Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2003, Dansker obtained an $83,000 home loan to purchase Las Vegas real estate. In 2009, Dansker died. No probate proceedings were instituted. In 2011, the neighborhood HOA began foreclosure proceedings and sold the property to LN. The priority lien-holder was Fannie Mae and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. The district court held that LN had not identified any legal representative of Dansker’s estate, and since no such person was identified and joined, complete diversity existed. The district court dismissed and denied a motion to substitute Dansker’s daughter.The Ninth Circuit vacated. Diversity did exist at the time of removal. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying a motion to substitute, so diversity jurisdiction continued to exist. The lawsuit was against Chase and Dansker. Dansker, being dead, had no legal existence, and, therefore, was not a citizen of any state. Jurisdiction exists where the federal entity is not the record beneficiary on the deed of trust but can prove its property interest through admissible evidence.The Federal Foreclosure Bar, which provides that FHFA's property shall not be subject to foreclosure without FHFA's consent, applies and is fatal to LN’s case on the merits. View "LN Management, LLC Series 5664 Divot V. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion to remand his case to state court, where he wants to pursue his claim that a JAG colleague, defendant, is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law because defendant is licensed only in states outside of California.The panel held that defendant was "acting under" a federal officer within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(2). The panel rejected plaintiff's contention that this was not a "civil action or criminal prosecution" under section 1442(a)(1), and held that defendant was a "person" within the meaning of the statute; there was a causal connection between plaintiff's claims and defendant's actions taken pursuant to a federal officer's directions; and defendant raised a colorable federal defense under the Supremacy Clause. In this case, defendant was appointed by and reports to a federal officer and is permitted by federal regulation to practice law, in a specific and limited capacity, without becoming a member of the California Bar. Therefore, defendant has a colorable defense that this federal regulatory scheme preempts a claim by a private individual that would have the effect of invalidating those federal regulations in states, like California, that do not require all JAG Trial Defense Service attorneys to become members of the California Bar. View "Stirling v. Minasian" on Justia Law

When a party that has suffered an adverse partial judgment subsequently dismisses any remaining claims without prejudice, and does so without the approval and meaningful participation of the district court, this court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291.The Ninth Circuit dismissed plaintiff's appeal of the district court's dismissal of her Rehabilitation Act claim. The panel dismissed the appeal based on lack of jurisdiction, because plaintiff voluntarily dismissed what she thought were her sole remaining claims without prejudice after the district court dismissed her Rehabilitation Act claim, and because the district court did not meaningfully participate in the dismissal of those claims and did not formally dismiss an additional remaining claim. The panel explained that the procedural posture indicates that the district court did not intend to enter a final judgment and that the retaliation claim is still before the district court. View "Galaza v. Wolf" on Justia Law

After plaintiffs were awarded more than $45 million in a products liability suit brought against EcoSmart, EcoSmart declared bankruptcy and plaintiffs brought a direct action against EcoSmart's insurer, LMIC, for payment on the judgment. LMIC argued that its policy with EcoSmart had a forum-selection clause designating Australian courts as the exclusive forum. The district court granted LMIC's motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens.The Ninth Circuit held that, because plaintiffs stand in the shoes of EcoSmart, their third-party creditors' rights are derivative of the rights and limitations held by the bankrupt insured, and thus the forum-selection clause applies. The panel also held that plaintiffs have not shown that the clause violates California public policy or that Australia is an inadequate forum for suit. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Lewis v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against 3D Systems for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, among other claims. Plaintiff's claims arose out of a purchase and sale agreement (PSA) documenting 3D Systems' acquisition of 3D printing websites from plaintiff. 3D Systems counterclaimed that plaintiff breached a covenant not to compete (CNTC) contained in the PSA.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's evidentiary rulings regarding the exclusion of a prior arbitration award. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of whether 3D Systems promised to invest substantial resources in the Domains. The panel also held that the district court exercised equitable jurisdiction to award 3D Systems restitution in the form of monetary relief. However, the district court erred in concluding that 3D Systems had a right to an equitable accounting and by relying solely on the text of the parties' contract to grant equitable relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. View "Barranco v. 3D Systems Corp." on Justia Law

