Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A putative class action against Roadrunner on behalf of all of Roadrunner’s California current and former hourly workers, alleged violations of California wage and hour laws. Roadrunner removed the case to federal court, invoking the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1711. The district court found that Roadrunner failed to establish the requisite $5 million minimum amount in controversy, and remanded the case to state court.The Ninth Circuit reversed The district court erred in imposing a presumption against CAFA jurisdiction, imposing “an inappropriate demand of certitude from Roadrunner.” Because the plaintiff contested removal, Roadrunner was required to show the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence. Roadrunner offered substantial evidence and identified assumptions to support its valuation of each claim. The district court erred in assigning a $0 value to five claims where it disagreed with Roadrunner’s calculations. Nothing in CAFA or caselaw “compels such a draconian response when the district court disagrees with a single assumption underlying the claim valuation.” The CAFA amount in controversy requirement was met; using the lowest hourly wage rate identified by the court, the minimum wage claim was reasonably valued at $4.5 million, plus the $2.1 million for two claims accepted by the district court. View "Jauregui v. Roadrunner Transportation Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2020, the Ninth Circuit vacated the EPA’s conditional registrations for three dicamba-based herbicides as violating the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. 136n(b). The court found that the EPA substantially understated risks that it acknowledged and failed entirely to acknowledge other risks. In a subsequent petition, seeking attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A), the plaintiffs in the underlying action argued that their requested attorneys’ fees should be calculated based on the market rates in San Francisco, where their petition for review was calendared for oral argument. Only one of their four attorneys is located in San Francisco. The other three are located in Portland.The Ninth Circuit disagreed. Where, as here, attorneys’ fees are incurred in connection with a petition for review in a court of appeals under FIFRA, the presumptive relevant community for calculating market rates is the legal community where counsel are located and where they do the bulk of their work. View "National Family Farm Coalition v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying transfer under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) and affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment to DePuy and Plaintiff Waber. Waber was hired by HOC and signed an employment contract with HOC's parent company, Stryker, which included restrictive one-year non-compete clause and forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses requiring adjudication of contract disputes in New Jersey.The panel concluded that, as the actual employer that participated in the proceedings to enforce its parent corporation’s forum-selection clause, HOC has a right to appeal the adverse decision of the district court on that issue. Furthermore, HOC properly became a party to this litigation in the district court case, albeit after the district court denied the motion to transfer. Accordingly, the panel has jurisdiction to hear HOC's appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1201. The panel held that the state law applicable here, Cal. Labor Code 925(b), which grants employees the option to void a forum-selection clause under a limited set of circumstances, determined the threshold question of whether Waber's contract contained a valid forum-selection clause. In this case, Waber satisfied all the prerequisites of section 925 and effectively voided the forum-selection clause under section 925(b). Finally, HOC presents no persuasive reason for the panel to overturn the district court's ruling of partial summary judgment in favor of DePuy and Waber that the forum-selection, non-compete and non-solicitation clauses were void under California law. View "DePuy Synthes Sales, Inc. v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision reversing the bankruptcy court's order allowing creditor's claim in the bankruptcy proceedings of Rejuvi, a chapter 11 debtor. Creditor seeks recognition and enforcement of a default money judgment for personal injuries against Rejuvi granted by an Australian district court. The panel held that Rejuvi waived any objection to personal jurisdiction by voluntarily appearing in the South Australian district court when it sought relief from the default judgment. Accordingly, the panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The panel granted creditor's motion to take judicial notice of Rules 230 and 242 of the 2006 Civil Rules of the District Court of South Australia. View "Corso v. Rejuvi Laboratory, Inc." on Justia Law

A fire swept through a cabin in the Idaho wilderness. Nobody was at home, and neither residents, neighbors, nor first responders saw the cabin catch fire. The owners claimed that the fire was caused by a negligent employee of Middlefork, the homeowners’ association. An expert report prepared by fire investigator Koster hypothesized that an open-flame pilot light at the cabin ignited combustible vapors from an excessive oil stain that had been applied to the wooden deck the previous day.The district court excluded Koster’s testimony as speculative, uncertain, and contradicted by multiple eyewitness accounts. The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that the district court improperly assumed a fact-finding role. Although a court may screen an expert opinion for reliability and may reject testimony that is wholly speculative, it may not weigh the expert’s conclusions or assume a fact-finding role. In its opinion, the district court took issue only with the expert’s ultimate conclusions. In its findings, the district court disregarded much of the expert’s scientific analysis, weighed the evidence on record, and demanded corroboration – fact-finding steps that exceeded the court’s gatekeeping role. View "Elosu v. Middlefork Ranch, Inc." on Justia Law

