Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from an action to abate gang activity under California's general public nuisance statutes. The Orange County District Attorney's Office (OCDA), on behalf of the state, filed a public nuisance action against the Orange Varrio Cypress Criminal Street Gang (OVC). OCDA subsequently obtained a default judgment, including a permanent injunction (the Order) against OVC and others. Plaintiffs, individuals of whom OCDA and the Orange Police Department (OPD) served the Order and Notice, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that OCDA and OPD's "dismiss-and-serve strategy" violated the procedural due process clauses of the U.S. and California constitutions. The court concluded that the district court properly declined to abstain under Younger v. Harris; plaintiffs' suit was not a forbidden de facto appeal barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to abstain from granting relief under general principles of comity and federalism; and the court evaluated the district court's discretionary decision to grant relief under the Colorado River doctrine rather than under Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am. The court reversed the district court's judgment against Rackauckas on plaintiffs' second claim for relief in light of Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Alderman. Further, the court concluded, inter alia, that the Order profoundly implicated liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause; the district court correctly determined that the Mathews v. Eldridge factors "weigh clearly in favor" of the conclusion that defendants violated plaintiffs' procedural due process rights by failing to provide any form of hearing before subjecting them to the Order; and, therefore, the court affirmed the district court's issuance of declaratory and injunctive relief in plaintiffs' favor. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Vasquez v. Rackauckas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate who has a history of bipolar disorder, delusions, Parkinson's disease, and hypertension, filed suit pro se against defendants, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The district court dismissed his claim and plaintiff, represented by counsel, appealed. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the appeal; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Dr. Bannister because plaintiff failed to submit evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Dr. Bannister was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Warden Neven and nurses Grisham, Diliddo, and Balao-Cledera because plaintiff expressly waived his appeal against them in his reply brief; vacated the clerk's entry of judgment in favor of Defendant Dr. Sussman because the district court abused its discretion in failing to comply with Rule 4(m); vacated the district court's decision denying plaintiff's request for leave to amend his second amended complaint to name additional defendants; and remanded with instructions to comply with Rule 4(m) with respect to Dr. Sussman and to allow plaintiff leave to amend his second amended complaint. View "Crowley v. Bannister" on Justia Law

Arizona filed suit against ASARCO on behalf of Angela Aguilar and the state. Aguilar later filed her own suit, alleging sexual harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. These proceedings were consolidated and removed to federal court. The jury found ASARCO liable on the sexual harassment claims only and the jury did not find any compensatory damages for Aguilar, instead awarding her one dollar in nominal damages for the sexual harassment claim. The jury also awarded Aguilar $868,750 in punitive damages. The district court subsequently ordered that the punitive damages be reduced to $300,000, which was the statutory maximum under Title VII for an employer of ASARCO's size. The court concluded that the punitive damages award was outside of constitutional limits and must be vacated. The court concluded that the requirement of a reasonable relationship between compensatory and punitive damages suggested that these damages should be reduced. However, given ASARCO's highly reprehensible conduct and the presence of a comparable civil penalty in the form of the Title VII damages cap, the court concluded that the Constitution did not bar the imposition of a substantial punitive award. Therefore, on remand, the district court could reorder a new trial unless plaintiff accepted a remittitur of $125,000. View "State of Arizona v. ASARCO" on Justia Law

