of action, so the Declaratory Judgment Act provided no basis for relief. View "CITY OF RENO V. NETFLIX, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

Bliss Sequoia Insurance and Risk Advisors held an insurance policy from Allied Property and Casualty Insurance (Allied Property) covering any liability that Bliss Sequoia might incur for “damages because of ‘bodily injury.’” One of Bliss Sequoia’s clients was a water park, and after a park guest was injured, the park sued Bliss Sequoia for professional negligence, alleging that the coverage limits on the park’s liability insurance were too low. This appeal presents the question whether that negligence claim arose “because of” the guest’s “bodily injury” and is therefore covered by Bliss Sequoia’s policy. We agree with the district court that the answer is no.   The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Allied Property. Allied’s policy provided that it covered any sums Bliss Sequoia was “legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage.’” Bliss Sequoia alleged that the bodily injury at issue was a “but-for” cause of Bliss Sequoia’s professional-negligence liability. The panel held that pure but-for causation would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts, and therefore, the law almost never employs that standard without limiting it in some way. The law cuts off remote chains of causation by applying common law principles of proximate causation. Further, the personal-injury lawsuit against the water park arose “because of bodily injury,” but the claims of professional negligence did not. Because Bliss Sequoia’s policy did not cover those claims, Allied had no duty to defend or indemnify Bliss Sequoia against them. View "BLISS SEQUOIA INSURANCE, ET AL V. ALLIED PROPERTY & CASUALTY INS" on Justia Law

ICE has decided to rely almost exclusively on privately owned and operated facilities in California. Two such facilities are run by appellant The Geo Group, Inc. AB 32 would override the federal government’s decision, pursuant to discretion conferred by Congress, to use private contractors to run its immigration detention facilities.The Ninth Circuit en banc court vacated the district court’s denial of the United States and The Geo Group, Inc.’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief, and held that California enacted Assembly Bill (AB) 32, which states that a “person shall not operate a private detention facility within the state,” would give California a virtual power of review over Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)’s detention decisions, in violation of the Supremacy Clause.The en banc court held that whether analyzed under intergovernmental immunity or preemption, California cannot exert this level of control over the federal government’s detention operations. The en banc court remanded for further proceedings. The en banc court held that AB 32 would breach the core promise of the Supremacy Clause. To comply with California law, ICE would have to cease its ongoing immigration detention operations in California and adopt an entirely new approach in the state. This foundational limit on state power cannot be squared with the dramatic changes that AB 32 would require ICE to make. The en banc court held that appellants are likely to prevail on their claim that AB 32 violates the Supremacy Clause as to ICE-contracted facilities. View "THE GEO GROUP, INC., ET AL V. GAVIN NEWSOM, ET AL" on Justia Law

Nexus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Nexus) developed the trademarked and FDA-approved drug Emerphed, ready-to-use ephedrine sulfate in a vial. Drug compounding by “outsourcing facilities” is permitted without FDA approval, but 21 U.S.C. Section  353b, a part of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, excludes from this exception compounded drugs that are “essentially a copy of one or more approved drugs.” To avoid the Act’s bar on private enforcement, Nexus alleged violation of state laws that prohibit the sale of drugs not approved by the FDA.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, for failure to state a claim, of state law claims brought by Nexus against Central Admixture Pharmacy Services, Inc., operator of a network of compounding pharmacies that sold the drug ephedrine sulfate pre-loaded into ready-to-use syringes without FDA approval.   The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that, under the implied preemption doctrine, Nexus’s state law claims were barred because they were contrary to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s exclusive enforcement provision, which states that proceedings to enforce or restrain violations of the Act, including the compounding statute, must be by and in the name of the United States, not a private party. The panel held that all of Nexus’s claims depended on a determination of whether Central Admixture’s ephedrine sulphate was “essentially a copy” of Nexus’s Emerphed, and the plain text of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act left that determination in the first instance to the FDA and its enforcement process. View "NEXUS PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. V. CAPS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Various parties appealed the dismissal of their action challenging Reclamation’s current operating procedures, which were adopted in consultation with other relevant federal agencies to maintain specific lake levels and instream flows to comply with the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and to safeguard the federal reserved water and fishing rights of the Hoopa Valley and Klamath Tribes (the “Tribes”). The Tribes intervened as of right but then moved to dismiss the action on the ground that they were required parties who could not be joined due to their tribal sovereign immunity   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, due to a lack of a required party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. The panel held that the district court properly recognized that a declaration that Reclamation’s operating procedures were unlawful would imperil the Tribes’ reserved water and fishing rights. The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the Tribes were required parties who could not be joined due to sovereign immunity, and that in equity and good conscience, the action should be dismissed.   The panel disagreed with Plaintiffs’ argument that the Tribes were not required parties to this suit because the Tribes’ interests were adequately represented by Reclamation. Because Reclamation is not an adequate representative of the Tribes, the Tribes are required parties under Rule 19. The court explained that The McCarran Amendment waives the United States’ sovereign immunity in certain suits. 43 U.S.C. Section 666(a). The panel held that even if the McCarran Amendment’s waiver of sovereign immunity extends to tribes as parties, the Amendment does not waive sovereign immunity in every case that implicates water rights. View "KLAMATH IRRIGATION DISTRICT, ET AL V. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified the following questions to the Hawaii Supreme Court: 1. May a Hawaii court assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporate defendant if the plaintiff’s injury “relates to,” but does not “arise from,” the defendant’s instate acts enumerated in Hawaii’s general long-arm statute? Compare Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021), with Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 634-35. 2. In light of Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, does Hawaii’s general long-arm statute, Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 634-35, permit a Hawaii court to assert personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? View "MATT YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD., ET AL" on Justia Law

The appeal was brought in the name of purported clients of the law firms of Gallo LLP and Wynne Law Firm (“Gallo/Wynne”). Gallo/Wynne originally sought to represent a putative class of Walgreen’s store managers in the San Francisco Superior Court in a wage and hour action (the Morales action). A different group of attorneys from the firms of Miller Shah LLP and Edgar Law Firm LLC (“Miller/Edgar”) filed a substantially similar wage and hour action on behalf of Walgreen’s store managers in the Eastern District of California (the Caves action). Gallo/Wynne sought to encourage putative class members in the Caves action to instead join a separate “mass action” to be filed by Gallo/Wynne as Gallo/Wynne clients.The district court issued an order granting Miller/Edgar’s ex parte application for Corrective Notice to the allegedly misleading Letter and invalidated all Gallo/Wynne procured opt-outs from the Caves action. The district court issued a second order granting Walgreen’s motion to modify the scope of the Corrective Notice to be sent to all Gallo/Wynne procured Caves opt-outs. Appellants are purported clients of Gallo/Wynne, and they appealed these two orders.The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied Appellants’ request for mandamus relief. The panel held that the two orders were amenable to review after final judgment, and this placed them outside of the third collateral order requirement: effective unreviewability. The panel held that the dispositive third factor–that the district court order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law– was not met here. View "RAQUEL AGUILAR, ET AL V. WALGREEN CO." on Justia Law