Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a resident of California, and Defendant, a resident of Michigan, worked together with a third man to develop and market an electrolyte for use in hydrogen fuel cells. When Plaintiff and the third man sold the electrolyte technology without telling Defendant, Defendant threatened to sue if he was not paid what he claimed was his one-third share of the proceeds under an oral agreement. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued Defendant in California seeking a declaration that no oral agreement existed between the parties and for damages for intentional interference with a sales contract. The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over Defendant on either of the two claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant neither purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in California nor expressly aimed his conduct at California, the district court did not err in dismissing the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Picot v. Weston" on Justia Law

The Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign (SeaMAC), a non-profit organization opposed to United States support for Israel, submitted an advertisement to run on King County Metro buses in the Seattle metropolitan area that opposed the United States government’s financial support for Israel. King County initially accepted the ad but then revoked its approval, concluding that displaying the ad would likely result in violence disruptive to the bus system. SeaMAC sued the County under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of its First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that Metro’s bus advertising program created a limited public forum and that the County’s decision to reject the ad was reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) King County created a limited public forum when it opened the sides of Metro buses to advertising from outside speakers; and (2) the County’s exclusion of SeaMAC’s proposed ad was both reasonable and viewpoint neutral and thus did not violate the First Amendment. View "Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King County" on Justia Law

The California Dump Truck Owners Association (Truck Association) initiated a federal preemption challenge to a California environmental regulation. The district court dismissed the suit, finding that the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) approval of the regulation as part of California’s state implementation plan (SIP) divested the court of jurisdiction under the Clean Air Act (CAA). The Truck Association appealed, contending that it was challenging only the regulation and not the SIP, and therefore, the CAA did not apply. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the Truck Association’s suit, as a practical matter, challenged the the EPA’s approval of a provision of California’s SIP; and (2) because the court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over such challenges, the district court lacked jurisdiction. View "Cal. Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v. Nichols" on Justia Law

Black Mesa sought costs and expenses from the OSM after Black Mesa participated in a successful challenge to OSM's grant of a coal mining permit revision. The ALJ denied the fee request, the IBLA affirmed, and the district court affirmed. The court held that, on the standard of review applicable here, the review of the agency's "eligibility" determination is de novo and its "entitlement" determination is reviewed for substantial evidence; on de novo review, Black Mesa is "eligible" for fees because it showed some degree of success on the merits; in light of the court's decision on "eligibility," the court declined to reach whether, on this record, Black Mesa was "entitled" to fees; and the court remanded for the agency to consider the issue. In addition, the court rejected Black Mesa's argument that the Secretary waived a challenge to the reasonableness of any award amount that the agency might grant on remand for costs and expenses reasonably incurred for Black Mesa's participation in the proceedings at the agency level. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Black Mesa Water Coalition v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Shell sought and obtained approval from the Bureau of two oil spill response plans, relating to the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, required by the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. 1321(j). After obtaining approval, Shell filed suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201(a), against environmental organizations seeking a declaration that the Bureau's approval did not violate the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 501 et seq. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Shell lacked Article III standing where Shell does not have legal interests adverse to the Bureau under the APA and it may not file suit solely to determine who would prevail in a hypothetical suit between the environmental groups and the Bureau. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order denying the environmental groups' motion to dismiss. View "Shell Gulf of Mex. v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Quality and others, alleging that Quality failed to pay him and other similarly situated employees minimum wages and overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal under Rule 8. Post- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the court reviewed plaintiff's complaint to determine whether the allegations plausibly state a claim that Quality failed to pay minimum wages and overtime wages, keeping in mind that detailed facts are not required. The court was persuaded by the rationale espoused in the First, Second, and Third Circuit cases that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff asserting a claim to overtime payments must allege that she worked more than forty hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the overtime hours worked during that workweek. The court further agreed with its sister circuits that, at a minimum, a plaintiff asserting a violation of the FLSA overtime provisions must allege that she worked more than forty hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the hours worked in excess of forty during that week. In this case, plaintiff failed to state a claim for unpaid minimum wages and overtime wages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Landers v. Quality Communications" on Justia Law

IntelliGender sold and advertised the IntelliGender Prediction Test as an accurate predictor of a fetus's gender using the mother's urine sample. The district court approved a Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), settlement between a nationwide certified class of purchasers of the Test and IntelliGender. The State subsequently filed an enforcement action against IntelliGender under the State's Unfair Competition and False Advertising Laws, largely based on the same claims as the class action. The court concluded that the district court correctly denied IntelliGender's motion to enjoin the State's enforcement action in its entirety where IntelliGender had not met its burden of showing that the CAFA class action settlement could bind the State in its sovereign capacity, where it asserted both public and private interests. The court agreed that a CAFA class action settlement, though approved by the district court, does not act as res judicata against the State in its sovereign capacity, even though many of the same claims are included in both actions. Because the State action is brought on behalf of the people, it implicates the public's interests as well as private interests, and therefore the remedial provisions sweep much more broadly. The court concluded, however, that the State is precluded from seeking the same relief sought in the CAFA class action where IntelliGender provided notice to the appropriate parties of the class action and the State chose not to participate. Therefore, the district court erred in denying IntelliGender's motion to enjoin the State's claims for restitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "State of California v. IntelliGender" on Justia Law

Appellant, an attorney, appealed the district court's order finding that he committed ethical violations, and disqualifying him from representing plaintiff in a pending action against Gateway. Appellant's violations stemmed from his use of knowledge gained from questionably-obtained emails to prepare a public records request. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the ethical violations are intertwined with the disqualification order and the United States Supreme Court has held that disqualification is not subject to interlocutory appeal. View "Thurbon v. Gateway Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's judgment dismissing her claims against Fannie Mae, contending that the district court lacked jurisdiction over their claims. The court affirmed, concluding that, under the rule announced in American National Red Cross v. S.G., the sue-and-be sued clause in Fannie Mae's federal charter confers federal question jurisdiction over claims brought by or against Fannie Mae. Accordingly, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims.View "Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that various defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights when they searched her apartment without a warrant. The court dismissed the claim based on untimeliness. The court concluded that the district court properly rejected plaintiff's claim that she sufficiently identified all defendants; the district court did not err in concluding that plaintiff's amended complaints, which added certain defendants, did not relate back to the date of her original complaint under Cal. Civ. P. Code 474; the district court also concluded that plaintiff's amended complaints did not relate back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C); and the district court correctly rejected plaintiff's claim for equitable tolling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Butler v. NCRC" on Justia Law