Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, the court considered the district court's order granting in part and denying in part a newspaper's motion to unseal transcripts and filings related to a grand jury witness's contempt and continued confinement proceedings. The court concluded that direct appeal was the appropriate procedure for the newspaper to seek review of the district court's order and mandamus relief is unavailable because the district court's order was a final, appealable order; there is no First Amendment public right of access to: (1) filings and transcripts relating to motions to quash grand jury subpoenas, (2) the closed portions of contempt proceedings containing discussions of matters occurring before the grand jury, or (3) motions to hold a grand jury witness in contempt; the public does have presumptive First Amendment rights of access to: (1) orders holding contemnors in contempt and requiring their confinement, (2) transcripts and filings concerning contemnors' continued confinement, (3) filings related to motions to unseal contempt files, and (4) filings in appeals from orders relating to the sealing or unsealing of judicial records; although the rights of access the court recognized are categorical, they are not unqualified; it is not sufficient for documents to be declared publicly available without a meaningful ability for the public to find and access those documents; because the government has not offered any alternatives, the court held that the district court must unseal its docket to allow the public to access those transcripts and filings to which it is entitled; and the court addressed each category of requested documents in turn.View "United States v. Index Newspapers" on Justia Law

Named plaintiffs, former FedEx drivers, represented two classes of plaintiffs comprising approximately 363 individuals who were full-time delivery drivers for FedEx in Oregon at any time between 1999 and 2009. Plaintiff class members worked for FedEx's two operating divisions, FedEx Ground and FedEx Home Delivery. FedEx contended its drivers were independent contractors under Oregon law. Plaintiffs contended they were employees. In a consolidated appeal, plaintiffs claimed that "FedEx improperly classified its drivers as independent contractors, thereby forcing them to incur business expenses and depriving them of benefits otherwise owed to employees" under Oregon law. The Ninth Circuit agreed with plaintiffs, and reversed the Multidistrict Litigation Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx Ground, its denial of plaintiff FedEx drivers' motion for partial summary judgment, and its certification of plaintiffs' classes insofar as they sought prospective relief. View "Slayman, et al v. FedEx Ground Package System" on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs represented a class comprising approximately 2300 individuals who were full-time delivery drivers for FedEx in California between 2000 and 2007. FedEx contended its drivers were independent contractors under California law. Plaintiffs contended they were employees. This appeal involved a class action originally filed in the California Superior Court in December 2005 on behalf of a class of California FedEx drivers, asserting claims for employment expenses and unpaid wages under the California Labor Code on the ground that FedEx had improperly classified the drivers as independent contractors. Plaintiffs also brought claims under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), which similarly turned on the drivers' employment status. FedEx removed to the Northern District of California based on diversity. Between 2003 and 2009, similar cases were filed against FedEx in approximately forty states. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated these FedEx cases for multidistrict litigation ("MDL") proceedings in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana ("the MDL Court"). Plaintiffs moved for class certification. The MDL Court certified a class for plaintiffs' claims under California law. It declined to certify plaintiffs' proposed national FMLA class. Plaintiffs in all the MDL cases moved for partial summary judgment, seeking to establish their status as employees as a matter of law. In this case, FedEx cross-moved for summary judgment. The MDL Court denied nearly all of the MDL plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and granted nearly all of FedEx's motions, holding that plaintiffs were independent contractors as a matter of law in each state where employment status was governed by common-law agency principles. The MDL Court remanded this case to the district court to resolve the drivers' claims under the FMLA. Those claims were settled, and the district court entered final judgment. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging the MDL Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx on the employment status issue. FedEx conditionally cross-appealed, arguing that if we reverse the MDL Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx, we should also reverse the MDL Court's class certification decision. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs were employees as a matter of law under California's right-to-control test. Accordingly, the Court reversed both the MDL Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx and its denial of plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to enter summary judgment for plaintiffs on the question of employment status. View "Alexander, et al v. FedEx Ground Package System" on Justia Law

