Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Will Co. Ltd., a Japanese adult entertainment producer, brought a copyright infringement action against the owners and operators of ThisAV.com, a video-hosting site based in Hong Kong, alleging that the site was displaying without authorization several of its copyrighted works. The district court found that it lacked specific personal jurisdiction over ThisAV.com’s owners and operators because Will Co. could not establish that they “expressly aimed” ThisAV.com’s content at the United States market, or that it was foreseeable that operating the site would cause jurisdictionally significant harm in the United States. Defendants were Youhaha Marketing and Promotion Limited (“YMP”) and Ka Yeung Lee.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of a copyright suit for lack of specific personal jurisdiction and remanded for further proceedings. The panel concluded that both YMP and Lee committed at least one intentional act by operating ThisAV.com and purchasing its domain name and domain privacy services. As to the second element, both Defendants did “something more” than mere passive operation of the website. As to the third element, Defendants’ conduct caused harm in the United States because there were almost 1.3 million visits to their website in the United States during the relevant period, and that harm was foreseeable. View "WILL CO., LTD. V. KA LEE" on Justia Law

At issue were several statements in articles published by Morgan Simon on Forbes.com that connected CoreCivic to the detention of separated families at the U.S. border and characterized its lobbying efforts as pushing for punitive criminal and immigration laws. Simon’s firm is Candide Group. CoreCivic filed suit against Simon and Candide Group (collectively “Candide”) for defamation and defamation by implication. Candide made a special motion to strike CoreCivic’s complaint under California’s antiSLAPP Act, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Section 425.16.   The Ninth Circuit held that the special motion provision of California’s anti-SLAPP statute applied in federal court, and affirmed in part the district court’s order granting Candide Group, LLC’s motion to strike the defamation complaint. The panel held that the court’s prior precedents control. In United States ex rel. v. Lockheed Missiles &Space Co., the court held that California’s anti-SLAPP statute applied in federal diversity actions because there was “no ‘direct collision’” between the statute and the relevant rules, and the twin purposes of Erie favored its application.   The panel turned to the merits of Candide’s anti-SLAPP motion. Because CoreCivic did not contest on appeal that the suit implicated Candide’s First Amendment rights, the panel needed only to determine–applying the 12(b)(6) standard–whether CoreCivic stated a claim for defamation under California law. The panel concluded that CoreCivic failed to plausibly plead a defamation or a defamation by implication claim based on statements about its connection to the separation of immigrant families at the U.S. border, and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of those claims. View "CORECIVIC, INC. V. CANDIDE GROUP, LLC" on Justia Law

Relator alleged that Defendants prevented generic drug competitors from entering the market. Relator alleged that this permitted defendants to charge Medicare inflated prices for the two drugs, in violation of the False Claims Act. The district court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the False Claims Act’s public disclosure bar, which prevents a relator from merely repackaging publicly disclosed information for personal profit by asserting a claim under the Act.The Ninth Circuit held that an ex parte patent prosecution is an “other 4 UNITED STATES EX REL. SILBERSHER V. ALLERGAN Federal . . . hearing” under 31 U.S.C. Sec. 3730(e)(4)(A)(ii). Thus, the public disclosure bar was triggered. The Ninth Circuit expressed no opinion on whether Relator still could bring his qui tam action because he was an “original source” of the information in his complaint. The court remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "ZACHARY SILBERSHER V. ALLERGAN, INC." on Justia Law

In March 2018, the officers were involved in the fatal shooting of a homeless man. The Oakland Police Department investigated the incident, concluding that the officers’ use of force was reasonable and complied with Police Department policy. The Chief of Police agreed. Separately, the Community Police Review Agency (CPRA), the investigative body of the City’s civilian oversight Police Commission, investigated the incident and determined that the use of force was objectively reasonable. The Compliance Director disagreed with the Chief of Police and the CPRA, instead recommending termination of the officers for unreasonable use of force. After their termination, the officers sought a writ of mandate and declaratory relief in state court.The Ninth Circuit vacated, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in favor of Defendants and remanded with instructions to remand this case to state court. The panel held that this was a case arising under state law that properly belonged in the state courts. Recognizing that under Section 1331, a case can “arise under” federal law in two ways, the panel determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under both branches of federal question jurisdiction. First, the panel lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the federal cause of action branch because federal law did not create the causes of action asserted. The panel next held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the substantial federal question branch. View "FRANCISCO NEGRETE V. CITY OF OAKLAND" on Justia Law

The dispute at issue is between Jones Day and one of its former partners, a German national who was based in its Paris office until he left to join Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe (“Orrick”). Jones Day’s partnership agreement provides for mandatory arbitration of all disputes among partners, and that all such arbitration proceedings are governed by the FAA. The partnership dispute proceeded to arbitration in Washington D.C., the location designated in the arbitration agreement.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying Jones Day’s petitions to compel Orrick to comply with an arbitrator’s subpoena. First, the court held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the action to enforce arbitral summonses issued by the arbitrator in an ongoing international arbitration being conducted in Washington, D.C., under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, known as the New York Convention. The court further held that venue was proper in the Northern District of California. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to enforce Jones Day’s petitions to compel Orrick and its partners to comply with the arbitral summonses. View "JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE" on Justia Law

