Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jennie McCormack filed suit alleging that Idaho Code Title 18, Chapters 5—the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act (“PUCPA”)—and 6, which regulate the performance of abortions, violate various provisions of the United States Constitution. Dr.Richard Hearn, McCormack's attorney and third-party intervenor, who is also an Idaho licensed physician who intends to provide his patients with pre-viability medical abortions, challenged the constitutionality of §§ 18-505 and 18-608, which fall within Chapters 5 and 6 of Idaho Code Title 18. The court concluded that McCormack’s challenge to § 18-606 is not moot; McCormack has standing based on a lingering risk of prosecution under § 18-606; Dr. Hearn has standing to challenge §§ 18-505 and 18-608; section 18-505 is facially unconstitutional because it categorically bans some abortions before viability; section 18-608(2) is facially unconstitutional because it places an undue burden on a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion by requiring hospitalizations for all second-trimester abortions; and section 18-608(1) in conjunction with § 18-605 is unconstitutionally vague. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "McCormack v. Herzog" on Justia Law

A-1 filed suit challenging the constitutionality of four provisions of Hawaii's campaign finance laws under Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. On appeal, A-1 challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commission. The court concluded that Hawaii’s expenditure and noncandidate committee definitions in HRS 11-302 are not vague given the Commission’s narrowing construction; Hawaii's advertising definition in HRS 11-302 is not unconstitutionally vague; the noncandidate committee reporting and disclosure requirements survive exacting scrutiny as applied to A-1 where they were substantially related to Hawaii's important interest in informing the electorate, preventing corruption or its appearance, and avoiding the circumvention of valid campaign finance laws; the disclaimer requirement for advertisements is constitutional under Citizens United; A-1 lacks standing to challenge the electioneering communications reporting requirements; the contractor contribution ban is constitutional even as applied to contributions to legislators who neither award nor oversee contracts; and individual Plaintiffs Yamada and Stewart are entitled to attorney's fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on the merits, but vacated the fee award, referring the matter to the Appellate Commissioner with instructions. View "A-1 A-Lectrician v. Snipes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Guam resident who is not eligible to register to vote because he is not a Native Inhabitant, filed suit alleging that Guam's Native Inhabitant classification is an unlawful proxy for race. At issue was whether plaintiff had standing to challenge the classification and whether his claims are ripe. The court concluded that plaintiff has Article III standing where his challenge to Guam's registration restriction asserts a judicially cognizable injury that would be prevented or redressed if the district court were to grant his requested relief; the claim is ripe because plaintiff alleges he is currently subject to unlawful unequal treatment in the ongoing registration process; and, therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Davis v. Guam" on Justia Law

After a lockdown was imposed on African American inmates at a California state prison, plaintiff filed suit against prison officials under the Eighth Amendment for injuries he suffered related to shower restrictions and under the Equal Protection Clause for the race-based classification of the lockdown. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff. On appeal, the court considered the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. California, which held that strict scrutiny applies to claims challenging racial classifications in prison, and the line of authorities, such as Turner v. Safley, that instruct courts to give deference to correctional officials with respect to constitutional claims involving prison regulations. The court affirmed as to the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim where the district court correctly stated the knowledge requirement outlined in Farmer v. Brennan. The court affirmed as to the district court's decision not to appoint counsel because there was no abuse of discretion. The court reversed, vacated, and remanded as to plaintiff's equal protection claim where the district court erred when it instructed the jury that the prison's obligations under the Eighth Amendment compete with its obligations under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A prisoner's success on an equal protection claims is not dependent on whether the government met its obligations under the Eighth Amendment. In light of Johnson's clear direction, the district court also erred by allowing the jury to defer generally to officials when considering plaintiff's equal protection claim, rather than assessing whether the challenged race-based actions were narrowly tailored. Finally, the error was prejudicial. View "Harrington v. Scribner" on Justia Law

