Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Roman Gonzales worked as a Security Police Officer for a government contractor managing a nuclear facility. He had a chronic back injury, for which he took prescription opiates. Battelle Energy Alliance, the contractor, was aware of his medical condition and medication. For several years, Gonzales performed his duties without incident, including after the Department of Energy began requiring more stringent security and medical certifications for such officers. Despite no change in his medication regimen or job performance, Battelle, after a change in medical staff and updated drug testing protocols, revoked Gonzales’s fitness-for-duty certification and subsequently terminated his employment. Gonzales then learned that management had informed coworkers he was being dismissed as an “opioid abuser,” which he reported to human resources.Gonzales filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, alleging discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). After a five-day trial, the jury found in his favor on claims of retaliation and “regarded as” disability discrimination. Battelle moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that decisions involving the revocation of security-related certifications, such as the one at issue, were not subject to judicial review because such decisions are reserved for federal agencies under national security regulations. The district court denied this motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that revocation of Gonzales’s fitness-for-duty certification under 10 C.F.R. § 1046 was subject to judicial review because it involved medical and physical standards, not predictive national security determinations or security clearance decisions reserved to the Department of Energy. The court distinguished between non-justiciable security clearance decisions and fitness-for-duty certifications, ensuring ADA protections remain enforceable. View "GONZALES V. BATTELLE ENERGY ALLIANCE, LLC" on Justia Law

An Iranian citizen, living in the United States, held a credit card account with a large financial institution. Due to United States sanctions against Iran, federal regulations prohibit U.S. banks from providing services to accounts of individuals ordinarily resident in Iran, unless those individuals are not located in Iran. The bank had a compliance policy requiring account holders from such sanctioned countries to regularly provide documents showing they were not residing in those countries. The plaintiff, subject to this policy, submitted various documents as proof of U.S. residency. After the bank mistakenly treated one of his residency documents as temporary rather than permanent, it closed his account when he failed to submit additional documentation.The plaintiff sued in state court, alleging violations of federal and state anti-discrimination and consumer protection statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, and the California Unfair Competition Law. The defendant bank removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. The district court granted summary judgment for the bank on all claims except for an ECOA notice claim and a related UCL claim, both of which the plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed. The plaintiff then appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act’s liability shield provision immunizes the bank from liability for good faith actions taken in connection with compliance with sanctions regulations, even if such actions are not strictly compelled by the regulations. The court found that the bank’s policy was consistent with federal guidance and that the plaintiff failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the bank’s good faith. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the bank. View "NIA V. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A." on Justia Law

A group of eighteen minors residing in California filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other federal officials, claiming that the government’s policy of discounting future costs and benefits in cost-benefit analyses for greenhouse gas (GHG) regulations discriminates against children. The plaintiffs alleged this practice favors present-day consumption, benefiting adults over minors, and leads to under-regulation of GHG emissions. They argued this under-regulation contributes to climate change, which, in turn, causes them various harms including property damage, health issues, and psychological distress.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. That court dismissed the action, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court found that the plaintiffs’ claims did not establish a cognizable injury-in-fact, that the alleged environmental harms were not fairly traceable to the government’s discounting policies, and that the requested declaratory relief would not redress their injuries. The district court allowed the plaintiffs one opportunity to amend their complaint, but after the plaintiffs did so, the court again dismissed the case and denied further leave to amend, finding further amendment would be futile.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to allege a viable injury to their equal protection rights, as the government’s discounting policies were not shown to be motivated by discriminatory intent toward children. The court also found the alleged environmental harms too attenuated and speculative to be fairly traceable to the challenged policies. Additionally, circuit precedent foreclosed the requested declaratory relief, as it would not redress the plaintiffs’ injuries. The Ninth Circuit concluded that denying further leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. View "G.B. V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

