Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

John Doe 1, an interested non-party, appealed the denial of his motion to quash a subpoena from Dell Plaintiffs to the DOJ. As part of a criminal antitrust investigation into the optical disc drive industry, the FBI made secret tape recordings and transcripts of conversations among various individuals, including Doe, an employee of one of the companies being investigated. After the grand jury investigation concluded with corporate pleas and a settlement, the Dell Plaintiffs, in a collateral civil antitrust suit against certain optical disk drive manufacturers, subpoenaed the DOJ seeking “recordings of conversations” and “verbatim transcripts” relating to the DOJ’s investigation of those manufacturers. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Doe's motion, holding that the tape recordings at issue in this case are not “matters occurring before the grand jury,” and, therefore, are not protected by Rule 6(e). The court declined to adopt the "effect test" in United States v. Dynavac, and Doe has offered no evidence showing that the disclosure of the tape recordings would compromise “the integrity of the grand jury’s deliberative process.” View "Dell Inc. v. Toshiba Samsung Storage Tech. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and numerous non-profit organizations filed a class-action suit challenging one aspect of the LASC's consolidation plan: the consolidation of unlawful detainer (tenant eviction) actions into hub courts. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit on federal abstention grounds under O'Shea v. Littleton. In this case, plaintiffs seek precisely the sort of “heavy federal interference in such sensitive state activities as administration of the judicial system” that Younger v. Harris and O’Shea sought to prevent. View "Miles v. Wesley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the Board's denial of plaintiff's application for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(C)(i). The EAJA entitles those who prevail on a legal claim against the U.S. government to an award of fees and costs, but only if they prevail in adversary adjudications. Specifically excluded from this category are proceedings “for the purpose of granting or renewing a license.” The court held that a hearing under the Mining Claims Rights Restoration Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C. 621–625, does not fall within the EAJA's definition of an adversary adjudication because such a hearing is held for the purpose of granting a license. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Eno v. Jewell" on Justia Law

The bank, chartered in Georgia, with its principal place of business in Doraville, Georgia, made a purchase money loan of $1,939,907.72 to AEHCC and defendant in connection with their purchase of a hotel. Defendant and her parents, guarantors of the loan, are residents of California. After the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant and her parents, defendant subsequently filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs pursuant to California Civil Code 1717(a), which makes reciprocal otherwise unilateral attorney’s fees clauses in contracts. The Bank contended that California Civil Code 1717(a) was inapposite, and that Georgia law should govern the attorney’s fees dispute. The district court agreed with defendant. The court applied the California choice-of-law principles and concluded that the district court correctly concluded that California law, including California Civil Code 1717(a), governs the outcome of this case, and awarded attorney’s fees to defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "First Intercontinental Bank v. Ahn" on Justia Law

The federal registration statute, 28 U.S.C. 1963, permits plaintiffs to take a judgment entered in one federal district court and register it in another. The court concluded that section 1963 is clear: a registered judgment has the “same effect” as a judgment issued by the registering district and thus itself may be registered, provided that it is “for the recovery of money or property.” In this case, the court concluded that the registration of the Washington registered judgment was valid. Therefore, the resulting Arizona registered judgment was enforceable under section 1963. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court, View "Fidelity Nat'l Fin. v. Friedman" on Justia Law

VSE agreed to store and destroy fireworks that had been seized by the federal government pursuant to a contract with the Department of the Treasury. On appeal, VSE challenges the district court’s order remanding to state court several actions that sought to impose liability on VSE for a deadly explosion involving the seized fireworks. The court concluded that the district court properly remanded plaintiffs’ actions to state court under 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) because VSE did not demonstrate that the requisite causal nexus between plaintiffs’ claims and direction or control of the project by a federal agency or official; VSE presented no evidence reflecting that the destruction plan for the fireworks was devised under the direction, supervision, or control of a federal officer as required for federal officer removal; federal officer removal was not warranted because VSE failed to demonstrate that it had a colorable federal defense to plaintiffs’ claims; VSE, a non-military contractor, was not able to assert a plausible government contractor defense; VSE did not establish that the federal government reviewed in detail the destruction plan that had been independently devised by VSE and Donaldson; and VSE was unable to satisfy the requirements for derivative sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cabalce v. Blanchard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence suit against defendant, alleging injuries resulting from a car accident. After the jury returned a verdict, the district court discharged them and recessed. After realizing that the verdict was a legal impossibility, the district court quickly called back the jurors, noting for the record that it was doing so moments after having dismissed them. The jury found for plaintiff again but plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred by recalling the jury after it had already been dismissed. The court joined the majority of circuit courts and held that a district court may reempanel a jury shortly after dismissal, but only if, during the period of dismissal, the jurors were not exposed to any outside influences that would compromise their ability to fairly reconsider the verdict. In this case, the recall was not an abuse of discretion given the circumstances, where the court promptly recalled the jurors, questioned them and found they were not exposed to prejudicial influence during the brief duration of their dismissal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dietz v. Bouldin" on Justia Law

