Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A fire swept through a cabin in the Idaho wilderness. Nobody was at home, and neither residents, neighbors, nor first responders saw the cabin catch fire. The owners claimed that the fire was caused by a negligent employee of Middlefork, the homeowners’ association. An expert report prepared by fire investigator Koster hypothesized that an open-flame pilot light at the cabin ignited combustible vapors from an excessive oil stain that had been applied to the wooden deck the previous day.The district court excluded Koster’s testimony as speculative, uncertain, and contradicted by multiple eyewitness accounts. The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that the district court improperly assumed a fact-finding role. Although a court may screen an expert opinion for reliability and may reject testimony that is wholly speculative, it may not weigh the expert’s conclusions or assume a fact-finding role. In its opinion, the district court took issue only with the expert’s ultimate conclusions. In its findings, the district court disregarded much of the expert’s scientific analysis, weighed the evidence on record, and demanded corroboration – fact-finding steps that exceeded the court’s gatekeeping role. View "Elosu v. Middlefork Ranch, Inc." on Justia Law

Relatives of Saldana, who died from COVID-19 at Glenhaven nursing home, sued Glenhaven in California state court, alleging state-law causes of action. Glenhaven removed the case to federal court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a remand to state court,The district court lacked jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442, because Glenhaven did not act under a federal officer or agency’s directions when it complied with mandatory directives from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Department of Health and Human Services.The claims were not completely preempted by the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, which provides immunity from suit when the HHS Secretary determines that a threat to health constitutes a public health emergency, but provides an exception for an exclusive federal cause of action for willful misconduct. A March 2020 declaration under the Act provided "liability immunity for activities related to medical countermeasures against COVID-19.” The Act does not displace non-willful misconduct claims related to the public health emergency, nor did it provide substitute causes of action. The federal scheme was not so comprehensive that it entirely supplanted state law claims.The district court did not have jurisdiction under the embedded federal question doctrine, which applies if a federal issue is necessarily raised, actually disputed, substantial, and capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress. View "Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and Swift reached a settlement pertaining to class claims alleging violations of California labor law, and claims brought under the California Private Attorney General Act (PAGA), which allows private citizens to recover civil penalties on behalf of themselves “and other current or former employees.” Peck and Mares objected to the settlement agreement. The district court gave final approval of the settlement.The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal of the PAGA settlement. Peck may not appeal the PAGA settlement because he was not a party to the underlying PAGA action. Although Peck is a class member of the class action, a PAGA action is distinct from a class action. Objectors to a PAGA settlement are not “parties” to a PAGA suit in the same sense that absent class members are “parties” to a class action. The fact that Peck may ultimately receive a portion of the PAGA settlement did not make him a party. Although Peck has a separately-filed PAGA action, that does not make him a party to this PAGA case.The court vacated the approval of the class action settlement. The district court erred in applying a presumption that the settlement was fair and reasonable, and the product of a non-collusive, arms-length negotiation; the error was not harmless. That erroneous presumption cast a shadow on the entire order. On remand, the district court must make findings in accordance with the applicable heightened standard. View "Peck v. Swift Transportation Co." on Justia Law

Falck is the parent company of subsidiaries that provide emergency medical care. A Falck subsidiary contracted with Griffith for consulting services. Griffith authorized the subsidiary to use Griffith’s proprietary information to support its bids. Years later, Griffith sent a cease-and-desist letter, claiming that Falck had used Griffith’s proprietary information without consent. Griffith shared its cease-and-desist letter with Falck’s competitor, who sent the letter to local media.Griffith sued Falck for intellectual property infringement and unfair competition in California, hours before Falck sued Griffith for defamation and breach of contract in Texas. The Texas court transferred Falck’s suit. The cases were consolidated in California, where Griffith moved to strike and dismiss the defamation claims in Falck’s First Amended Complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP rule. Falck was allowed to amend its complaint. Griffith moved to dismiss Falck’s Second Amended Complaint and appealed the order denying its anti-SLAPP motion to strike the original complaint.The Ninth Circuit dismissed Griffith’s appeal as moot because it could no longer grant any effective relief on the original complaint. Griffith has not appealed the decision to allow the Second Amended Complaint. Griffith did not appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss the original complaint until the Second Amended Complaint had been filed. The Second Amended Complaint made the original complaint no longer operative. View "Falck Northern California Corp. v. Scott Griffith Collaborative Solutions, LLC," on Justia Law

The "borrower defense" cancellation of federal student loans is allowed in certain cases of school misconduct, 20 U.S.C. 1087e(h). After DeVos became the Secretary of the Department of Education, the Department used a new methodology to decide borrower defense claims. The Department was preliminarily enjoined from using that methodology. From June 2018-December 2019, the Department issued no borrower defense decisions. Individuals with pending applications sued. The parties negotiated a proposed settlement that included an 18-month deadline to resolve outstanding claims. Before the class fairness hearing, the Department sent out form letters denying borrower defense applications at a rate of 89.8%. The district court denied final approval of the settlement and ordered updated written discovery. Plaintiffs took four depositions of Department officials and received about 2,500 documents. In 2021, after DeVos resigned as secretary, the district court authorized class counsel to take her deposition. Plaintiffs then served a subpoena for a nonparty deposition on DeVos under FRCP 45.The Ninth Circuit quashed the subpoena. Compelling the testimony of a cabinet secretary about the actions she took as a leader in the executive branch is allowable only in extraordinary circumstances. The party seeking the deposition must demonstrate agency bad faith and that the information sought from the secretary is essential to the case and cannot be obtained in any other way. There was no indication that DeVos held information that was essential to the case or that it was otherwise unobtainable. View "In re: United States Department of Education" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a wrongful foreclosure action, holding that the district court erred in denying plaintiffs’ motion to remand the action to the state court from which it had been removed to federal court by a party not named in the complaint. Constrained by the text of 28 U.S.C. 1441(a), the panel declined to follow the Second Circuit's La Russo rule, but instead held that only the actual named defendant or the defendants may remove a case under that removal provision. In this case, DBNTC was not a defendant when it removed this case, and thus the district court should have remanded the case. Accordingly, the court remanded to the state court. View "Sharma v. HSI Asset Loan Obligation Trust 2007-1" on Justia Law