ASARCO, LLC ("Asarco") appealed the district court's dismissal of its contribution action brought under section 113(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). Asarco sought to recover from Union Pacific Railroad Co. and Union Pacific Corp. a share of $482 million in cleanup costs Asarco paid for environmental harm at the Coeur d'Alene Superfund Site in Northern Idaho. The district court dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that although Asarco's claim was timely, it was barred by a 2008 settlement agreement between the parties that settled Union Pacific's claims against Asarco at the same site. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Asarco's claim was timely, but that the parties' 2008 settlement agreement did not unambiguously release Asarco's claim in this case. Therefore reversed the district court's judgment dismissing the case under Rule 12(b)(6). View "ASARCO LLC v. UPRC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging that defendants failed to provide necessary services for students with diabetes in California public schools. The parties subsequently entered into a settlement agreement and the district court retained limited jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. After the district court's jurisdiction had expired per the terms of the settlement agreement, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking attorneys' fees for monitoring defendants' compliance with the agreement. The district court denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the district court erred in failing to recognize the distinction between ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and ancillary jurisdiction over an attorney's fees dispute. While the settlement agreement limited the district court's ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the parties' settlement, it did not affect the district court's ancillary jurisdiction over an attorneys' fees dispute. Thus, the district court has ancillary jurisdiction over plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees. The court reversed and remanded. View "K.C. v. Torlakson" on Justia Law

Riverkeeper attempted to intervene in an effort to prevent LNG from constructing a liquefied natural gas facility and pipeline along the Columbia River in Oregon. Riverkeeper sought review of the Coast Guard's issuance of a letter of recommendation regarding the suitability of the waterway for vessel traffic, contending that the court has jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717r(d)(1). Section 717r(d) authorizes judicial review of agency orders and actions that issue, condition, or deny any permit, license, concurrence, or approval. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition for review because the letter of recommendation was not such an order or action under section 717r(d)(1). View "Columbia Riverkeeper v. U.S. Coast Guard" on Justia Law

Defendants invoked diversity jurisdiction and filed a notice of removal fourteen months after the lawsuit was filed in state court. The district court sua sponte remanded, concluding that defendants removed the case too late. The court held that the district court acted in excess of its statutory authority because the one-year time limitation for removal of diversity cases under 28 U.S.C. 1446(b) is a procedural requirement rather than jurisdictional; while the district court may remand at any time prior to final judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot remand sua sponte based on a non-jurisdictional defect because procedural deficiencies are waivable; and, in this instance, plaintiffs' failure to object constituted a waiver of any right to contest the removal. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Smith v. Mylan Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a victim of a mailbox theft crime, challenged the district court's orders denying in part motions to quash two subpoenas duces tecum whose issuance defendant had requested under Rule 17(c)(3). The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion or commit legal error in denying the motions to quash; the information sought by defendant meets the standard for issuing a Rule 17(c) subpoena; in ordering production of the requested documents, the district court appropriately balanced the victim's privacy interests against defendant's right to investigate the case and prepare a defense for trial; and, therefore, the court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus under the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. 3771. Given the sensitive nature of the documents sought, production and disclosure of the documents on July 2, 2014 shall initially be limited to the district court. View "K.K. v. USDC-HI" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their claims related to the formation and operation of the MERS System, an electronic mortgage registration system. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction appellants' appeal of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) Order because they have not sought a writ of mandamus; the court held that appellants have waived their argument regarding the MDL Court's remand orders; nothing in the record suggested that the MDL Court considered extraneous materials in ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); therefore, the MDL Court did not convert defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment; the court reversed the MDL Court's dismissal of Count I, alleged violations of Arizona's false documents statute; affirmed the MDL Court's dismissal of Count II, wrongful foreclosure; affirmed the MDL Court's dismissal of Count III, Nevada Revised Statutes 107.080; affirmed the MDL Court's dismissal of Count V, aiding and abetting wrongful foreclosure under Arizona, California, and Nevada law; affirmed the MDL Court's dismissal of Count VI, aiding and abetting predatory lending under Arizona, California, and Nevada law; and concluded that the MDL Court acted within its discretion in denying leave to amend. View "In re: MERS" on Justia Law

This appeal involves parallel judicial proceedings initiated by ReadyLink in state court and in federal court. ReadyLink contended that a decision by the Commissioner was preempted by IRS regulations. The federal district court abstained pursuant to Younger v. Harris and while the district court judgment was pending, the California Court of Appeal rejected ReadyLink's preemption claim. The California Supreme Court denied review. The court applied the Supreme Court's guidance in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs and found that the district court erred by abstaining. Applying the California issue preclusion test, the court concluded that the decision of the California Court of Appeals barred ReadyLink's preemption claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "ReadyLink Healthcare v. SCIF" on Justia Law