Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In February 2016, two Seattle police officers, Scott Miller and Michael Spaulding, fatally shot Che Andre Taylor during an attempted arrest. Kshama Sawant, a Seattle City Council member, publicly referred to the incident as a "blatant murder" and later reiterated that Taylor was "murdered by the police." Following an inquest, prosecutors declined to file charges against the officers due to insufficient evidence of malice. Miller and Spaulding subsequently filed a lawsuit alleging defamation and outrage under state law, as well as a federal defamation claim against Sawant.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the federal defamation claim but retained jurisdiction over the state law claims. The court later granted Sawant's motion for summary judgment on the state law claims and awarded her expert witness deposition expenses, including fees for preparation time. Miller and Spaulding appealed the decision, challenging the award of expert witness fees and the admissibility of the expert's opinions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 allows for the recovery of reasonable expenses for time an expert witness spends preparing for a deposition. The court joined other circuits in concluding that such preparation fees are recoverable under Rule 26. The court found that the expert witness deposition preparation fees awarded to Sawant were reasonable and did not result in manifest injustice. The Ninth Circuit also noted that objections to the admissibility of the expert's opinions did not negate the obligation to pay a reasonable fee under Rule 26. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and the award of expert witness deposition expenses. View "Miller v. Sawant" on Justia Law

Michael Mayes filed a complaint against American Hallmark Insurance Company in state court. American Hallmark received a copy of the complaint and removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction before being formally served. Mayes moved to remand the case, arguing that removal was improper because American Hallmark had not yet been formally served.A magistrate judge concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) does not require formal service before removal and recommended denying the motion to remand. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon reviewed the issue de novo and agreed with the magistrate judge’s interpretation, denying Mayes’ motion to remand.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), a defendant may remove a state-court civil action once it receives a copy of the complaint, without waiting for formal service. The court clarified that the statute sets a deadline for removal but does not establish a "window" that prohibits removal before formal service. The court also noted that the statutory context and precedent from other circuit courts support this interpretation. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Mayes' motion to remand. View "Mayes v. American Hallmark Insurance Co." on Justia Law

An attorney, Jeffrey Cogan, filed a federal lawsuit challenging an Arizona state court judgment against him for malicious prosecution. The state court judgment arose from Cogan's actions during a federal bankruptcy proceeding involving Arnaldo Trabucco. Cogan sought a declaration that the state court lacked jurisdiction over the malicious prosecution claim because it involved conduct exclusively within federal jurisdiction.The Arizona state court had granted partial summary judgment against Cogan, finding him liable for malicious prosecution and awarding $8 million in damages. Cogan appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the liability finding but vacated the damages award, remanding for a new trial on damages. Cogan then filed the federal lawsuit before the retrial, arguing that the state court lacked jurisdiction. The district court dismissed Cogan's federal complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars federal courts from reviewing state court judgments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because the malicious prosecution claim was completely preempted by federal law, falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. The court reasoned that state courts lack jurisdiction over malicious prosecution claims arising from federal bankruptcy proceedings, as established in MSR Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc. Therefore, the state court judgment was subject to collateral attack in federal court.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Cogan's challenge to the state court judgment to proceed in federal court. View "COGAN V. TRABUCCO" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit against the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) for racially profiling Latino drivers and passengers under the guise of immigration enforcement. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court issued a permanent injunction in 2013, followed by a supplemental injunction appointing an independent monitor to oversee MCSO’s compliance. In 2016, a second supplemental injunction required MCSO to reform its internal misconduct investigation procedures. In 2022, a third supplemental injunction found the Sheriff in contempt for non-compliance and set forth curative measures, including creating a Constitutional Policing Authority (CPA) and assigning its duties to the Monitor.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona initially issued the permanent injunction and subsequent supplemental injunctions. The court found MCSO in contempt for failing to comply with the injunctions and ordered additional remedial measures. The district court relied on its inherent equitable powers rather than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 in issuing these orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s amended third supplemental permanent injunction. It held that the district court acted within its inherent equitable powers in assigning the CPA’s duties to the Monitor. The court rejected the Sheriff’s contention that this assignment violated Article III of the Constitution and separation of powers principles. It also found that the First Order provided adequate judicial review of the Monitor’s actions and that the Third Order did not contravene Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65’s specificity requirement. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court’s actions were appropriate and affirmed the Third Order. View "MELENDRES V. SKINNER" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, representing a class of drivers whose cars were totaled in accidents, alleged that their insurers, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, failed to pay the actual cash value of their vehicles. They contended that State Farm applied two unlawful discounts: a negotiation discount, which reduced the value based on typical buyer negotiations, and a condition discount, which adjusted for the car's condition compared to similar vehicles.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington initially certified two classes: a negotiation class and a condition class. However, following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lara v. First National Insurance Company of America, the district court decertified both classes and granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's decertification of the negotiation class, holding that plaintiffs could prove injury on a class-wide basis by adding back the unlawful negotiation adjustment to determine the value each class member should have received. However, the court affirmed the decertification of the condition class, as determining injury required an individualized comparison of the unlawful condition adjustment and a hypothetical lawful adjustment.The Ninth Circuit also vacated the district court's summary judgment against the named plaintiffs, remanding the case for the district court to reassess whether the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence of injury. The court clarified that plaintiffs could rely on the Autosource reports, minus the unlawful adjustments, as relevant evidence of injury. The court rejected State Farm's argument that Article III standing was a barrier to the plaintiffs' suit, affirming that the plaintiffs' claim of receiving less than owed under their insurance policies constituted a concrete injury. View "JAMA V. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY" on Justia Law