Sanctionees Hancock, Musnuff, and Goodyear appealed from the district court's award of sanctions, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in relying upon its inherent power to impose sanctions, and in determining the amount and the nature of the sanctions imposed. The court concluded that Sanctionees’ argument that the district court should have relied on Federal Rule of Civil Produce 37 fails because the district court's inherent power is not limited by overlapping statutes or rules. The court held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to rely on its inherent power to sanction the conduct at issue in this case, and to determine that Rule 37 did not provide the appropriate remedy, especially since the discovery fraud was not discovered until after the case had settled. In this case, it is clear the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Hancock, Musnuff, and Goodyear acted in bad faith in this litigation; the district court acted well within its discretion in awarding all the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by plaintiffs after Goodyear served its supplemental responses to plaintiffs’ First Request; and the court affirmed the monetary and non-monetary sanctions set forth in the district court’s Order. View "Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co." on Justia Law

FibroGen, a biotechnology company and owner of two patents at issue, appealed the district court's order granting an ex parte application filed by Akebia under 28 U.S.C. 1782 for discovery in aid of foreign proceedings. FibroGen's patents, a European and Japanese patent, concern the use of various chemical compounds in treating anemia. Akebia, a biopharmaceutical company that develops products using similar chemical compounds, disputes the validity of FibroGen’s patents. Akebia initiated proceedings in both the European Patent Office and the Japanese Patent Office but neither office has established procedures through which Akebia may seek discovery of potentially relevant information located in the United States for use in those foreign proceedings. Akebia filed in the district court an application to conduct discovery in aid of foreign proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782. The district court granted Akebia’s application but imposed a restrictive protective order because of the confidential nature of the information sought. The court concluded that Akebia has Article III standing where it has a statutory right as an interested person under section 1782 to receive information and it has demonstrated an injury in fact caused by FibroGen's failure to disclose; the district court permissibly granted Akebia’s application for discovery in aid of a foreign proceeding; both the European Patent Office and the Japanese Patent Office are “tribunals” within the meaning of section 1782, and Akebia, as the party challenging the validity of the foreign patents, is an “interested person” that is allowed to seek judicial assistance; and the district court properly exercised its discretion in granting the application. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Akebia Therapeutics v. FibroGen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer NEON and NEON's parent company (Nike, Inc.), alleging sex and age discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, 2000e-3, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623. Plaintiff filed in the District of Oregon. Neon's parent company is headquartered in Oregon, but the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred in the Netherlands. The district court dismissed the claims. The court held that NEON’s contacts with the state of Oregon are insufficient to make it amenable to general personal jurisdiction there, pursuant to Daimler AG v. Bauman. The court also held that a court may attribute a parent company's contacts with the forum state to its foreign subsidiary for the purpose of exercising personal jurisdiction over the subsidiary upon a showing that the subsidiary is an alter ego of its parent, consistent with Doe v. Unocal Corp. In this case, plaintiff has not shown that NEON is Nike’s alter ego. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against NEON for lack of personal jurisdiction and affirmed the dismissal of the claims against Nike under the doctrine of forum non conveniens because the Netherlands provides a more convenient forum than Oregon to hear plaintiff's claims. The Dutch Equal Treatment Commission is an adequate alternative forum and it has already considered and rejected plaintiff’s claims. View "Ranza v. Nike, Inc." on Justia Law