Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2009, a confidential informant told Anaheim police officer Stauber that Cruz was a gang member who sold methamphetamine and carried a gun. Stauber determined that Cruz had prior convictions including a felony involving a firearm. Later, the informant told Stauber where Cruz was, what his vehicle looked like, that he was armed and carried in his waistband, and that he had stated that “he was not going back to prison.” Stauber notified other officers, who converged on Cruz’s location. Officers noticed that Cruz’s vehicle had a broken tail light, executed a traffic stop, and surrounded him in a parking lot. Cruz attempted to escape, backing his SUV into a patrol car, but eventually stopped. The officers emerged with weapons drawn and shouted for Cruz to get on the ground as he was emerging from the vehicle. According to four officers, he ignored their commands and reached for his waistband. Fearing that he was reaching for a gun, five officers fired 20 shots. A bystander witnessed most of the event from the other side of Cruz’s vehicle, but didn’t see whether Cruz reached for his waistband. After they ceased firing, the officers approached to find Cruz’s body tangled in and hanging from his seatbelt. Cutting the body loose, they found no weapon, but a loaded nine-millimeter was later recovered from the passenger seat. Cruz’s relatives sued. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs had not presented anything to contest the officers’ version of events. The Ninth Circuit reversed, except as to one officer, noting “curious and material factual discrepancies.”View "Cruz v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

Rashdan, an Egyptian dentist, enrolled in a program to credential her for practice in the U.S. Three months before graduation, Rashdan followed her clinical supervisor’s instructions to seat a crown, but the procedure was unsuccessful. The head of the restorative dentistry program, Geissberger, heard about the failed procedure, and told Rashdan, within earshot of others, that her “clinical work ... was ‘Third World Dentistry.’” Later, another supervisor greeted Rashdan saying, “What’s up, TW?” then stated: “Don’t you get it? ... Third World?” Days before graduation, Rashdan was informed that despite adequate academic work, she was not recommended for graduation and that she would have to remediate in restorative dentistry and removable prosthodontics. Rashdan entered an additional quarter of clinical work at no extra cost; her performance did not improve. Evaluators stated that she was actively harming patients. Faculty members exchanged emails about her poor performance, and recommended that Rashdan pursue an additional quarter of remedial work on models, after which she could return to work on patients. Rather than appeal the plan or begin remediation, Rashdan took a leave of absence and filed suit, claiming national origin discrimination in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000d. The district court rejected the claim on summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework for disparate treatment claims under Title VII applied to the Title VI claim. Rashdan did not establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination.View "Rashdan v. Geissberger" on Justia Law

ISKCON appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), manager Stephen Yee, and the LAX police chief, on ISKCON's claim that section 23.27(c) of the Los Angeles Administrative Code - which bans continuous or repetitive solicitation for the immediate receipt of funds at LAX, a nonpublic forum - violated the First Amendment. Major international airports have a legitimate interest in controlling pedestrian congestion and reducing the risk of fraud and duress attendant to repetitive, in-person solicitation for the immediate receipt of funds. The court held that the ordinance acts as a reasonable restriction on protected speech under the First Amendment because it was limited in nature and leaves open alternative channels for ISKCON to raise money. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.View "ISKCON v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint alleging that defendants violated plaintiffs' First Amendment right to freedom of religion by forcing them to provide direct staff support to a developmentally disabled client who wished to attend Jehovah's Witness services. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint against Defendant Matsushita because plaintiffs failed to allege specific facts against Matsushita other than to identify her title; the district court's holding that defendants' interpretation of the Lanterman Act, Cal. Welf. & Ins. Code 4500-4906, and its regulations, did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments; and the district court's denial of leave to amend because of futility of amendment. The court adopted the district court's well-reasoned and comprehensive disposition.View "Williams v. State of California" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her union appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on their First Amendment retaliation claims. Defendants cross-appealed a later order denying them attorneys' fees. The court remanded so that the district court could evaluate on a more detailed basis the incidents that it dismissed collectively as "petty workplace gripes" where there was evidence suggesting that some of these actions were taken as part of a more general campaign and hence might in context have greater materiality than when viewed in isolation. The court concluded that plaintiffs carried their burden of production sufficient to survive summary judgment as to the three involuntary transfers at issue. Plaintiffs presented a genuine factual dispute as to whether an internal investigation was retaliatory. Further, the district court erred in determining that defendant County was not subject to Monell liability. Defendants' cross-appeal is moot. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.View "Thomas v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a police officer, filed suit after he was terminated following severe interpersonal problems between him and other police officers. Plaintiff contended that these interpersonal problems resulted from his attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and that the police department discharged him based on his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The jury returned a general verdict for plaintiff, finding that he was disabled and that the City had discharged him because of his disability. The court reversed, holding that, based on the evidence presented, the jury could not have found plaintiff disabled under the ADA. Plaintiff's ADHD did not substantially limit plaintiff's ability to work or to interact with others. Therefore, the district court erred in denying the City's motion for judgment as a matter of law.View "Weaving v. City of Hillsboro" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights when prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in refusing him cataract surgery to restore his vision. The court held that blindness in one eye caused by a cataract is a serious condition. The court also held that the blanket, categorical denial of medically indicated surgery solely on the basis of an administrative policy that "one eye is good enough for prison inmates" is the paradigm of deliberate indifference. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of prison officials and remanded for trial.View "Colwell v. Bannister, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a death row prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Department of Corrections officials and a prison guard, alleging that the prison guard read a confidential letter he sent to his attorney, rather than merely scanning it to inspect the letter for contraband. The court concluded that plaintiff stated a Sixth Amendment claim when he alleged that prison officials read his legal mail, that they claim entitlement to do so, and that his right to private consultation with counsel has been chilled; plaintiff's allegations also support a claim for injunctive relief; and, therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nordstrom v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Coons and Novack filed suit challenging the constitutionality of two provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (Affordable Care Act): the individual mandate and the establishment of the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB). Plaintiffs also sought a declaration that the Arizona Health Care Freedom Act, Ariz. Const. art. XXVII, section 2, is not preempted by the Affordable Care Act. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the individual mandate does not violate Coons' substantive due process right to medical autonomy; affirmed the dismissal of Coons' challenge, based on lack of ripeness, to the individual mandate for violation of his substantive due process right to informational privacy; affirmed the district court's holding that the Affordable Care Act preempts the Arizona Act; and, with respect to Novack's challenge to IPAB, the court vacated the district court's decision on the merits of the claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Coons v. Lew" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Ringgold and Ringgold-Lockhart appealed the district court's vexatious litigant order. The court concluded that the district court provided proper notice and an opportunity to be heard, in accordance with the court's case law's first procedural requirement and due process; the district court compiled an adequate record to permit the court to review the basis of its order; the district court failed to consider alternative sanctions before issuing this injunction; the district court erred by issuing an order against Ringgold-Lockhart on the basis of state litigation in which he played no part; and the scope of the order is too broad in several respects. Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ringgold-Lockhart v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law