Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed statutory and constitutional challenges to government surveillance programs. The district court dismissed a Fourth Amendment claim regarding Internet surveillance, on the grounds that plaintiffs lacked standing and that their claim was barred by the state secrets privilege. The district court then certified the issue as final under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The government filed a motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the Rule 54(b) certification was not warranted and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the Fourth Amendment question is intertwined with several other issues that remain pending in district court and because this interlocutory appeal would only prolong final resolution of the case. View "Jewell v. NSA" on Justia Law

Chevron and Transpay dispute a multi-million dollar purchase of a gasoline service station in San Francisco. Chevron argued that the station's $2.375 price constituted a bona fide offer under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA), 15 U.S.C. 2802(b)(3)(D)(iii), but Transbay rejected this argument and urged the court to preserve the jury verdict awarding it almost half a million dollars as compensation for overpayment. At issue was whether the district court erred in excluding at trial a third-party appraisal of the property that valued it significantly higher than either of the appraisals commissioned by the parties. The court used the possession plus test and held that when a party acts in conformity with the contents of a document - e.g., by giving an independent appraisal to a lender in support of accomplishing its objective to secure a commercial loan - such an action constitutes an adoption of the statements contained under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(B) even if the party never reviewed the document’s contents; such an action constitutes an adoption even if the third-party never itself uses or relies on the document; and where, however, a party forwards a document while acting as a mere messenger, this does not constitute an adoption. In this case, the PSG Appraisal - the only third-party appraisal available - values the property higher than any other appraisal and remarkably higher than any other going concern appraisal. Because the court cannot say with any degree of confidence that had the jury been presented with the PSG Appraisal, it would have come to the same conclusion, the court concluded that the evidentiary error merits a new trial. Accordingly, the court reversed, vacated, and remanded. View "Transbay Auto Serv. v. Chevron" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint and the subsequent denial of his motion to reconsider that dismissal. At issue was whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) required plaintiff, who filed his First Amended Complaint with consent of the opposing party, to seek leave of court before filing his Second Amended Complaint. The court found that Rule 15(a) does not impose any such timing mechanism and therefore held that plaintiff was permitted to file his Second Amended Complaint “as a matter of course,” without seeking leave of court. Because the timely filed Second Amended Complaint mooted the motion to dismiss, the court reversed the district court’s grant of defendants’ motion to dismiss the superseded First Amended Complaint and the resulting dismissal of plaintiff’s case. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino" on Justia Law

The Union seeks enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum it served on Fresh & Easy before a hearing before the Board. The Board issued the subpoena at the Union’s request in connection with charges that Fresh & Easy engaged in unfair labor practices by stifling union activity. Fresh & Easy contends that it missed the filing deadline because the Union did not serve Fresh & Easy’s counsel of record with a copy of the subpoena where only the party was served. The district court held that the subpoena was properly served and ordered Fresh & Easy to comply with the Union’s requests. The court concluded that, in neglecting to serve the subpoena on Fresh & Easy’s counsel of record, the Union failed to meet its procedural obligations. Although the Union was obliged to serve the subpoena on Fresh & Easy’s counsel of record, the court agreed with the Board’s conclusion that “failure to serve counsel does not constitute grounds for revoking a subpoena, absent a showing of prejudice.” In this case, Fresh & Easy cannot credibly claim prejudice where counsel never filed a petition to revoke the subpoena. The court's finding that Fresh & Easy was not prejudiced precludes consideration of the merits-based challenges to the subpoena’s validity, as the Board did not consider those claims. Accordingly, the court upheld the district court's enforcement order. View "NLRB v. Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Mkt." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, owners of a rare coin known as a "Brasher Doubloon," alleging claims for quantum meruit, fraud, breach of contract, constructive trust, and misappropriation of trade secrets. Plaintiff offered to sell defendants information that would prove that their coin was the first legal-tender coin struck pursuant to an Act of Congress. After plaintiff gave defendants the information, defendants denied payment. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that the Coin was not, as plaintiff theorized, legal tender struck pursuant to the Act Regulating Foreign Coins, and For Other Purposes, ch. 5. 1 Stat. 300. Plaintiff could not recover because he had not provided the information he alleged he was required to provide pursuant to the parties’ agreement. Further, the court concluded that plaintiff did not satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) because he failed to identify what specific facts a deposition of Defendant Contursi would have revealed that would have precluded summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Swoger v. Rare Coins Wholesalers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Lieutenant with the Corrections Department, filed suit alleging violations of both 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the California Whistleblower Protection Act, California Government Code 8547, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding that plaintiff was collaterally estopped from relitigating the whistleblower retaliation issue because it had been litigated during the State Personnel Board proceedings. The court reversed because, pursuant to State Board of Chiropractic Examiners v. Superior Court, the State Personnel Board’s decision does not have preclusive effect under theories of res judicata and collateral estoppel and thus does not prevent plaintiff from litigating his whistleblower retaliation damages claim in the district court. View "Wabakken v. CA Dep't of Corr. & Rehab." on Justia Law

