Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal stems from a patent dispute involving Amity's patent for a device that dispenses both toothpicks and tablets and Market Quest's alleged infringement of the patent. The court concluded that this case arises under the patent laws and therefore falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. The court lacked jurisdiction to resolve the merits of the appeal, but concluded that, had this appeal been filed with the Federal Circuit at the time it was filed with this court, the Federal Circuit would have had jurisdiction. And because this appeal is neither frivolous nor is there any indication that it was filed in bad faith, the court concluded that transfer is in the interest of justice. Therefore, the court ordered the matter transferred to the Federal Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1631. View "Amity Rubberized Pen Co. v. Market Quest Grp." on Justia Law

The United States filed a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district judge’s policy restricting the pro hac vice admission of government attorneys. After the petition was filed, the district judge reversed his previous order denying an attorney in this case pro hac vice admission. The court concluded that the case was not moot and that the controversy remains live where it was reasonably likely that the judge will again deny the pro hac vice applications of attorneys for the United States; while the reversal of the challenged order did not render this controversy moot, it rendered a formal writ of mandamus a superfluous or ineffective remedy here; in this case, the judge acted outside his discretion by failing to provide a valid reason to deny the attorney's application for pro hac vice admission; the judge committed clear error; the first and second Bauman v. U.S. District Court factors weighed in favor of issuing mandamus when the petition was filed, and weigh in favor of offering guidance to the district court; the fact that the judge's order in this case was not an isolated occurrence weighed in favor of granting mandamus relief when the petition was filed; the district court's order raises important problems or issues of first impression and weighed in favor of mandamus relief when the petition was filed and weighs in favor of offering guidance to the district court even though a formal writ is no longer necessary; and issuing a formal writ would have been an appropriate remedy but for the judge’s voluntary cessation. Accordingly, the court denied the petition without prejudice. View "USA V. USDC-NVR" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Apple, alleging that Apple conspired with ATTM to violate federal antitrust laws by entering into an exclusivity agreement in which ATTM would be the exclusive provider of voice and data services for Apple's iPhone. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims under F.R.C.P. 19 for failure to join ATTM as a defendant. As a preliminary matter, the court determined that it had jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1291 because this is an appeal from a final decision of the district court. On the merits, the court concluded that ATTM's role as an antitrust co-conspirator is not alone dispositive of whether it had interests that warrant protection under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i). In this case, the district court erred by failing to specify the interests ATTM claimed or to address how those interests might be impaired if the action were resolved in its absence. The court concluded that Apple has not demonstrated that ATTM has a legally protected interest in this action where Apple has not demonstrated that the risk of regulatory scrutiny gives ATTM a legally protected interest in this action; ATTM’s reputational interests in this action are not legally protected under Rule 19; and Apple has not demonstrated that ATTM currently has any substantial contract rights that may be impaired by resolution of this action. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Ward v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute related to the division of pension assets after a divorce. At issue is whether a magistrate judge is empowered to issue an order remanding a removed case to state court, and whether such an order, once made, may be reviewed by the district court. The court held that a remand order made under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) is not within the power of a magistrate judge to issue under 28 U.S.C. 636. The court agreed with its sister circuits and held that a motion to remand is properly characterized as a dispositive motion under section 636(b)(1)(A), meaning that a remand order cannot be issued by a magistrate judge. Thus, a magistrate judge presented with a motion for remand “should provide a report and recommendation to the district court that is subject to de novo review.” Because the magistrate lacked the authority to issue a remand order under section 1447(c), section 1447(d) poses no bar to review under court precedent. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions. View "Flam v. Flam" on Justia Law

