Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that the school district had violated T.B.’s civil rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment regarding plaintiffs' allegations that the school district violated the ADA and Section 504 by failing to offer and implement a gastronomy tube (g-tube) feeding regime that would enable T.B. to attend school safely; California law establishes federally enforceable rights governing g-tube feeding in schools; the court held that where the State has defined an accommodation by law, that accommodation is enforceable in court; but, plaintiffs failed to prove that the district court was deliberately indifferent to the need to meet state standards for feeding T.B. at school. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the claim regarding the 2007-2008 Individualized Education Plan (IEP), because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the district violated T.B.’s civil rights by failing to accommodate his need for g-tube feedings. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court that a reasonable jury would not be able to find that the district retaliated against plaintiffs. The court vacated the district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs and remanded. View "T.B. V. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of PCC, his former employer, on his claim of discrimination in violation of Oregon disability law. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that an employee whose stress leads to violent threats is not a “qualified individual” under the Oregon statute. In this case, plaintiff had threatened to kill co-workers. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Mayo v. PCC Structurals, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging California's Shark Fin Law, Cal. Fish & Game Code 2021(b), which makes it unlawful to possess, sell, offer for sale, trade, or distribute a shark fin in the state. Plaintiffs alleged that the law violates the Supremacy Clause by interfering with the national government’s authority to manage fishing in the ocean off the California coast, and the dormant Commerce Clause by interfering with interstate commerce in shark fins. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' amended complaint with prejudice. The court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the law is preempted by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), 16 U.S.C. 1801-1884, where plaintiffs failed to identify any actual conflict between the MSA or the California law. The court also concluded that the district court did not fail to grant leave sua sponte and did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice. In this instance, leave to amend would be futile. Further, the court rejected plaintiffs' Commerce Clause argument, concluding that nothing about the extraterritorial reach of the Shark Fin Law renders it per se invalid; the law does not fix prices in other states, require those states to adopt California standards, or attempt to regulate transactions conducted wholly out of state, and the price control cases are therefore inapposite; and the Shark Fin Law does not interfere with activity that is inherently national or that requires a uniform system of regulation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chinatown Neighborhood Ass'n v. Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging California's Shark Fin Law, Cal. Fish & Game Code 2021(b), which makes it unlawful to possess, sell, offer for sale, trade, or distribute a shark fin in the state. Plaintiffs alleged that the law violates the Supremacy Clause by interfering with the national government’s authority to manage fishing in the ocean off the California coast, and the dormant Commerce Clause by interfering with interstate commerce in shark fins. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' amended complaint with prejudice. The court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the law is preempted by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), 16 U.S.C. 1801-1884, where plaintiffs failed to identify any actual conflict between the MSA or the California law. The court also concluded that the district court did not fail to grant leave sua sponte and did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice. In this instance, leave to amend would be futile. Further, the court rejected plaintiffs' Commerce Clause argument, concluding that nothing about the extraterritorial reach of the Shark Fin Law renders it per se invalid; the law does not fix prices in other states, require those states to adopt California standards, or attempt to regulate transactions conducted wholly out of state, and the price control cases are therefore inapposite; and the Shark Fin Law does not interfere with activity that is inherently national or that requires a uniform system of regulation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chinatown Neighborhood Ass'n v. Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the owner of a pharmacy and two individual pharmacists who have religious objections to delivering emergency contraceptives, challenged the Commission's rules requiring the timely delivery of all prescription medications by licensed pharmacies. The rules permit pharmacies to deny delivery for certain business reasons, such as fraudulent prescriptions or a customer’s inability to pay; permit a religiously objecting individual pharmacist to deny delivery, so long as another pharmacist working for the pharmacy provides timely delivery; but, unless an enumerated exemption applies, the rules require a pharmacy to deliver all prescription medications, even if the owner of the pharmacy has a religious objection. The district court held that the rules violate the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses, and the court permanently enjoined enforcement of the rules. The court reversed, concluding that the rules are neutral and generally applicable and that the rules rationally further the State’s interest in patient safety. Further concluding that the rules do not infringe on a fundamental right, the court reversed the judgment. View "Stormans, Inc. v.Wiesman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City and several police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and California law, alleging unlawful arrest and excessive force claims. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence on which a reasonable jury could have concluded that no probable cause existed, based both on evidence that plaintiff did not in fact resist Officer Abuhadwan and evidence that plaintiff did not impede Abuhadwan in the exercise of his lawful duties. Therefore, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment as a matter of law on the unlawful arrest claim. The court also concluded that the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's unlawful arrest claim so substantially prejudiced the jury’s consideration of the excessive force claim as to warrant reversal of the verdict. The court held that the district court's incorrect evidentiary ruling, categorically excluding evidence to establish plaintiff's theory on municipal liability, resulted in the judge erroneously entering judgment as a mater of law for defendants. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law on the Monell claims. The court further held that the district court abused its discretion in blanketly refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and so reversed its dismissal of plaintiff’s state law claims. View "Velazquez v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