Defendant filed suit against the County, the Sheriff's Department, and individual defendants after he was savagely attacked by an intoxicated arrestee who had been placed in a "sobering cell" with plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff against both the individual and entity defendants for past and future damages. On appeal, defendants challenged the denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court concluded that neither the individual defendants, plaintiff's jailers, is entitled to qualified immunity where the duty to protect plaintiff from violence was clearly established at the time of the incident; the jury could have found that Defendant Solomon was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to plaintiff because he disregarded plaintiff's pounding on the cell door; and the jury could have found that Defendant Valentine was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to plaintiff when he placed the attacker in plaintiff's cell. In regards to punitive damages, no additional evidence is required to make a finding of "reckless disregard" when a finding of "deliberate indifference" has been made. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment against the individual defendants. However, the court reversed the judgment against the County where plaintiff's claims under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. was legally viable but there was no evidence that the County had actual knowledge of the risk of plaintiff's safety. Further, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence regarding the amount of past damages. View "Castro v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The IRS requires non-profit educational and charitable organizations registered under 24 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) to disclose the names and contributions of their "significant donors" on Form 990 Schedule B. CCP filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking to enjoin the Attorney General from requiring it to file an unredacted Form 990 Schedule B. The court affirmed the district court's denial of CCP's motion for a preliminary injunction because CCP failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. The court concluded that CCP's First Amendment facial challenge to the Attorney General's disclosure requirement fails exacting scrutiny where CCP has not shown any "actual burden" on its, or its supporters', freedom of association. In this case, CCP did not claim and produced no evidence to suggest that their significant donors would experience threats, harassment, or other potential chilling conduct as a result of the Attorney General's disclosure requirement. The regulation has a "plainly legitimate sweep" where CCP concedes that the Attorney General has a compelling interest in enforcing the laws of California and CCP does not contest the Attorney General's power to require disclosure of significant donor information as a part of her general subpoena power. Further, the disclosure requirement bears a substantial relation to a sufficiently important government interest. Therefore, CCP's First Amendment facial challenge to the disclosure requirement fails exacting scrutiny. Finally, the court concluded that federal tax law, 26 U.S.C. 6104, does not preempt the requirement. View "Ctr. for Competitive Politics v. Harris" on Justia Law

In 2003, the City of Santa Monica enacted an exception to the general prohibition on “unattended displays” of nativity scenes in its parks for the month of December in the City’s Palisades Park. A decade later, after a number of atheists began opposing the nativity scenes, the City repealed the “Winter Display” exception. The Santa Monica Nativity Scenes Committee sued the City, alleging that the repeal ordinance violated the Committee’s right to free speech because it was an unconstitutional heckler’s veto and violated the Establishment Clause by conveying the message that the City disapproved of Christianity. The district court dismissed the Committee’s complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the heckler’s veto doctrine had no application in this case because the repeal was a valid content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation; and (2) the Committee failed to state a claim under the Establishment Clause. View "Santa Monica Nativity Scenes Comm. v. City of Santa Monica" on Justia Law

Appellant, a California state prisoner serving a life sentence for first-degree murder and attempted robbery, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court more than six years after the statutory filing deadline had passed. Appellant sought equitable tolling on the basis of his previous counsel’s handling of the case. The district court dismissed the habeas petition as time-barred, concluding that Appellant had not met his burden of proving entitlement to equitable tolling. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment dismissing Appellant’s federal habeas petition, holding (1) this Court’s cases holding that egregious attorney misconduct may serve as a basis for equitable tolling, even if the misconduct falls short of abandonment, remain good law; and (2) the professional misconduct of Appellant’s former counsel constituted an extraordinary circumstance, and that misconduct prevented Appellant from filing his federal habeas petition on time. Remanded for a determination of whether Appellant diligently pursued his rights through the date of filing. View "Luna v. Kernan" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Arizona Legislature enacted a new law requiring voter registration forms to list the two largest parties, as well as provide a blank line for “other party preferences.” See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-152(A)(5). The Arizona Green Party, the Arizona Libertarian Party, and three of their members (together, Plaintiffs) brought this action alleging that the new voter registration form violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because the form failed to “treat equally the four parties with Statewide continuing ballot access.” The district court granted summary judgment for the State. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing that section 16-152(A)(5) is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. View "Ariz. Libertarian Party v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Appellant, an Idaho state prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction and capital sentence for two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of felony murder, and one count of grand theft. The district court denied the petition. Appellant subsequently filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and 60(d) for relief from the district court’s judgment, arguing (1) Martinez v. Ryan gives cause for the state-law procedural default of three of the claims he raised in his initial federal habeas petition; and (2) he was entitled to relief under Rules 60(b)(6) and 60(d)(3) because the state’s attorneys perpetrated a fraud on the federal district court. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s claims related to judicial bias were not the type of claims that could be pursued under Martinez; (2) Appellant’s claim relating to his counsel’s conflict of interest did not satisfy this circuit’s test for establishing cause to excuse procedural default under Martinez; and (3) Appellant failed to establish a factual basis to show that the state Attorney General’s office perpetrated a fraud on the court during Appellant’s federal habeas proceedings. View "Pizzuto v. Ramirez" on Justia Law