Kohn Law filed suit against APMM, alleging that it was entitled to payments APMM owed to a third party. The district court stayed the proceedings, finding the question presented was already being litigated by the same or related parties in Mississippi. At issue is the first-to-file rule. The parties do not dispute that the Mississippi interpleader action was filed first. Because the Mississippi interpleader action is a previously filed lawsuit involving substantially similar parties and issues, the district court did not abuse its discretion by entering the stay. Finally, the court denied the parties' motions to supplement the record. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Kohn Law Grp. v. Auto Parts Mfg." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint charging Apple Nevada with sexual harassment and discrimination, as well as an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court dismissed the complaint based on untimeliness. The court held that the filing date of a complaint is the date it is delivered to the clerk, whether it is submitted with or without an IFP application; if an IFP application is submitted with the complaint in lieu of the filing fee, and the application is thereafter denied, the district court will be free to dismiss the complaint if the fee is not paid within a reasonable time following the denial; and the filing date will be the date on which the complaint was originally delivered to the clerk’s office along with the IFP application. The court also held that it is an abuse of discretion to deny an IFP application based upon a spouse’s financial resources, unless there is a reasonable inquiry into (a) whether the spouse’s resources are actually available to the would-be plaintiff and (b) whether the spouse in fact has sufficient funds, given his or her own expenses, to assist in paying the fee. In this case, plaintiff's complaint was filed for purposes of the statute of limitations when she delivered it to the clerk's office along with her IFP application. The complaint was filed on time and the denial of the IFP application lacked adequate foundation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Escobedo v. Apple American Grp." on Justia Law

Byron Pickle appealed the district court's default judgment and final judgment of forfeiture of real property. The judgment was entered after the district court granted the government's motion to strike Pickle's claim and answer based on Pickle's failure to respond to special interrogatories the government propounded under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure's Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions (Rule) G(6)(c)(i)(A), and denied Pickle's motion to stay. The court concluded that the district court incorrectly viewed Pickle's failure to answer the Rule G(6) special interrogatories as a per se basis for striking his claim. Because the district court’s decision to strike Pickle’s claim was based on the legally erroneous belief that Pickle’s failure to comply with Rule G(6) vitiated his statutory standing to contest the forfeiture and required dismissal of his claim forthwith, and because Pickle’s failure to answer the G(6) interrogatories would not have warranted striking his claim as a discovery sanction without giving him an opportunity to cure his lack of response, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Pickle" on Justia Law

In 2013, Plaintiffs filed an action against the Boeing Company and Landau Associates (Landau) in a Washington state court alleging that from the 1960s to the present years Boeing released toxins into the groundwater around its facility in Auburn, Washington and that for over a decade Landau, Boeing’s environmental-remediation contractor, had been negligent in its investigation and remediation of the pollution. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs asserted state law claims of negligence, nuisance, and trespass. Boeing removed the action to a federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The district court remanded the case to state court, concluding (1) contrary to Boeing’s allegations, Landau was not fraudulently joined, and thus there was not complete diversity; and (2) Plaintiffs’ action came within the local single event exception to CAFA federal jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that Boeing failed to show that Landau was fraudulently joined; but (2) Plaintiffs’ action does not come within the local single event exception to CAFA, and therefore, the district court has federal jurisdiction under CAFA. Remanded. View "Allen v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

Thirteen inmates in custody throughout the Arizona prison system brought a class action suit against senior officials in the Arizona Department of Corrections alleging that they were subjected to systemic Eighth Amendment violations. The district court certified a class consisting of 33,000 prisoners incarcerated in the Arizona prison system, concluding that the putative class and subclass of inmates satisfied the requirements of class certification set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Plaintiffs satisfied Rule 23(a)(2). The panel subsequently voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc. Judge Ikuta filed a dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc concurrently with this order, arguing that all members of this diverse class of prisoners did not have an Eighth Amendment claim, alone a common claim, and therefore the certification ran afoul of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, Lewis v. Casey, and the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. View "Parsons v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The government filed a civil complaint seeking forfeiture of funds held in a brokerage account. The clerk entered a default against Appellants and all other potential claimants. The district court granted the government’s motion for entry of default and, concluding that Appellants could not allege a meritorious defense, refused to grant their motion to set aside the default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). The court did not specifically articulate any “extreme circumstances” justifying entry of default and default judgment. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) courts reviewing a Rule 60(b) motion must apply the factors outlined in Falk v. Allen to ensure that the “extreme circumstances” policy is recognized, but nothing in Rule 60(b) nor the Court’s precedent requires a district court to articulate on the record particular “extreme circumstances” before it denies a motion to set aside a default judgment; and (2) after applying the Falk factors, it is clear that Appellants had no meritorious defense, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants’ Rule 60(b)(1) motion. View "United States v. Aguilar" on Justia Law