WCDSS took B.W. into protective custody when she was two-days old and placed her with a foster parent without obtaining prior judicial authorization. Plaintiff, B.W.'s biological father, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the County and three social workers, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court concluded that plaintiff lacked a cognizable liberty interest in his relationship with B.W. and the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants because he could not prove a violation of his constitutional rights. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in deciding that the complaint did not provide adequate notice that B.W. asserted a Fourth Amendment claim on her own behalf and, therefore, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this basis. The court further concluded that Defendants Wilcox and Kennedy are not entitled to qualified immunity on B.W.'s Fourth Amendment claim where a reasonable juror might find that a reasonable social worker could not have determined that B.W. would be in imminent danger of serious bodily injury in the time that it would have taken to obtain a warrant. Thus, the court reversed and remanded on this issue. Because the evidence presented here creates at least an inference of an unconstitutional, unofficial custom in Washoe County, the County is not entitled to summary judgment. The court reversed and remanded as to this issue. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant Reynolds because plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that she was involved with the decision to take custody of B.W. View "Kirkpatrick v. Cnty. of Washoe" on Justia Law

The school board of Tucson developed the Mexican American Studies (MAS) program in Tucson public schools to provide a culturally relevant curriculum for students by incorporating historical and contemporary Mexican American contributions into coursework and classroom studies. Arizona state superintendents of education successfully sponsored and implemented legislation that did away with the program (A.R.S. 15-111 and 15-112). The statute prohibits a school district or charter school from including in its program of instruction any courses or classes that: (1) “Promote the overthrow of the United States government,” (2) “Promote resentment toward a race or class of people,” (3) “Are designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic group,” or (4) “Advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment of pupils as individuals.” Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the statutes. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings that A.R.S 15-112(A)(3) is unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment but severable from the rest of the statute; that A.R.S. 15-112(A)(2) and (A)(4) are not overbroad in violation of the First Amendment; and that A.R.S. 15-112(A)(2) and (A)(4) are not vague in violation of the Due Process Clause. The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants on plaintiffs’ equal protection claim where there are genuine issues of fact regarding whether the enactment and/or enforcement of A.R.S. 15-112 was motivated at least in part by a discriminatory intent. The court remanded that claim for trial. Finally, the court remanded plaintiffs’ First Amendment viewpoint discrimination claim to the district court for further proceedings. View "Arce v. Douglas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of his Eighth Amendment rights by use of excessive force by prison guards. At issue was a claim that a threat of retaliatory action by a prison guard had the effect of rendering the prison grievance system unavailable so as to excuse the prisoner’s failure to meet the time limitation for filing a grievance. As a preliminary matter, the court held that exhaustion issues must instead generally be decided on a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. The court joined other circuits in holding that fear of retaliation may be sufficient to render the inmate grievance procedure unavailable, and the court approved the test applied in the Eleventh Circuit that requires both a subjective and objective basis for the fear. In this case, the court held that plaintiff failed to show an objective basis for his belief that prison officials would retaliate against him for filing a grievance. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "McBride v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, applying advantage gambling techniques, won a significant amount of money on video blackjack machines at a casino owned and operated by the Tonto Apache Tribe on tribal land. Plaintiffs filed suit against the tribal defendants, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and under state tort law for battery, false imprisonment, conversion, defamation, trespass to chattels, and negligence. The district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss. At issue was whether tribal officers may assert tribal sovereign immunity when sued in their individual capacities for an assertedly unconstitutional detention and seizure of property. The court concluded that sovereign immunity is a quasi-jurisdictional issue that, if invoked at the Rule 12(b)(1) stage, must be addressed and decided; the district court erred in concluding that it could deny the tribal defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion even if they were entitled to tribal sovereign immunity; the tribal defendants are not entitled to tribal sovereign immunity, however, because they are being sued in their individual capacities, rather than in their official capacities, for actions taken in the course of their official duties; and whether the tribal defendants were acting under state or tribal law does not matter for purposes of this analysis, although it will matter for purposes of deciding whether plaintiffs can succeed in their section 1983 claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Pistor v. Garcia" on Justia Law