Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case arose from a federal grand jury investigation of the acquisition of one company by another company. The grand jury issued two indictments and subpoenas to a third company, Doe Company ("the Company"), and to Pat Roe, a former officer at the acquired company and a current partner at the Company. The Company appealed the district court's denial of the Company's motion to quash and order of compliance by both the Company and by Pat Roe. After the Company declined to produce the documents, the district court held the Company in contempt.The Ninth Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's enforcement order directed to Roe. The panel clarified under Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), that in seeking interlocutory review of a court order enforcing a grand jury subpoena, an appellant must assert a claim of evidentiary privilege or some other legal claim specifically protecting against disclosure to the grand jury. Because the Company makes no such claim, the panel held that it did not have jurisdiction under Perlman and dismissed in part.After determining that it had jurisdiction to review the district court's enforcement orders directed to the Company and holding the Company in contempt, the panel held that, taken together, the district court's findings adequately support its determination that it had in personam jurisdiction over the Company. Furthermore, service of process on the Company was proper where it was fair, reasonable, and just to imply the authority of the General Counsel to receive service on behalf of the Company. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part. View "United States v. Doe Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action in state court alleging that Costco violated California Labor Code 1198 by failing to provide her and other employees suitable seating. After Costco removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), the district court ultimately granted summary judgment to plaintiff.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment with instructions to remand to state court, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction at the time the action was removed to federal court. The panel first held that the district court lacked diversity jurisdiction under section 1332(a). The panel explained that, because plaintiff's pro-rata share of civil penalties, including attorney's fees, totaled $6,600 at the time of removal, and the claims of other member service employees may not be aggregated under Urbino v. Orkin Services of California, Inc., 726 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2013), the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold was not met. The panel also held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA because plaintiff's stand-alone Private Attorney General Act lawsuit was not, and could not have been, filed under a state rule similar to a Rule 23 class action. Therefore, the district court erred by not remanding the case to state court. View "Canela v. Costco Wholesale Corp." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal seeking review of the district court's order remanding back to state court a partnership dissolution claim in an action that was originally filed in state court and removed to federal court.The panel held that 28 U.S.C. 1447, which governs procedure after removal and provides two separate authorizations for a district court's remand of a removed case, was applicable in this appeal. Furthermore, no matter whether the district court issued the remand pursuant to section 1447(c) or, as here, pursuant to section 1447(e), section 1447(d)'s bar applies; the accusation of legal error does not permit this court to sidestep the command of section 1447(d); and the panel rejected defendants' contention that section 1447(d) does not bar review because the district court remanded a single claim to state court while section 1447(d) prevents the review of orders "remanding a case."In holding that the joinder of a diversity-destroying party is not separable from a section 1447(e) remand order and is therefore unreviewable, the panel joined the Fourth Circuit. Finally, the panel need not decide whether section 1447(d) barred review of pre-remand decisions to sever claims, and mandamus relief was not warranted nor permissible. View "DeMartini v. DeMartini" on Justia Law

For standing purposes, a loss of even a small amount of money is ordinarily an injury. The temporary loss of use of one's money constitutes an injury in fact for purposes of Article III.Plaintiff filed a putative class action on behalf of LLR customers in Alaska who were improperly charged sales tax. The complaint alleged claims for conversion and misappropriation and for violation of the Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act. In this case, plaintiff was refunded $531.25 for sales tax charges, but contends that she is owed at least $3.76 in interest on that sum to account for her lost use of the money. The district court granted LLR's motion to dismiss.The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred by concluding that $3.76 is "too little to support Article III standing." The panel held that plaintiff suffered a cognizable and concrete injury: the loss of a significant amount of money (over $500) for a substantial amount of time (months with respect to some purchases, over a year with respect to others). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Van v. LLR, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed on different grounds the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims for restitution. Pursuant to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), the panel held that federal courts must apply equitable principles derived from federal common law to claims for equitable restitution under California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend her complaint for a third time to reallege the CLRA damages claim. In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she lacked an adequate legal remedy. View "Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp." on Justia Law

