Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The eight plaintiffs in this action (collectively, “Sharp”) are former employees of apparel manufacturer S&S Activewear (“S&S”). Seven are women, and one is a man. Sharp alleges that S&S permitted its managers and employees to routinely play “sexually graphic, violently misogynistic” music throughout its 700,000-square-foot warehouse in Reno, Nevada. Sharp eventually filed suit, alleging that the music and related conduct created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. The district court granted S&S’s motion to dismiss and denied leave to amend the music claim, reasoning that the music’s offensiveness to both men and women and audibility throughout the warehouse nullified any discriminatory potential. The court countenanced S&S’s argument that the fact that “both men and women were offended by the work environment” doomed Sharp’s Title VII claim.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal. The panel disagreed with the district court’s reasoning that the music’s offensiveness to both men and women and audibility throughout the warehouse nullified any discriminatory potential. The panel vacated the district court’s dismissal, with prejudice and without leave to amend, of Plaintiffs’ music-based claim and instructed the district court to reconsider, on remand, the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ pleadings in light of two key principles: First, harassment, whether aural or visual, need not be directly targeted at a particular plaintiff in order to pollute a workplace and give rise to a Title VII claim. Second, the challenged conduct’s offensiveness to multiple genders is not a certain bar to stating a Title VII claim. View "STEPHANIE SHARP, ET AL V. S&S ACTIVEWEAR, L.L.C." on Justia Law

At around nine o’clock in the evening, a concerned citizen called 911 to report a Ford Mustang darting erratically in the streets. Behind the wheel was a young white male, along with a blindfolded female in the car. With the aid of the car’s license plate number provided by the caller, Fountain Valley police officers figured out the home address of the driver and raced to that house. But this was not an ongoing kidnapping. In reality, the driver was taking his wife for a “surprise” anniversary dinner. And his parents would soon experience a surprise of their own as the police officers descended upon the home that they shared with their son. Before this mix-up could be cleared, the police officers ordered the Plaintiffs out of their home for obstructing the police and pushed the father to the ground as they handcuffed him. The Hills later sued, alleging (among other things) violations of their Fourth Amendment rights against warrantless arrests and excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment for police officers.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that the police officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure when the officers ordered them to exit the home or face arrest for obstruction. The officers never seized Plaintiffs, who did not submit to the officers’ demand to leave the home. They, therefore, could not claim that they were unlawfully arrested. The panel next held that while the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for obstruction of justice, they were nevertheless shielded by qualified immunity. View "STEPHEN HILL, ET AL V. CITY OF FOUNTAIN VALLEY, ET AL" on Justia Law

Appellants are agricultural workers hired by strawberry growers (“the Growers”) to pick the fruit that was then turned over to the Appellees Red Blossom Sales, Inc. and Better Produce, Inc. (“the Marketers”) for distribution. Appellants sought to hold the Marketers liable for their wages as “client employers.” The Marketers cooled and sold the berries principally to large retail grocery chains. The Marketers conducted their cooling and distribution operations on premises that were close to but separate from the farms. The Growers stopped paying Appellants and later filed for bankruptcy. Appellants sued the Growers and the Marketers as joint employers under California and federal law. Appellants also sued the Marketers as client employers under California Labor Code Section 2810.3. The district court ruled for the Marketers on all theories. Appellants appeal only with respect to the Marketers’ liability under Section 2810.3.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that Appellants were not performing labor within the Marketers’ “usual course of business” as defined by the statute. That term is defined as “the regular and customary work of a business, performed within or upon the premises or worksite of the client employer.” Given the particular facts of this case, the court concluded that Appellants’ work took place on the farms where the strawberries were grown, not on the premises or worksites of the Marketers. The Marketers are, therefore, not liable as client employers under California Labor Code Section 2810.3. View "LUIS MORALES-GARCIA, ET AL V. BETTER PRODUCE, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