Relatives of Saldana, who died from COVID-19 at Glenhaven nursing home, sued Glenhaven in California state court, alleging state-law causes of action. Glenhaven removed the case to federal court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a remand to state court,The district court lacked jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442, because Glenhaven did not act under a federal officer or agency’s directions when it complied with mandatory directives from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Department of Health and Human Services.The claims were not completely preempted by the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, which provides immunity from suit when the HHS Secretary determines that a threat to health constitutes a public health emergency, but provides an exception for an exclusive federal cause of action for willful misconduct. A March 2020 declaration under the Act provided "liability immunity for activities related to medical countermeasures against COVID-19.” The Act does not displace non-willful misconduct claims related to the public health emergency, nor did it provide substitute causes of action. The federal scheme was not so comprehensive that it entirely supplanted state law claims.The district court did not have jurisdiction under the embedded federal question doctrine, which applies if a federal issue is necessarily raised, actually disputed, substantial, and capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress. View "Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and Swift reached a settlement pertaining to class claims alleging violations of California labor law, and claims brought under the California Private Attorney General Act (PAGA), which allows private citizens to recover civil penalties on behalf of themselves “and other current or former employees.” Peck and Mares objected to the settlement agreement. The district court gave final approval of the settlement.The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal of the PAGA settlement. Peck may not appeal the PAGA settlement because he was not a party to the underlying PAGA action. Although Peck is a class member of the class action, a PAGA action is distinct from a class action. Objectors to a PAGA settlement are not “parties” to a PAGA suit in the same sense that absent class members are “parties” to a class action. The fact that Peck may ultimately receive a portion of the PAGA settlement did not make him a party. Although Peck has a separately-filed PAGA action, that does not make him a party to this PAGA case.The court vacated the approval of the class action settlement. The district court erred in applying a presumption that the settlement was fair and reasonable, and the product of a non-collusive, arms-length negotiation; the error was not harmless. That erroneous presumption cast a shadow on the entire order. On remand, the district court must make findings in accordance with the applicable heightened standard. View "Peck v. Swift Transportation Co." on Justia Law

Falck is the parent company of subsidiaries that provide emergency medical care. A Falck subsidiary contracted with Griffith for consulting services. Griffith authorized the subsidiary to use Griffith’s proprietary information to support its bids. Years later, Griffith sent a cease-and-desist letter, claiming that Falck had used Griffith’s proprietary information without consent. Griffith shared its cease-and-desist letter with Falck’s competitor, who sent the letter to local media.Griffith sued Falck for intellectual property infringement and unfair competition in California, hours before Falck sued Griffith for defamation and breach of contract in Texas. The Texas court transferred Falck’s suit. The cases were consolidated in California, where Griffith moved to strike and dismiss the defamation claims in Falck’s First Amended Complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP rule. Falck was allowed to amend its complaint. Griffith moved to dismiss Falck’s Second Amended Complaint and appealed the order denying its anti-SLAPP motion to strike the original complaint.The Ninth Circuit dismissed Griffith’s appeal as moot because it could no longer grant any effective relief on the original complaint. Griffith has not appealed the decision to allow the Second Amended Complaint. Griffith did not appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss the original complaint until the Second Amended Complaint had been filed. The Second Amended Complaint made the original complaint no longer operative. View "Falck Northern California Corp. v. Scott Griffith Collaborative Solutions, LLC," on Justia Law

The "borrower defense" cancellation of federal student loans is allowed in certain cases of school misconduct, 20 U.S.C. 1087e(h). After DeVos became the Secretary of the Department of Education, the Department used a new methodology to decide borrower defense claims. The Department was preliminarily enjoined from using that methodology. From June 2018-December 2019, the Department issued no borrower defense decisions. Individuals with pending applications sued. The parties negotiated a proposed settlement that included an 18-month deadline to resolve outstanding claims. Before the class fairness hearing, the Department sent out form letters denying borrower defense applications at a rate of 89.8%. The district court denied final approval of the settlement and ordered updated written discovery. Plaintiffs took four depositions of Department officials and received about 2,500 documents. In 2021, after DeVos resigned as secretary, the district court authorized class counsel to take her deposition. Plaintiffs then served a subpoena for a nonparty deposition on DeVos under FRCP 45.The Ninth Circuit quashed the subpoena. Compelling the testimony of a cabinet secretary about the actions she took as a leader in the executive branch is allowable only in extraordinary circumstances. The party seeking the deposition must demonstrate agency bad faith and that the information sought from the secretary is essential to the case and cannot be obtained in any other way. There was no indication that DeVos held information that was essential to the case or that it was otherwise unobtainable. View "In re: United States Department of Education" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a wrongful foreclosure action, holding that the district court erred in denying plaintiffs’ motion to remand the action to the state court from which it had been removed to federal court by a party not named in the complaint. Constrained by the text of 28 U.S.C. 1441(a), the panel declined to follow the Second Circuit's La Russo rule, but instead held that only the actual named defendant or the defendants may remove a case under that removal provision. In this case, DBNTC was not a defendant when it removed this case, and thus the district court should have remanded the case. Accordingly, the court remanded to the state court. View "Sharma v. HSI Asset Loan Obligation Trust 2007-1" on Justia Law