During the summer of 2025, protests erupted in Southern California in response to federal immigration raids. Protesters, legal observers, and journalists alleged that officers of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal Protective Services, and Customs and Border Protection, used crowd control weapons indiscriminately against them. Multiple individuals, including members of the press and protesters, suffered significant physical injuries during these events, even when they were complying with police orders or were not near disruptive protest activity.Several individual journalists, legal observers, protesters, and two press organizations filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. They alleged violations of their First Amendment rights, specifically the right to be free from retaliation for engaging in protected activities and the right of public access to protests. The district court issued a preliminary injunction to protect the rights of protesters, journalists, and legal observers, finding that the defendants’ conduct chilled First Amendment activity. The government appealed, arguing that the injunction was overly broad and legally unsound.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their First Amendment retaliation claims, that both individual and organizational plaintiffs had standing, and that the other requirements for a preliminary injunction were met. However, the court found that the scope of the injunction was overbroad because it extended relief to non-parties and included provisions not narrowly tailored to the specific harms alleged. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to issue a preliminary injunction but vacated and remanded the case for the district court to craft a narrower injunction consistent with its opinion. View "LOS ANGELES PRESS CLUB V. NOEM" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual convicted of two counts of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and one count of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, stemming from a 2018 indictment related to the sale of methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court classified him as a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, based on two prior convictions: one federal conviction for distribution of cocaine and one Nevada state conviction for the sale of controlled substances under Nevada Revised Statute § 453.321(1)(a). This classification resulted in a higher sentencing range, and he ultimately received a sentence of 235 months, substantially longer than a similarly situated co-defendant.After his direct appeal was unsuccessful, he filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, arguing that his prior Nevada conviction was not a qualifying “controlled substance offense” for the purposes of the career offender enhancement. The district court held that this claim was procedurally barred because it was not raised on direct appeal, and alternatively found that the prior conviction did qualify as a predicate offense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that there was cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default, finding that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the career offender enhancement, and that this failure prejudiced the outcome. On the merits, the Ninth Circuit determined that the relevant Nevada statute is indivisible and overbroad, and therefore, his conviction under that statute cannot serve as a predicate offense for career offender status under the Guidelines. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the § 2255 motion and remanded for resentencing. View "USA V. CASILDO" on Justia Law

Two blind individuals, after enrolling at a community college in Los Angeles, were approved for disability accommodations, including accessible course materials and technology. Despite these approvals, they faced repeated barriers in accessing required textbooks, online platforms, library resources, and other educational tools. They also experienced difficulties in receiving their approved accommodations, such as accessible test-taking and note-taking support. These obstacles led to their inability to participate fully in their courses and, in one case, being steered away from certain classes due to their disability.After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the jury found the college district liable on multiple counts and awarded damages for intentional violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court, however, reduced the damages to only out-of-pocket expenses, concluding that the jury’s award could only be for emotional distress or lost educational opportunities—both of which it believed were not recoverable. The district court also issued injunctive relief. The plaintiffs appealed the reduction of damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that, under Supreme Court precedent, emotional distress damages are not available under Title II of the ADA because the statute’s remedies are coextensive with those of the Rehabilitation Act and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which do not permit such damages. However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs may recover compensatory damages for loss of educational opportunities resulting from ADA violations. The court found that the jury’s award was supported by evidence and the instructions given. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s remittitur, vacated its judgment as to damages, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the original jury awards. View "PAYAN V. LOS ANGELES COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT" on Justia Law

A California state prisoner, Maurice Lydell Harris, is a practicing Nichiren Buddhist who believes his faith requires him to eat “clean” food, including meat as close to its natural state as possible. Because the prison system did not offer a diet specifically aligned with his religious practice, Harris enrolled in the halal meat program (RMAP), based on advice from a prison chaplain that it most closely matched his requirements. Prison regulations require RMAP participants to refrain from buying non-halal foods from the commissary, but Harris purchased such items, including ramen and processed meats, citing health needs and cultural practices, which led to multiple violations and ultimately his removal from the program.Harris filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that his removal from RMAP violated his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). He sought preliminary injunctive relief to continue receiving the RMAP diet while supplementing with non-halal foods. The district court denied Harris’s requests twice, concluding that the RMAP diet was not required by Harris’s religion and that expulsion would not affect his ability to observe his faith.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the district court erred by evaluating the centrality of the halal diet to Harris’s beliefs, rather than whether Harris sincerely believed the diet best suited his religious needs. The Ninth Circuit held that Harris could demonstrate a substantial burden on his religious exercise and that, if so, the government must show its regulation is the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling interest. The court vacated the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings to reassess whether Harris’s religious exercise was substantially burdened. View "Harris v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

