Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair to move in public, filed suit against BB&B under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 2000a(b), for purported architectural barriers that plaintiff claimed impeded his ability to fully use the store. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to BB&B. The court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that the ADA does not require wall space within the maneuvering clearance next to the frame of a restroom door that must be pulled open. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in ruling that, because the door lacked a "latch" within the meaning of standards governing ADA compliance, no maneuvering space was required next to the frame of a restroom door that must be pushed open. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kohler v. Bed Bath & Beyond" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a 55-year-old-man with disabilities that require him to use a wheelchair and two canes, filed suit against defendants, alleging that his new parole terms, including a housing restriction imposed under the California Sexual Predator and Control Act that required plaintiff to move from his residence, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; and 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff claimed that defendants' decision to require him to live in motels that did not have accommodations for his disabilities caused him pain and stress, exacerbated his medical conditions, and deprived him of access to important medical treatments. The district court concluded that plaintiff's claims were time-barred under California's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. The court held, however, that the district court did not apply the correct statute of limitations standards with respect to the Title II and ADA claims; the district court must borrow the three-year limitations period applicable to claims under California Government Code 11135; under the three-year limitations period, plaintiff's ADA claim is not time-barred; and, although plaintiff does not contest the applicable limitations periods as to his other claims, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice without allowing plaintiff leave to amend. Accordingly, reversed and remanded. View "Sharkey v. O'Neal" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of her son, Philip Cortez, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, against a corrections officer and the State of Arizona after Cortez was attacked by two other inmates and sustained severe, permanent mental impairment. The court concluded that there are triable issues of material fact related to the officer's awareness of an objectively substantial risk of serious harm where the officer escorted Cortez and the other two inmates by himself through an isolated prison passage. All three inmates were mutually hostile, half-restrained, and high-security inmates. Further, there is sufficient evidence that the officer was subjectively aware of the risk involved in the escort and acted with deliberate indifference to Cortez's safety. The court also concluded that there are triable issues of material fact in regards to the gross negligence claim against the State where the State's gross negligence standard is lower than the federal deliberate indifference standard. Accordingly, the court remanded the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cortez v. Skol" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, while incarcerated, received a $107,416.48 settlement from a medical liability claim against a drug manufacturer whose products caused him to develop diabetes. Counsel in the product liability suit deposited the settlement proceeds into plaintiff's inmate trust account. After the ODOC issued an order requiring plaintiff to pay $65,353.94 for the estimated cost of his incarceration and then subsequently froze and withdrew the funds at issue, plaintiff filed suit alleging various constitutional violations. The court concluded that plaintiff received insufficient due process as the result of Oregon's actions considering plaintiff's substantial interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the ability to provide a hearing without compromising a significant government interest. Nor should providing a pre-deprivation hearing be administratively burdensome. However, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants considering no precedent established a state's obligation to provide a pre-deprivation hearing in these circumstances and thus, was not clearly established at the time of the conduct. Further, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim where the withdrawal was a reimbursement rather than a punishment. View "Shinault v. Hawks" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a pro se California prisoner, filed suit against defendants alleging violations of her constitutional rights to due process of law and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff alleged that prison officials started rumors that she was a convicted sex offender and changed her prison records. As a result, gang members threatened plaintiff and, when plaintiff reported the problem, prison officials refused to file her grievance and rejected her appeal. The court concluded that, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), a court of appeals may require a three strike prisoner seeking in forma pauperis status to show an imminent danger at the time the notice of appeal is filed; the Andrews v. Cervantes standard is the appropriate one to be applied in determining whether a prisoner has shown an imminent danger on appeal, and that applying that standard to plaintiff’s case, she may proceed in forma pauperis on appeal; and the district court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants on the issue of exhaustion because defendants have not met their burden of establishing that defendant did not exhaust available administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court granted plaintiff's right to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. The court vacated the order of the district court and remanded for further proceedings on the issue of exhaustion. View "Williams