The Estate of a man who was shot and killed by police brought claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and state law alleging that police officers used excessive force. The Estate claimed that the decedent was known to the officers to be homeless and mentally ill. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that, under the totality of the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that the man posed an immediate threat. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the man, he was carrying a replica gun, disregarded multiple warnings to drop it, and pointed it at the officers. While the misidentification of the replica gun added to the tragedy of this situation, it did not render the officers’ use of force objectively unreasonable. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Estate leave to amend the complaint. The complaint established that the man pointed the replica gun’s barrel at the officers, so it was objectively reasonable for the officers to respond with lethal force. Under these pleaded facts, it would be futile to allow leave to amend. View "ESTATE OF GABRIEL STRICKLAND, ET AL V. NEVADA COUNTY, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 lawsuit against Defendants—each present or former employees of the California Department of Public Health—on the grounds that Defendants acted under color of state law to deprive Plaintiffs of certain rights secured by the United States Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged a “stigma-plus” due process claim under Section 1983 on the grounds that Defendants violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying Plaintiff an opportunity to be heard before publishing a purportedly erroneous investigative report on an unsuccessful cardiac surgery. They contend that the publication of this report caused Plaintiffs to be deprived of protected employment-related interests. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to establish several necessary elements of their claim and, thus, dismissed the action in its entirety; Plaintiffs challenged each of the district court’s negative elemental findings.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that the district court’s negative causation finding was plausible in light of record evidence establishing; the timing and conclusions of the hospital’s internal investigations, the independent actions of a hospital employee to alert the family to potential malfeasance by Plaintiff, the family and estate’s pursuit of legal action; the accounts of key percipient witnesses to the surgery as part of the malpractice case; and the sizable malpractice judgment awarded against Plaintiff. The panel thus sustained the district court’s determination that Plaintiffs failed to prove that Defendants’ conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury and concluded that, at a minimum, Plaintiffs failed to establish the requisite causation element of their “stigma-plus” due process claim under Section 1983. View "PERVAIZ CHAUDHRY, ET AL V. TOMAS ARAGON, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was cited for misuse of a vehicle horn under Section 27001 after she honked in support of protestors gathered outside a government official’s office. Although the citation was dismissed, Plaintiff filed suit to block future enforcement of 27001 against any expressive horn use―including honks not only to “support candidates or causes” but also to “greet friends or neighbors, summon children or co-workers, or celebrate weddings or victories.” She asserted that Section 27001 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments as a content-based regulation that is not narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Alternatively, she argued that even if the law is not content-based, it burdens substantially more speech than necessary to protect legitimate government interests.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the State of California. The first held that Plaintiff had standing to challenge the law because, ever since she received a citation for impermissible horn use, she has refrained from honking in support of political protests to avoid being cited again. The panel determined that, at least in some circumstances, a honk can carry a message that is intended to be communicative and that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the listener to be communicative. The panel noted that Plaintiff had not alleged that the State has a policy or practice of improper selective enforcement of Section 27001, so the panel had no occasion to address that possibility here. View "SUSAN PORTER V. KELLY MARTINEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff previously worked for the Springfield Utility Board (SUB). As part of an internal investigation into Plaintiff’s alleged misconduct, SUB restricted Plaintiff from speaking with potential witnesses and other SUB employees regarding the subject of the investigation while it was underway. Plaintiff sued SUB, certain SUB employees, and SUB’s retained counsel pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that the investigation-related speech restrictions violated the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and Plaintiff appealed.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The panel held that the communication restriction complained of by Plaintiff did not violate the First Amendment because it did not limit Plaintiff’s ability to speak about matters of public concern. Nothing in Defendants’ instructions barred him from speaking about any alleged mismanagement at the Springfield Utility Board or other topics that would potentially relate to a matter of public concern. Rather, the restrictions merely barred him from personally discussing his own alleged violation of Springfield Utility Board policies—a matter of private, personal concern—with potential witnesses or fellow Springfield Utility Board employees. View "TODD ROBERTS V. SPRINGFIELD UTILITY BOARD, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission (“CJTC”), the City of Spokane, and others (collectively, the “CJTC Defendants”) moved for summary judgment in the district court on Plaintiff’s state law claims, asserting that they are entitled to statutory immunity under Wash. Rev. Code (“RCW”) 43.101.390(1). The district court denied summary judgment, and the CJTC Defendants appealed.   The Ninth Circuit certified to the Washington Supreme Court the following question: What is the scope of immunity provided by RCW 43.101.390? Specifically, does the provision grant immunity for intentional torts committed in the course of administering the Basic Law Enforcement Academy? View "JOHN CRUZ V. CITY OF SPOKANE, ET AL" on Justia Law

While incarcerated, Plaintiff completed several education courses which entitled him to sentence deductions under Nevada law. After he was released and his parole ended, Plaintiff sued, asserting that Defendants’ failure to apply earned credit-deductions to his sentence deprived him of liberty without due process and denied him equal protection of the law by targeting him for the denial of credits because he is a sex offender.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s  Section 1983 against the Nevada Department of Corrections and several Department officials alleging that they violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by failing to deduct education-credits he earned from his sentence, and remanded. The panel first rejected Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because they necessarily implied that the duration of his sentence was invalid. The panel held that Heck did not apply in this case. Plaintiff was no longer in custody and was thus unable to raise claims for credit deductions in a petition for habeas corpus. The panel held that the district court erred by interpreting Plaintiff’s due process claim as asserting only a deprivation of minimum-sentence deductions affecting his parole eligibility date and ignoring his claim for maximum-sentence deductions. The panel affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection claim because Plaintiff had not alleged facts supporting discrimination. View "PHILIP GALANTI V. NDOC, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was cited for misuse of a vehicle horn under Section 27001 after she honked in support of protestors gathered outside a government official’s office.  Plaintiff filed suit to block future enforcement of 27001 against any expressive horn use―including honks not only to “support candidates or causes” but also to “greet friends or neighbors, summon children or co-workers, or celebrate weddings or victories.” She asserted that Section 27001 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments as a content-based regulation that is not narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Alternatively, she argued that even if the law is not content-based, it burdens substantially more speech than necessary to protect legitimate government interests.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of California. The panel determined that, at least in some circumstances, a honk can carry a message that is intended to be communicative and that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the listener to be communicative. The panel next held that because section 27001 applies evenhandedly to all who wish to use a horn when a safety hazard is not present, it draws a line based on the surrounding factual situation, not based on the content of expression. The panel, therefore, evaluated Section 27001 as a content-neutral law and applied intermediate scrutiny. The panel concluded that Section 27001 was narrowly tailored to further California’s substantial interest in traffic safety and, therefore, that it passed intermediate scrutiny. View "SUSAN PORTER V. KELLY MARTINEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law