In the underlying action, plaintiff filed suit against Williams-Sonoma for damages after he allegedly suffered from the company's alleged misrepresentations about thread count on bedding he purchased. Before a class action was certified, the district court concluded that Kentucky law governed plaintiff's claims and that Kentucky consumer law prohibited class actions. The district court then granted plaintiff's request to obtain discovery from the company for the sole purpose of helping counsel's attempt to find a California purchaser of bedding from Williams-Sonoma who might be willing to sue.The Ninth Circuit granted Williams-Sonoma's petition for writ of mandamus and ordered the district court to vacate a pre-class-certification discovery order that directed Williams-Sonoma to produce a list of California customers who had purchased certain bedding products. Applying the Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 656-661 (9th Cir. 1977), factors, the panel held that the district court clearly erred as a matter of law when it ordered the discovery in question. In this case, the first two Bauman factors weigh in favor of granting the petition, because Williams-Sonoma has no other adequate means to obtain relief at this time. Furthermore, before a direct appeal could be taken and heard, the disclosure and damage to its (and its customers') interests would be complete. The panel held that the balance of factors weighed in favor of granting the writ and vacated the district court's discovery order. View "In re: Williams-Sonoma, Inc." on Justia Law

Volkhoff appealed the district court's dismissal of the qui tam complaint filed by relator under the False Claims Act (FCA) and analogous state false claims laws. The Ninth Circuit dismissed Volkhoff's appeal based on lack of appellate jurisdiction, because Volkhoff was not a party to relator's complaint, and it was not clear from Volkhoff's notice of appeal, as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c), whether relator also sought to take an appeal. View "United States ex rel. Alexander Volkhoff, LLC v. Janssen Pharmaceutica NV" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion for relief from judgment in an action under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). In Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1135–40 (9th Cir. 2009), the panel set out the analysis that courts should employ to guide their discretion when evaluating the merits of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion that seeks relief from the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition on the ground of an intervening change in the law. In this case, plaintiffs sought relief from judgment based on an intervening change of law in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017).The panel held that many of the Phelps factors were relevant to the Rule 60(b)(6) analysis in the present context, and reemphasized that courts must consider all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the specific motion before the court in order to ensure that justice be done in light of all the facts. In this case, the panel held that the district court's denial of plaintiffs' Rule 60(b)(6) motion rested upon an erroneous view of the law as to several significant factors, and thus the panel remanded with directions. View "Henson v. Fidelity National Financial Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an action alleging that the FAA wrongfully terminated plaintiff. Plaintiff filed her action in the district court within the 30-day statutory limitations period, but she mistakenly named only the FAA and her former supervisor as defendants. Because plaintiff's action alleged claims of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, she should have named the head of the executive agency to which the FAA belonged, Secretary of Transportation Elaine Chao. After the statute of limitations had expired, the FAA moved to dismiss and Secretary Chao then filed her own motion to dismiss.The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff was entitled to relation back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2). The panel held that the district court adopted an overly technical interpretation of the term "process" as used in Rule 15(c)(2). Rather, the panel held that the notice-giving function of "process" under Rule 15(c)(2) was accomplished whether or not the summons accompanying the complaint was signed by the clerk of court. Furthermore, the requirements for relation back were met here where both the United States Attorney and the Attorney General were sufficiently notified of the action within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)'s 90-day period. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Silbaugh v. Chao" on Justia Law

The en banc court dismissed an appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs in an action challenging Nevada Senate Bill 223. SB 223 amended state vicarious liability and lien collection laws to impose certain administrative requirements on labor union trusts when they pursue debt collection on behalf of union members. While this appeal was pending, the Nevada legislature repealed SB 223 and replaced it with SB 338, with the specific intent to avoid the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preemption issues of SB 223.The en banc court joined other circuits and held that the repeal, amendment, or expiration of legislation creates a presumption that an action challenging the legislation is moot, unless there is a reasonable expectation that the legislature is likely to enact the same or substantially similar legislation in the future. Applying these principles in this case, the en banc court held that the action was moot where no live controversy remained. Accordingly, the en banc court remanded with instructions to vacate the judgment and dismiss the complaint. View "Board of Trustees of the Glazing Health and Welfare Trust v. Chambers" on Justia Law