v. Paramo" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against EA, alleging that Madden NFL, a series of video games, includes accurate likenesses of plaintiffs without authorization, as well as roughly 6,000 other former NFL players who appear on more than 100 historic teams in various editions of Madden NFL. EA moved to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion where EA has not shown a probability of prevailing on its incidental use defense and its other defenses are effectively precluded by the court's decision in Keller v. Elec. Arts. In this case, EA has not shown that the transformative use defense applies to plaintiffs' claims; EA has not established a probability of prevailing on either the common law public interest defense or the "public affairs" exemption of California Civil Code 3344(d); the Rogers v. Grimaldi test does not apply to plaintiffs' right-of-publicity claims; and EA has not established a probability of prevailing on its incidental use defense. View "Davis v. Electronic Arts" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the enforcement of the County of Los Angeles Safer Sex in the Adult Film Industry Act ("Measure B"), Los Angeles County, Cal. Code tit. 11, div. 1, ch. 11.39, and amending tit. 22, div. 1, ch. 22.56.1925. Measure B imposes a permitting system and additional production obligations on the makers of adult films, such as requiring performers to wear condoms in certain contexts. The court concluded that it need not decide whether Intervenors satisfy the requirements of Article III standing where plaintiffs have standing. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting preliminary injunctive relief to only certain parts of Measure B, while allowing enforcement of other provisions as severable. The purpose of Measure B is twofold: (1) to decrease the spread of sexually transmitted infections among performers within the adult industry, (2) thereby stemming the transmission of sexually transmitted infections to the general population among whom the performers dwell. The court concluded that the district court properly exercised its discretion in concluding that the condom requirement would likely survive intermediate scrutiny where the restriction of expression in this case is de minimus; the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest; and the condom requirement leaves alternative channels of expression available. The portions of Measure B's permitting system left in place by the district court also survives constitutional scrutiny where the requirements that adult film producers complete training about blood-borne pathogens and post a permit during shooting still serve the County's interest in preventing sexually transmitted infections. The district court correctly concluded that the remaining permitting provisions leave little, if any, discretion to government officials. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction with respect to the condom and permitting requirement. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Vivid Entertainment v. Fielding" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against justices of the Arizona Supreme Court challenging the Arizona Supreme Court Rule 34(f) (the AOM Rule). The AOM Rule permits admission on motion to the Arizona Bar for attorneys who are admitted to practice law in states that permit Arizona attorneys to be admitted to the bars of those states on a basis equivalent to Arizona’s AOM Rule, but requires attorneys admitted to practice law in states that do not have such reciprocal admission rules to take the uniform bar exam (UBE) in order to gain admission to the Arizona Bar. The court concluded that although plaintiffs can establish Article III standing based on injuries suffered by Plaintiff Girvin, plaintiffs failed to establish that the AOM Rule is unconstitutional on First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, or Privileges and Immunities Clause grounds. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the justices. View "NAAMJP V. Berch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City, alleging claims of discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate any pretext for discrimination based on his hearing impairment and his EEOC complaint where plaintiff presented no evidence that the City's reliance on past threats was actually pretext for discrimination and, even if the fit-for-duty evaluation somehow undermined the credibility of the City's stated concern about plaintiff's threats, the City put forward other reasons for terminating him: nonperformance of duties, conducting personal business at work, and making disparaging remarks about his supervisors and the City. Likewise, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because he cannot show pretext. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the City. View "Curley v. City of North Las Vegas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the Californians Against Sexual Exploitation (CASE) Act, Cal. Penal Code 290.015(a)(4)-(5), infringes their freedom of speech in violation of the First Amendment. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and defendants and intervenors appealed. The court applied intermediate scrutiny and concluded that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment challenge. The court concluded that registered sex offenders who have completed their terms of probation and parole enjoy the full protection of the First Amendment; First Amendment scrutiny is warranted because the Act imposes a substantial burden on sex offenders' ability to engage in legitimate online speech, and to do so anonymously; the Act unnecessarily chills protected speech in at least three ways: the Act does not make clear what sex offenders are required to report, there are insufficient safeguards preventing the public release of the information sex offenders do report, and the 24-hour reporting requirement is onerous and overbroad; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that all the necessary elements for obtaining a preliminary injunction are satisfied where there is irreparable injury sufficient to merit relief, and the balance of the equities and the public interest favor the exercise of First Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Doe v. Harris" on Justia Law