Liberty Insurance Corporation (“Liberty”) sought to rely on a general coverage exclusion, it was aware that its policy also contained an exception to the general exclusion if the Defendant homeowners, could show that the all-terrain vehicle (ATV) was not subject to motor vehicle registration and was used to “service” their cabin. One of Defendant homeowners was the only witness who testified during a bench trial.   After the trial concluded, the district court (at Liberty’s request) imposed Rule 37(c)(1) sanctions on Defendants for failing to disclose a witness. The district court also excluded one of the homeowner’s testimony about whether the ATV was registered and used to service the cabin, based on the theory that he had not been properly disclosed as a witness. The district court ruled that ATV was used to service the cabin at any time,” and thus found that the Defendants were not entitled to coverage.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order imposing sanctions and remanded for a new trial. The court held that because Defendants complied with Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i)’s requirement to disclose “individuals likely to have discoverable information—along with the subjects of that information” for the purpose of identifying potential fact witnesses, sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1) were not justified. But even Defendants had not complied with Rule 26, the district court abused its discretion by imposing Rule 37(c)(1) sanctions without analyzing (1) whether the alleged defects in the disclosures were harmless and (2) whether the defects involved willfulness, fault, or bad faith. View "LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION V. YVONNE BRODEUR" on Justia Law

Affirming the district court’s summary judgment in favor of National Railroad Passenger Corporation and other railroad companies, the Ninth Circuit held that, as to railroad employees, the federal Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act preempts California’s Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act, which requires employers to provide employees with paid sick leave that they may use for specified purposes.   RUIA provides unemployment and sickness benefits to railroad employees, and it contains an express preemption provision disallowing railroad employees from having any right to “sickness benefits under a sickness law of any State.” Looking at the plain meaning of the statutory text, the court concluded that the preemption provision broadly refers to compensation or other assistance provided to employees in connection with physical or mental well-being. The court concluded that RUIA’s statutory framework and stated purposes confirm the breadth of its preemptive effect.   The court found unpersuasive an argument by the California Labor Commissioner and union-intervenors that RUIA does not preempt the California Act as to railroad employees because the benefits the Act offers are different in kind than RUIA’s benefits. The court also found unpersuasive (1) an argument that RUIA should be interpreted as preempting only the kinds of state laws that existed at the time RUIA was amended to provide for sickness benefits; and (2) various textual arguments in support of a narrower interpretation of the preemption provision. View "NAT'L RAILROAD PASSENGER CORP. V. JULIE SU" on Justia Law

In a prior appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated a prior dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction and remanded with instructions that Plaintiff be permitted to undertake jurisdictional discovery. On remand, the district court granted defendant VNG Corporation’s renewed motion to dismiss, finding that there was no specific personal jurisdiction in California over VNG, a Vietnamese corporation that released the Zing MP3 mobile music application in the Apple App Store and the Google Play store.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal, for lack of personal jurisdiction, of a copyright infringement suit and remanded for further proceedings. In assessing whether Plaintiff established a prima facie case of jurisdiction, the court analyzed jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), which provides for jurisdiction over foreign defendants that have ample contact with the United States as a whole, but whose contacts are so scattered among states that none of them would have jurisdiction. Under Rule 4(k)(2), the plaintiff must prove: (1) the claim at issue arises from federal law; (2) the defendant is not subject to any state’s courts of general jurisdiction; and (3) invoking jurisdiction upholds due process. The plaintiff has the burden to show the first two prongs, and the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the application of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. The court concluded that VNG purposefully targeted American companies and their intellectual property. Rejecting VNG’s argument regarding forum non conveniens, the court concluded that venue, in this case, was not proper in Vietnam. View "LANG VAN, INC. V. VNG CORPORATION" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, an individual and his telemarketing companies, sued the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), over its alleged prohibition of most uses in telemarketing of soundboard technology.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of Plaintiffs’ complaint against the FTC based on Plaintiffs’ failure to adequately plead Article III standing.   The court rejected the FTC’s contention that the district court’s order was not final and appealable. The panel held that there was appellate jurisdiction based on the principles set forth in WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997), and subsequent precedents. The court concluded that based on the whole record – including the failure to grant leave to amend and the clerk’s immediate entry of final judgment – the district court’s dismissal was final.   The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiffs failed to plead facts establishing an injury in fact for purposes of standing under Article III of the Constitution. The court held that the complaint provided virtually no information about Plaintiffs’ use or concrete plans to use soundboard technology in a manner that contravened FTC regulations, nor did it offer any indication that the threat of FTC enforcement against them was credible or imminent. View "UNIFIED DATA SERVICES, LLC V. FTC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ross Dress for Less, Inc. sued Makarios seeking declaratory relief regarding its end-of-lease obligations in connection with Ross’s lease of the Richmond Building, as to which Makarios had received an assignment of rights and thereafter acted as Ross’s landlord. Makarios demanded a jury trial on its counterclaims. Ross filed a document waiving its right to a jury trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 38. Makarios moved to withdraw its jury demand. Ross argued it was entitled to rely on Makarios’s request for a jury. The district court held a four-day Phase II bench trial and entered judgment in favor of Makarios.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting Defendant’s motion to withdraw its demand for a jury trial. The court explained that because jurisdiction in the district court was based on diversity of citizenship, Oregon substantive law and federal procedural law governed.   The court wrote that neither party argued that the waiver in Section 13.04 of the lease was unknowing or involuntary, but the parties disagreed on the scope of the provisions. The court held that the ordinary meaning of Section 13.04 was clear and it established that Ross waived its right to a jury trial on counterclaims filed by Makarios. The court rejected Ross’s argument that even if it contractually waived its jury trial right, it was still entitled to rely on Makarios’s jury demand under Rules 38(d) and 39(a).  The court held that typically, the combination of Rules 38(d) and 39(a) prevents a party from unilaterally withdrawing its jury demand, even when no other party has requested a jury trial. View "ROSS DRESS FOR LESS, INC. V. MAKARIOS-OREGON, LLC" on Justia Law