John Doe 1, an interested non-party, appealed the denial of his motion to quash a subpoena from Dell Plaintiffs to the DOJ. As part of a criminal antitrust investigation into the optical disc drive industry, the FBI made secret tape recordings and transcripts of conversations among various individuals, including Doe, an employee of one of the companies being investigated. After the grand jury investigation concluded with corporate pleas and a settlement, the Dell Plaintiffs, in a collateral civil antitrust suit against certain optical disk drive manufacturers, subpoenaed the DOJ seeking “recordings of conversations” and “verbatim transcripts” relating to the DOJ’s investigation of those manufacturers. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Doe's motion, holding that the tape recordings at issue in this case are not “matters occurring before the grand jury,” and, therefore, are not protected by Rule 6(e). The court declined to adopt the "effect test" in United States v. Dynavac, and Doe has offered no evidence showing that the disclosure of the tape recordings would compromise “the integrity of the grand jury’s deliberative process.” View "Dell Inc. v. Toshiba Samsung Storage Tech. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and numerous non-profit organizations filed a class-action suit challenging one aspect of the LASC's consolidation plan: the consolidation of unlawful detainer (tenant eviction) actions into hub courts. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit on federal abstention grounds under O'Shea v. Littleton. In this case, plaintiffs seek precisely the sort of “heavy federal interference in such sensitive state activities as administration of the judicial system” that Younger v. Harris and O’Shea sought to prevent. View "Miles v. Wesley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the Board's denial of plaintiff's application for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(C)(i). The EAJA entitles those who prevail on a legal claim against the U.S. government to an award of fees and costs, but only if they prevail in adversary adjudications. Specifically excluded from this category are proceedings “for the purpose of granting or renewing a license.” The court held that a hearing under the Mining Claims Rights Restoration Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C. 621–625, does not fall within the EAJA's definition of an adversary adjudication because such a hearing is held for the purpose of granting a license. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Eno v. Jewell" on Justia Law

The bank, chartered in Georgia, with its principal place of business in Doraville, Georgia, made a purchase money loan of $1,939,907.72 to AEHCC and defendant in connection with their purchase of a hotel. Defendant and her parents, guarantors of the loan, are residents of California. After the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant and her parents, defendant subsequently filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs pursuant to California Civil Code 1717(a), which makes reciprocal otherwise unilateral attorney’s fees clauses in contracts. The Bank contended that California Civil Code 1717(a) was inapposite, and that Georgia law should govern the attorney’s fees dispute. The district court agreed with defendant. The court applied the California choice-of-law principles and concluded that the district court correctly concluded that California law, including California Civil Code 1717(a), governs the outcome of this case, and awarded attorney’s fees to defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "First Intercontinental Bank v. Ahn" on Justia Law