In response to the Port of Portland continuing to assign refer work to members of a particular union after leasing Terminal 6 to ICTSI. ILWU engaged in high-profile work stoppages and other coercive activity at Terminal 6. Ocean-going cargo traffic ceased for more than a year. ILWU’s actions forced ICTSI to buy back the remainder of its lease and leave Terminal 6. ICTSI filed charges against ILWU with the NLRB. The ALJ found that because the dispute was between ILWU and the Port, ILWU violated 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(4)(B), prohibiting unions from interfering with secondary employers (ICTSI). A jury awarded ICTSI more than $93.5 million. The court conditioned its post-trial rulings on ICTSI accepting remittitur of damages. ICTSI declined The district court certified its post-trial order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b).The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. A court of appeals may assert jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal under section 1292(b) if the district court determines that the order rests on a controlling question of law, there are substantial grounds for differences of opinion as to that question, and an immediate resolution may materially advance the termination of the litigation. The court of appeals enjoys broad discretion to refuse to accept it. The question on which ILWU relied was not a question of law; the parties’ dispute about whether ICTSI became a primary employer under the circumstances was a question of fact. View "ICTSI Oregon, Inc. v. International Longshore and Warehouse Union" on Justia Law

Through a bankruptcy proceeding, Bristol became the successor-in-interest to Haven, an accredited mental-health and substance-abuse treatment center that regularly serviced patients insured by Cigna. Bristol alleged that Cigna violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and state law by denying Haven’s claims for reimbursement for services provided. Haven was out-of-network for Cigna’s insureds. The district court dismissed Bristol’s ERISA claim, as an assignee of a healthcare provider, for lack of derivative standing, or lack of authority to bring a claim under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B).The Ninth Circuit reversed. Under ERISA, a non-participant health provider cannot bring claims for benefits on its own behalf but must do so derivatively, relying on its patients’ assignments of their benefits claims. Other assignees also may have derivative standing if extending standing would align with the goal of ERISA. Refusing to allow derivative standing for Bristol would create serious perverse incentives that would undermine the goal of ERISA. Denying derivative standing to health care providers would harm participants or beneficiaries because it would discourage providers from becoming assignees and possibly from helping beneficiaries who were unable to pay up-front. View "Bristol SL Holdings, Inc. v. Cigna Health and Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Childs leased military family housing at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, which was owned by SDFH, a public-private venture created by statute, in which the U.S. Navy is a minority LLC member. Lincoln managed the property. Childs reported water and mold problems to SDFH and Lincoln. The problems were not resolved. SDFH and Lincoln moved to dismiss Childs's subsequent lawsuit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing they were government contractors acting at the direction of the federal government, and therefore had derivative sovereign immunity. The district court denied their motion.The Ninth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The district court’s order was not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, under which an order that does not terminate the litigation is nonetheless treated as final if it conclusively determines the disputed question, resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. While the first two prongs were satisfied, the denial of derivative sovereign immunity was not effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment because denying an immediate appeal would not imperil a substantial public interest. The public interest underlying derivative sovereign immunity is extending the federal government’s immunity from liability, in narrow circumstances, to government agents carrying out the federal government’s directions. That interest could be vindicated after trial. View "Childs v. San Diego Family Housing LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a 2006 aircraft from an unidentified individual in 2016. In 2017, the plane was forced to make an emergency crash landing. The aircraft suffered significant structural damage and the complete loss of its engine, but no one was killed in the crash. Various actors were involved in the manufacture and maintenance of the aircraft, including Continental, which manufactured and shipped the engine to Columbia in Oregon, where it was installed. Cessna acquired assets from Columbia but did not assume Continental’s liabilities apart from express, written aircraft warranties still in effect at the time of acquisition. In 2014, Cessna became a subsidiary of Textron.Plaintiffs filed suit in Arizona, where the crash occurred. The case was removed to federal court. Four of the 15 original defendants—including Continental and Textron—were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that Plaintiffs had failed to show “that any of the moving Defendants are meaningfully connected to Arizona in such a way that renders them subject to this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed, noting that the Plaintiffs have conceded that Arizona does not have general jurisdiction over either Defendant. Plaintiffs also failed to establish a prima facie case of specific jurisdiction over either Defendant, failing to establish that Defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with Arizona that are related to Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs’ reasons for seeking jurisdictional discovery with regard to Defendants’ contacts with Arizona were properly deemed insufficient. View "LNS Enterprises, LLC v. Continental Motors, Inc." on Justia Law