Two individuals active in a right-wing political organization alleged that government officials and entities in Portland, Oregon, conspired to arrest and prosecute them without probable cause in order to suppress their political speech. The plaintiffs claimed that city and county officials, various prosecutors, and a police detective orchestrated the investigation and charges after a confrontation at a bar, focusing their efforts on the plaintiffs while allegedly ignoring violent acts by left-wing activists. The plaintiffs were indicted and arrested before a planned protest, but ultimately acquitted at trial. They then sued, asserting violations of federal civil rights statutes and state tort law, including claims of conspiracy, malicious prosecution, and selective enforcement.After the plaintiffs’ acquittal, they filed their action in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that it was a “shotgun pleading” that failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 because it lumped together claims and factual allegations without specifying which defendants were responsible for which acts. The court also ruled, in the alternative, that several defendants were immune from suit: the Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office (“MCDA”) and prosecutors in their official capacities under the Eleventh Amendment; the prosecutors in their individual capacities under absolute immunity; and the police detective for his grand jury testimony.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the complaint was properly dismissed as a shotgun pleading, but that plaintiffs must be allowed to amend. The court affirmed dismissal with prejudice of all claims against MCDA and prosecutors in their official capacities on sovereign immunity grounds, and against the prosecutors in their individual capacities to the extent their actions were prosecutorial. However, the court reversed the dismissal of claims against a deputy prosecutor for allegedly filing false affidavits, holding that such conduct is not protected by absolute immunity and is not shielded by qualified immunity if false statements were knowingly made to obtain a warrant. The court also reversed dismissal of certain state-law claims against Multnomah County and remanded for further proceedings, allowing plaintiffs to replead those claims not based on the acts of the immune parties. It affirmed immunity for the detective regarding his grand jury testimony. The disposition was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to permit amendment of the complaint. View "Gibson v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

A Nevada state prisoner claimed that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, staff at High Desert State Prison denied him outdoor exercise, even while requiring him and other inmates in his unit to work together in a prison industry warehouse. He alleged that inmates in other units were permitted outdoor yard time, and that the denial of exercise caused him physical and psychological harm. The plaintiff, housed in a protective segregation unit, asserted that these actions violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as similar state constitutional provisions.After filing grievances that were denied at each level by prison officials, the inmate brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada against the warden and other prison staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court screened the complaint and allowed certain claims, including those regarding denial of outdoor exercise and equal protection, to proceed against the warden. On summary judgment, the district court denied qualified immunity to the warden for both the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims, prompting the warden to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that the district court correctly denied qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment claim, finding that the right to outdoor exercise was clearly established and that there were triable issues as to whether the warden’s actions constituted deliberate indifference. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment claim, concluding that the plaintiff did not provide evidence that ruled out all rational justifications for the difference in yard time between his unit and others. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cardenas-Ornelas v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The case involves the death of Ramon Timothy Lopez following an encounter with Phoenix Police Department officers. After receiving reports of erratic behavior, officers pursued Lopez in a foot chase, subdued him, and restrained him with handcuffs and a RIPP hobble device. This restraint bent Lopez’s body into a hogtied position while he was face down. Despite Lopez's distress and visible signs of medical need, officers transported him in the back of a patrol vehicle in this position. He became unresponsive during transport and was later pronounced dead at the hospital. The medical examiner attributed his death to cardiac arrest in the context of methamphetamine intoxication, heart disease, and physical restraint.Plaintiff Laura Gonzalez, Lopez’s mother, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the City of Phoenix and several officers, asserting claims under federal and state law, including excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in part, dismissing claims of false arrest, Monell liability, and others, but denied summary judgment on the excessive force claim related to the officers’ actions after the RIPP restraint was applied, including the transportation of Lopez in the prone, hogtied position.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that a reasonable jury could find the officers’ use of the RIPP restraint and the manner of transport unreasonable and excessive, given Lopez’s lack of resistance and medical distress. The court found that precedent in the Ninth Circuit clearly established that continued use of force or refusal to alleviate its harmful effects against a helpless detainee constitutes excessive force. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "GONZALEZ V. CITY OF PHOENIX" on Justia Law