Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The federal registration statute, 28 U.S.C. 1963, permits plaintiffs to take a judgment entered in one federal district court and register it in another. The court concluded that section 1963 is clear: a registered judgment has the “same effect” as a judgment issued by the registering district and thus itself may be registered, provided that it is “for the recovery of money or property.” In this case, the court concluded that the registration of the Washington registered judgment was valid. Therefore, the resulting Arizona registered judgment was enforceable under section 1963. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court, View "Fidelity Nat'l Fin. v. Friedman" on Justia Law

VSE agreed to store and destroy fireworks that had been seized by the federal government pursuant to a contract with the Department of the Treasury. On appeal, VSE challenges the district court’s order remanding to state court several actions that sought to impose liability on VSE for a deadly explosion involving the seized fireworks. The court concluded that the district court properly remanded plaintiffs’ actions to state court under 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) because VSE did not demonstrate that the requisite causal nexus between plaintiffs’ claims and direction or control of the project by a federal agency or official; VSE presented no evidence reflecting that the destruction plan for the fireworks was devised under the direction, supervision, or control of a federal officer as required for federal officer removal; federal officer removal was not warranted because VSE failed to demonstrate that it had a colorable federal defense to plaintiffs’ claims; VSE, a non-military contractor, was not able to assert a plausible government contractor defense; VSE did not establish that the federal government reviewed in detail the destruction plan that had been independently devised by VSE and Donaldson; and VSE was unable to satisfy the requirements for derivative sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cabalce v. Blanchard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence suit against defendant, alleging injuries resulting from a car accident. After the jury returned a verdict, the district court discharged them and recessed. After realizing that the verdict was a legal impossibility, the district court quickly called back the jurors, noting for the record that it was doing so moments after having dismissed them. The jury found for plaintiff again but plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred by recalling the jury after it had already been dismissed. The court joined the majority of circuit courts and held that a district court may reempanel a jury shortly after dismissal, but only if, during the period of dismissal, the jurors were not exposed to any outside influences that would compromise their ability to fairly reconsider the verdict. In this case, the recall was not an abuse of discretion given the circumstances, where the court promptly recalled the jurors, questioned them and found they were not exposed to prejudicial influence during the brief duration of their dismissal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dietz v. Bouldin" on Justia Law

Sanctionees Hancock, Musnuff, and Goodyear appealed from the district court's award of sanctions, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in relying upon its inherent power to impose sanctions, and in determining the amount and the nature of the sanctions imposed. The court concluded that Sanctionees’ argument that the district court should have relied on Federal Rule of Civil Produce 37 fails because the district court's inherent power is not limited by overlapping statutes or rules. The court held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to rely on its inherent power to sanction the conduct at issue in this case, and to determine that Rule 37 did not provide the appropriate remedy, especially since the discovery fraud was not discovered until after the case had settled. In this case, it is clear the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Hancock, Musnuff, and Goodyear acted in bad faith in this litigation; the district court acted well within its discretion in awarding all the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by plaintiffs after Goodyear served its supplemental responses to plaintiffs’ First Request; and the court affirmed the monetary and non-monetary sanctions set forth in the district court’s Order. View "Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co." on Justia Law