Arizona’s 2010 Senate Bill 1070 includes various immigration-related provisions, passed in response to the growing presence of unauthorized aliens in Arizona. The stated purpose of S.B. 1070 is “to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and government agencies in Arizona” by creating “a variety of immigration-related state offenses and defin[ing] the immigration-enforcement authority of Arizona’s state and local law enforcement officers.” Section 13-2929 of the Bill attempts to criminalize transporting, concealing, harboring, or attempting to transport, conceal, or harbor an unauthorized alien under certain circumstances and to criminalize inducing or encouraging an unauthorized alien to come to or reside in Arizona. The district court entered a preliminary injunction with respect to 13-2929 on the basis that it is preempted by federal law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the statute, as written, is void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause because one of its key elements—being “in violation of a criminal offense”—is unintelligible. The provision is also preempted by federal law and invalid under the Supremacy Clause. View "Valle del Sol, Inc. v. State of Arizona" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, disabled state prisoners and parolees, filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., seeking disability accommodations. In these consolidated appeals, defendant challenged the scope of the district court's injunction in light of the amendments to California Penal Code 3056. The court concluded that the August 28 orders, which required California state officials to disseminate and implement a previously negotiated County Jail Plan for disabled persons and parolees, neither conflicted with section 3056 nor required more of defendants than was appropriate to assist in remedying the ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations for which they bear responsibility. Therefore, the court affirmed the remedial August 28 orders issued by the district court. Case No. 12-6018 was dismissed as moot and the court affirmed the district court's order in Case No. 12-17198. View "Armstrong v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Arizona state prisoner, filed suit against defendants, alleging that they violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131-12134, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), 29 U.S.C. 794, by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability. Plaintiff picked tomatoes for Eurofresh as a part of a convict labor force. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims against Eurofresh were properly dismissed because plaintiff and Eurofresh were not in an employment relationship, and Eurofresh did not receive federal financial assistance. The court concluded, however, that judgment was improperly granted to the State Defendants where they were liable for disability discrimination committed by a contractor. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court to determine in the first instance whether such discrimination occurred. View "Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc." on Justia Law

This case was one of twenty-six pending before the district court alleging injuries related to the ingestion of propoxyphene, an ingredient found in the Darvocet and Darvon pain medications, as well as their generic brand counterparts. On appeal, Teva challenged the district court's order remanding the case to state court. At issue was whether removal was proper under the "mass action" provision of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. N. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, when plaintiffs moved for coordination pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 404. The court affirmed the district court's order, concluding that plaintiffs' petition for coordination was not a proposal to try the cases jointly under section 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) of CAFA. View "Romo, et al. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc." on Justia Law

After the Department denied Memorial's application for a Certificate of Need to perform elective percutaneous coronary interventions (PCIs), Memorial filed suit alleging that the PCI regulations were an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and unreasonably discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court concluded that the requirements did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause where the minimum procedure requirement did not burden interstate commerce and the minimum procedure requirement protected public safety. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of all of Memorial's remaining claims. View "Yakima Valley Mem'l Hosp. v. Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the City's enactment of an ordinance which had the practical effect of prohibiting new group homes - i.e., homes in which recovering alcoholics and drug users live communally and mutually support each other's recovery - from opening in most residential zones. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims; plaintiffs have created a triable fact that the ordinance was enacted in order to discriminate against them on the basis of disability, and that its enactment and enforcement harmed them; and the court reversed the district court's dismissal of all of plaintiffs' damages claims, except for its dismissal of Terri Bridgeman's claim for emotional distress. View "Pac. Shores Properties v. City of Newport Beach" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a former prison gang member and police informant. Defendants are producers of the documentary television series, "Gangland." Plaintiff filed suit for various claims alleging that defendants' failure to conceal his identity in an episode of "Gangland" endangered his life and cost him his job as an informant. On interlocutory appeal, defendants challenged the district court's denial of their anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) motion to strike the complaint under California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. The court concluded that defendants have met their initial burden under the anti-SLAPP statute where defendants' acts in furtherance of their right of free speech were in connection with issues of public interest. The court also concluded that, at this juncture, plaintiff's claims were not barred by the release he signed. It follows that plaintiff's statements were not barred by the parole evidence rule. The court further concluded that plaintiff met his burden of showing a probability of prevailing on his claims for (1) public disclosure of private fact; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) false promise; and (4) declaratory relief. Plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable probability of prevailing on his claims for (1) appropriation of likeness and (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Doe v. Gangland Productions, Inc." on Justia Law