Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a class action in California state court alleging that Dollar Tree Stores Inc. violated California state law by denying proper rest breaks to its employees. Dollar Tree removed the case to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The district court granted Plaintiff’s request to remand back to California state court because the CAFA $5 million amount-in-controversy requirement was not satisfied. After remand, a California superior court certified a broader class. Dollar Tree again filed a notice of removal, arguing that the expanded class actually certified placed at least $5 million in controversy. The district court concluded that the second removal was untimely because the order was based on the same complaint that had been the subject of the first removal. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding (1) the state court’s class certification order created a new occasion for removal, and the second removal was permissible; (2) the second removal was timely; and (3) because the jurisdictional requirements of CAFA were met, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. Remanded. View "Reyes v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this class action lawsuit in Washington state court against Nationstar Mortgage LLC, alleging several causes of action, including violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Nationstar filed a notice of removal to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Plaintiff moved to remand the proceeding to state court, arguing that its removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. 1446(b). The district court granted the motion and awarded Plaintiff attorney fees and costs because it found that Nationstar did not have an objectively reasonable basis for removal. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding (1) Nationstar’s removal under CAFA was timely, and therefore, the action properly belonged in federal court; and (2) the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees that was premised on improper removal must be reversed. View "Jordan v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC" on Justia Law

In 2007, MTB Enterprises, Inc. obtained a $17 million construction loan from financial institution ANB Financial. ANB thereafter failed, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation transferred the construction loan to ADC Venture 2011-2, LLC. In 2012, MTB filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho against ADC Venture alleging that ADC Venture assumed the obligations of ANB Financial and was therefore liable for breach of contract and damages from MTB’s failed construction venture. The district court dismissed MTB’s claims. The Ninth Circuit dismissed MTB’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding (1) the rule set forth in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 that a claimant must sue in the district court where the failed bank’s principal place of business was located or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is a jurisdictional limitation on federal court review; and (2) because the United States District Court for the District of Idaho lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case from the start, the case must be dismissed. View "MTB Enters., Inc. v. ADC Venture 2011-2, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the family members and a former coworker of three Americans who were kidnapped and killed while providing contract security services during the U.S. military occupation of Iraq, brought suit against U.S. government officials challenging policies governing the supervision of private contractors and the response to the kidnappings of American citizens in Iraq (“policy claims”) and claiming that the government was withholding back pay, insurance proceeds, and government benefits owed to the families of the deceased contractors (“monetary claims”). The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly dismissed the policy claims for lack of standing and for presenting nonjusticiable political questions; but (2) erred in dismissing the monetary claims for failure to establish a waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity from suits for damages and for failure to state a claim, as, although Plaintiffs failed to allege a governmental waiver of sovereign immunity that would confer jurisdiction in the district court over the monetary claims, the United States Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction over the claims for withheld back pay and insurance proceeds. Remanded for the district court to transfer those claims. View "Munns v. Kerry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a resident of California, and Defendant, a resident of Michigan, worked together with a third man to develop and market an electrolyte for use in hydrogen fuel cells. When Plaintiff and the third man sold the electrolyte technology without telling Defendant, Defendant threatened to sue if he was not paid what he claimed was his one-third share of the proceeds under an oral agreement. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued Defendant in California seeking a declaration that no oral agreement existed between the parties and for damages for intentional interference with a sales contract. The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over Defendant on either of the two claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant neither purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in California nor expressly aimed his conduct at California, the district court did not err in dismissing the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Picot v. Weston" on Justia Law

The Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign (SeaMAC), a non-profit organization opposed to United States support for Israel, submitted an advertisement to run on King County Metro buses in the Seattle metropolitan area that opposed the United States government’s financial support for Israel. King County initially accepted the ad but then revoked its approval, concluding that displaying the ad would likely result in violence disruptive to the bus system. SeaMAC sued the County under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of its First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that Metro’s bus advertising program created a limited public forum and that the County’s decision to reject the ad was reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) King County created a limited public forum when it opened the sides of Metro buses to advertising from outside speakers; and (2) the County’s exclusion of SeaMAC’s proposed ad was both reasonable and viewpoint neutral and thus did not violate the First Amendment. View "Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King County" on Justia Law

The California Dump Truck Owners Association (Truck Association) initiated a federal preemption challenge to a California environmental regulation. The district court dismissed the suit, finding that the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) approval of the regulation as part of California’s state implementation plan (SIP) divested the court of jurisdiction under the Clean Air Act (CAA). The Truck Association appealed, contending that it was challenging only the regulation and not the SIP, and therefore, the CAA did not apply. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the Truck Association’s suit, as a practical matter, challenged the the EPA’s approval of a provision of California’s SIP; and (2) because the court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over such challenges, the district court lacked jurisdiction. View "Cal. Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v. Nichols" on Justia Law

Black Mesa sought costs and expenses from the OSM after Black Mesa participated in a successful challenge to OSM's grant of a coal mining permit revision. The ALJ denied the fee request, the IBLA affirmed, and the district court affirmed. The court held that, on the standard of review applicable here, the review of the agency's "eligibility" determination is de novo and its "entitlement" determination is reviewed for substantial evidence; on de novo review, Black Mesa is "eligible" for fees because it showed some degree of success on the merits; in light of the court's decision on "eligibility," the court declined to reach whether, on this record, Black Mesa was "entitled" to fees; and the court remanded for the agency to consider the issue. In addition, the court rejected Black Mesa's argument that the Secretary waived a challenge to the reasonableness of any award amount that the agency might grant on remand for costs and expenses reasonably incurred for Black Mesa's participation in the proceedings at the agency level. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Black Mesa Water Coalition v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Shell sought and obtained approval from the Bureau of two oil spill response plans, relating to the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, required by the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. 1321(j). After obtaining approval, Shell filed suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201(a), against environmental organizations seeking a declaration that the Bureau's approval did not violate the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 501 et seq. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Shell lacked Article III standing where Shell does not have legal interests adverse to the Bureau under the APA and it may not file suit solely to determine who would prevail in a hypothetical suit between the environmental groups and the Bureau. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order denying the environmental groups' motion to dismiss. View "Shell Gulf of Mex. v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Quality and others, alleging that Quality failed to pay him and other similarly situated employees minimum wages and overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal under Rule 8. Post- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the court reviewed plaintiff's complaint to determine whether the allegations plausibly state a claim that Quality failed to pay minimum wages and overtime wages, keeping in mind that detailed facts are not required. The court was persuaded by the rationale espoused in the First, Second, and Third Circuit cases that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff asserting a claim to overtime payments must allege that she worked more than forty hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the overtime hours worked during that workweek. The court further agreed with its sister circuits that, at a minimum, a plaintiff asserting a violation of the FLSA overtime provisions must allege that she worked more than forty hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the hours worked in excess of forty during that week. In this case, plaintiff failed to state a claim for unpaid minimum wages and overtime wages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Landers v. Quality Communications" on Justia Law