Claude Stephen Bent, a lawful permanent resident from Jamaica, pleaded no contest to two felony charges in California in 2006. The judge did not inform him of the immigration consequences of his plea. After serving his sentence, Bent was detained by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2016 and charged with removability based on his felony conviction. Bent applied for asylum and other relief, but an immigration judge (IJ) denied his application and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision. Bent appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which remanded the case to the BIA. The BIA again dismissed his appeal, and Bent petitioned for review.Bent moved to vacate his 2006 conviction in California state court, which was granted in 2022 on the grounds that his plea was involuntary and violated his Fifth Amendment rights. Bent then moved to reopen his removal proceedings before the BIA, arguing that his vacated conviction invalidated the basis for his removal. The BIA denied the motion, stating it was untimely and not subject to equitable tolling, and mischaracterized the California statute as allowing vacatur solely to mitigate immigration consequences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in its interpretation of California Penal Code § 1473.7(a)(1) and the state court's order, which vacated Bent's conviction due to a constitutional defect, not to alleviate immigration consequences. The Ninth Circuit also held that the BIA misapplied equitable tolling precedent by not properly assessing whether Bent diligently pursued his rights. The court granted Bent's petition for review in part and remanded the case to the BIA to adjudicate his motion to reopen under the correct legal standards. View "BENT V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, Election Integrity Project California, Inc., and ten former political candidates, challenged the California Secretary of State’s certification of the November 2020 general election results and sought to declare California’s vote-by-mail election system unconstitutional. They alleged that state and county officials diluted the voting power of in-person voters and voters in certain counties by inadvertently counting some invalid vote-by-mail ballots.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for failure to state a claim. The district court concluded that even if all the plaintiffs’ allegations were true, they failed to state plausible claims of constitutional violations in the administration of California’s elections. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ vote dilution claim failed as a matter of law because they did not show disproportionate voting power for some voters over others. The court found that any effect of counting invalid vote-by-mail ballots was the same for all votes, regardless of voting method or geography. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that California’s election laws and county practices violated the Equal Protection Clause, finding that the state’s election rules and practices satisfied the requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiffs’ allegations of election irregularities did not plausibly demonstrate the scale of disenfranchisement or lack of integrity necessary to state a due process claim.Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiffs a further opportunity to amend their complaint, as any further amendment would likely prove futile. The court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims without leave to amend. View "ELECTION INTEGRITY PROJECT CALIFORNIA, INC. V. WEBER" on Justia Law

Maria Pomares submitted three Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) concerning potential misconduct within the VA. She suspected that Charmain Bogue, the director of the Education Service in the Veterans Benefit Administration, had improper ties to a political advocacy organization and that the VA might have leaked nonpublic information. After Pomares submitted her FOIA requests, the VA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) found that Bogue had acted improperly.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the VA. The court concluded that the VA’s search for responsive emails was reasonable and that the VA properly justified its withholdings under FOIA Exemptions 4, 5, 6, and 7. The district court found that the Vaughn Indices provided by the VA were adequate and included sufficient detail to justify the withholdings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment regarding the adequacy of the VA’s search for emails and the application of Exemption 4 to records obtained from Evocati. The court also affirmed the application of Exemption 6 to the redaction of names and contact information, except for the names (but not email addresses) of Veterans Education Success (VES) employees who lobbied Congress or the VA. However, the court reversed the district court’s judgment regarding the withholding of OIG interview transcripts under Exemption 7(E), as the VA did not adequately justify that the interview techniques and methods used by OIG fell within this exemption. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Pomares v. USDVA" on Justia Law

Ryan Cox filed a class action lawsuit alleging that the defendants manipulated the price of a cryptocurrency called HEX by artificially lowering its ranking on CoinMarketCap.com. The defendants include two domestic companies, a foreign company, and three individual officers of the foreign company. Cox claimed that the manipulation caused HEX to trade at lower prices, benefiting the defendants financially.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that Cox needed to show the defendants had sufficient contacts with Arizona before invoking the Commodity Exchange Act's nationwide service of process provision. The court found that none of the defendants had sufficient contacts with Arizona.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the Commodity Exchange Act authorizes nationwide service of process independent of its venue requirement. The court concluded that the district court had personal jurisdiction over the U.S. defendants, CoinMarketCap and Binance.US, because they had sufficient contacts with the United States. The court also found that Cox's claims against these defendants were colorable under the Commodity Exchange Act. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the claims against the U.S. defendants and remanded for further proceedings.However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims against the foreign defendants, Binance Capital and its officers, due to their lack of sufficient contacts with the United States. The court vacated the dismissal "with prejudice" and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint against the foreign defendants without prejudice. View "COX V. COINMARKETCAP OPCO, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a non-fatal shooting of Joseph Williams by officers of the Sparks Police Department following a 42-minute car chase. Williams had stolen alcohol and vandalized a vehicle, leading to a police pursuit. During the chase, Williams ran red lights, drove through a fence, and briefly drove on the wrong side of the freeway. The chase ended when officers pinned Williams's truck, but he continued to attempt to flee, leading officers to fire multiple rounds, injuring him.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied summary judgment on Williams's claims of excessive force, municipal liability, and battery, except for the negligence claim. The court found genuine factual disputes about the threat Williams posed and whether he was attempting to flee when officers fired. The court also denied summary judgment on the Monell claims and the battery claim, citing unresolved factual issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment. The appellate court found that video evidence clearly showed Williams attempting to accelerate, contradicting his claim. The court held that the officers' use of deadly force was objectively reasonable, given the threat Williams posed to public safety. The court also exercised pendent jurisdiction over the Monell and battery claims, finding no constitutional violation in the officers' use of force and ruling that the battery claim failed because the force used was not unreasonable. The court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Williams v. City of Sparks" on Justia Law