FibroGen, a biotechnology company and owner of two patents at issue, appealed the district court's order granting an ex parte application filed by Akebia under 28 U.S.C. 1782 for discovery in aid of foreign proceedings. FibroGen's patents, a European and Japanese patent, concern the use of various chemical compounds in treating anemia. Akebia, a biopharmaceutical company that develops products using similar chemical compounds, disputes the validity of FibroGen’s patents. Akebia initiated proceedings in both the European Patent Office and the Japanese Patent Office but neither office has established procedures through which Akebia may seek discovery of potentially relevant information located in the United States for use in those foreign proceedings. Akebia filed in the district court an application to conduct discovery in aid of foreign proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782. The district court granted Akebia’s application but imposed a restrictive protective order because of the confidential nature of the information sought. The court concluded that Akebia has Article III standing where it has a statutory right as an interested person under section 1782 to receive information and it has demonstrated an injury in fact caused by FibroGen's failure to disclose; the district court permissibly granted Akebia’s application for discovery in aid of a foreign proceeding; both the European Patent Office and the Japanese Patent Office are “tribunals” within the meaning of section 1782, and Akebia, as the party challenging the validity of the foreign patents, is an “interested person” that is allowed to seek judicial assistance; and the district court properly exercised its discretion in granting the application. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Akebia Therapeutics v. FibroGen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer NEON and NEON's parent company (Nike, Inc.), alleging sex and age discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, 2000e-3, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623. Plaintiff filed in the District of Oregon. Neon's parent company is headquartered in Oregon, but the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred in the Netherlands. The district court dismissed the claims. The court held that NEON’s contacts with the state of Oregon are insufficient to make it amenable to general personal jurisdiction there, pursuant to Daimler AG v. Bauman. The court also held that a court may attribute a parent company's contacts with the forum state to its foreign subsidiary for the purpose of exercising personal jurisdiction over the subsidiary upon a showing that the subsidiary is an alter ego of its parent, consistent with Doe v. Unocal Corp. In this case, plaintiff has not shown that NEON is Nike’s alter ego. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against NEON for lack of personal jurisdiction and affirmed the dismissal of the claims against Nike under the doctrine of forum non conveniens because the Netherlands provides a more convenient forum than Oregon to hear plaintiff's claims. The Dutch Equal Treatment Commission is an adequate alternative forum and it has already considered and rejected plaintiff’s claims. View "Ranza v. Nike, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal stems from a patent dispute involving Amity's patent for a device that dispenses both toothpicks and tablets and Market Quest's alleged infringement of the patent. The court concluded that this case arises under the patent laws and therefore falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. The court lacked jurisdiction to resolve the merits of the appeal, but concluded that, had this appeal been filed with the Federal Circuit at the time it was filed with this court, the Federal Circuit would have had jurisdiction. And because this appeal is neither frivolous nor is there any indication that it was filed in bad faith, the court concluded that transfer is in the interest of justice. Therefore, the court ordered the matter transferred to the Federal Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1631. View "Amity Rubberized Pen Co. v. Market Quest Grp." on Justia Law

The United States filed a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district judge’s policy restricting the pro hac vice admission of government attorneys. After the petition was filed, the district judge reversed his previous order denying an attorney in this case pro hac vice admission. The court concluded that the case was not moot and that the controversy remains live where it was reasonably likely that the judge will again deny the pro hac vice applications of attorneys for the United States; while the reversal of the challenged order did not render this controversy moot, it rendered a formal writ of mandamus a superfluous or ineffective remedy here; in this case, the judge acted outside his discretion by failing to provide a valid reason to deny the attorney's application for pro hac vice admission; the judge committed clear error; the first and second Bauman v. U.S. District Court factors weighed in favor of issuing mandamus when the petition was filed, and weigh in favor of offering guidance to the district court; the fact that the judge's order in this case was not an isolated occurrence weighed in favor of granting mandamus relief when the petition was filed; the district court's order raises important problems or issues of first impression and weighed in favor of mandamus relief when the petition was filed and weighs in favor of offering guidance to the district court even though a formal writ is no longer necessary; and issuing a formal writ would have been an appropriate remedy but for the judge’s voluntary cessation. Accordingly, the court denied the petition without prejudice. View "USA V. USDC-NVR" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Apple, alleging that Apple conspired with ATTM to violate federal antitrust laws by entering into an exclusivity agreement in which ATTM would be the exclusive provider of voice and data services for Apple's iPhone. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims under F.R.C.P. 19 for failure to join ATTM as a defendant. As a preliminary matter, the court determined that it had jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1291 because this is an appeal from a final decision of the district court. On the merits, the court concluded that ATTM's role as an antitrust co-conspirator is not alone dispositive of whether it had interests that warrant protection under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i). In this case, the district court erred by failing to specify the interests ATTM claimed or to address how those interests might be impaired if the action were resolved in its absence. The court concluded that Apple has not demonstrated that ATTM has a legally protected interest in this action where Apple has not demonstrated that the risk of regulatory scrutiny gives ATTM a legally protected interest in this action; ATTM’s reputational interests in this action are not legally protected under Rule 19; and Apple has not demonstrated that ATTM currently has any substantial contract rights that may be impaired by resolution of this action. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Ward v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute related to the division of pension assets after a divorce. At issue is whether a magistrate judge is empowered to issue an order remanding a removed case to state court, and whether such an order, once made, may be reviewed by the district court. The court held that a remand order made under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) is not within the power of a magistrate judge to issue under 28 U.S.C. 636. The court agreed with its sister circuits and held that a motion to remand is properly characterized as a dispositive motion under section 636(b)(1)(A), meaning that a remand order cannot be issued by a magistrate judge. Thus, a magistrate judge presented with a motion for remand “should provide a report and recommendation to the district court that is subject to de novo review.” Because the magistrate lacked the authority to issue a remand order under section 1447(c), section 1447(d) poses no bar to review under court precedent. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions. View "Flam v. Flam" on Justia Law