Counties and cities filed six complaints in California state court against energy companies, alleging nuisance and other causes of action arising from the role of fossil fuel products in global warming. After removal to federal court, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion to remand.The Ninth Circuit held, under 28 U.S.C. 1447(d), that the single ground of removal that it has jurisdiction to review is whether the district court erred in holding that there was no subject matter jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Therefore, the panel dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction to the extent the energy companies seek review of the district court's ruling as to other bases for subject matter jurisdiction. The panel affirmed in part, holding that the district court did not err in holding that there was no subject matter jurisdiction under section 1442(a)(1) where the energy companies failed to establish that they were "acting under" a federal officer's directions. View "County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp." on Justia Law

Defendants removed two complaints brought by California cities in state court alleging that defendants' production and promotion of fossil fuels is a public nuisance under California law.The Ninth Circuit held that the state-law claim for public nuisance does not arise under federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1331, and remanded to the district court to consider whether there was an alternative basis for subject-matter jurisdiction. The panel held that neither exception to the well-pleaded-complaint rule applies to the original complaints and thus the district court erred in holding that it had jurisdiction under section 1331 at the time of removal. The panel also held that the cities cured any subject-matter jurisdiction defect by amending their complaints to assert a claim under federal common law. The panel joined the Fifth Circuit in holding that a dismissal for failure to state a claim, unlike a grant of summary judgment or judgment after trial, is generally insufficient to forestall an otherwise proper remand. View "City of Oakland v. BP PLC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of claims brought by U.S. servicemembers and their families against TEPCO and GE, alleging that they were exposed to radiation from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. The Japanese Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage provides that the operator of a nuclear power plant is strictly liable for any damage caused by the operation of the power plant but no other person shall be liable.The panel held that Japan's Compensation Act was a liability-limiting statute with outcome-determinative implications and was substantive for Erie purposes. In this case, the district court did not err in proceeding with the full choice-of-law analysis at the motion-to-dismiss stage of the litigation. The panel applied California's three step "governmental interest" test in deciding the choice-of-law questions and ultimately concluded that the district court did not err when it decided that the laws of Japan, not California, govern plaintiffs' claims against GE. The panel likewise held that the district court did not err in proceeding with the choice-of-law analysis and finding that Japanese law also applies to plaintiffs' claims against TEPCO. Finally, having decided that Japanese law applies to the case and considering Japan's strong interests in the case being litigated in Japan, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the claims against TEPCO on international-comity grounds. View "Cooper v. Tokyo Electric Power Co." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for writ of mandamus filed under the Crime Victims' Rights Act. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of restitution to which petitioner is entitled. Furthermore, the panel held that the district court's finding that the prior civil settlement reduced the amount of petitioner's loss was supported by the evidence and was neither an abuse of discretion nor legally erroneous. View "Barber v. USDC, San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion for relief from the district court's denial of his 2009 motion for authorization to interview jurors at his 2003 criminal trial in order to investigate potential juror misconduct. Petitioner argued that the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017), changed the law governing requests to interview jurors for evidence of racial bias, and that this change constituted an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6).The panel first held that petitioner's motion is not a disguised second or successive section 2255 habeas motion, and the district court had jurisdiction to decide his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The panel held that a mere development in jurisprudence, as opposed to an unexpected change, does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance for purposes of Rule 60(b)(6). In this case, the panel wrote that, although Peña-Rodriguez established a new exception to Rule 60(b), this change in law left untouched the law governing investigating and interviewing jurors. Furthermore, because Peña-Rodriguez does not override local court rules or compel access to jurors, it is not "clearly irreconcilable" with precedent, Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (2003) (en banc), and therefore did not make any change in the law regarding lawyer access to jurors, let alone one so significant that it would constitute "extraordinary circumstances" for purposes of Rule 60(b). View "Mitchell v. United States" on Justia Law