Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and his wife filed a pro se action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, the warden of the prison where defendant had served his sentence and the director of the Montana Department of Corrections, seeking damages related to his sentence and probation. The court concluded that prison officials who simply enforced facially valid court orders were performing functions necessary to the judicial process. Accordingly, the court held that prison officials, like defendants in this case, who were charged with executing facially valid court orders enjoyed absolute immunity from section 1983 liability for conduct prescribed by those orders. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. View "Engebretson v. Mahoney" on Justia Law

Arizona House Bill 2036 (H.B. 2036), enacted in April 2012, forbids, except in a medical emergency, abortion of a fetus determined to be of a gestational age of at least twenty weeks. Arizona law separately prohibited abortions after fetal viability unless necessary to preserve the pregnant woman's life or health. The challenged provision at issue, Section 7 of H.B. 2036, extended the abortion ban earlier in pregnancy, to the period between twenty weeks gestation and fetal viability. Under controlling Supreme Court precedent, the court concluded that Arizona could not deprive a woman of the choice to terminate her pregnancy at any point prior to viability. Section 7 effects such a deprivation, by prohibiting abortion from twenty weeks gestational age through fetal viability. The twenty-week law was therefore unconstitutional under an unbroken stream of Supreme Court authority, beginning with Roe v. Wade and ending with Gonzales v. Carhart. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of declaratory and injunctive relief. View "Isaacson v. Horne" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, father of Adolf Anthony Sanchez Gonzalez, sued officers and the City of Anaheim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of his Fourth Amendment right of familial association and Gonzalez's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable and excessive force. Gonzalez's daughter and successor-in-interest then brought a separate suit raising similar federal claims and various state law claims. The district court consolidated both actions and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that striking Gonzalez in the arm with a flashlight was not excessive force given his stubborn refusal to follow the officers' commands; because all three Graham v. Connor factors supported the officers, they were justified in applying significant force; because the officers' prior conduct never amounted to a constitutional violation, the shooting was not unreasonable as a result; and plaintiffs presented no evidence to suggest that the officers, at any point, had a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest or self-protection and, therefore, plaintiffs' claim that the officers' conduct violated their due process right to familial association failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

Plaintiff spent 24 years in prison after being convicted for murder based largely upon the perjured testimony of an unreliable jailhouse informant, Edward Fink. Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the District Attorney's Office failed to create any system for the Deputy District Attorneys handling criminal cases to access information pertaining to the benefits provided to jailhouse informants and other impeachment information, and failed to train Deputy District Attorneys to disseminate this information. At issue on appeal was whether a district attorney acted as a local or a state official when establishing policy and training related to the use of jailhouse informants. The court concluded that the policies challenged by plaintiff were distinct from the acts the district attorney undertook on behalf of the state. Even taking into account the control and supervisory powers of the Attorney General, the District Attorney represented the county when establishing policy and training related to the use of jailhouse informants. Therefore, a cause of action could lie against the county under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the pleadings. View "Goldstein v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against correctional officials at the Saguaro Correctional Center (SCC), asserting that the decision to house him in the same cell with a member of a rival gang after he had fought with another member of that same gang violated his Eight Amendment rights. The district court rejected defendant's claims that defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk he faced from the cell assignment. The court concluded that, despite the late Rand v. Rowland notice, plaintiff did not suffer a deprivation of substantial rights when the district court decided the summary judgment motion on the merits. Plaintiff's response demonstrated that he understood the nature of summary judgment and complied with the requirements of Rule 56. Thus, reversal and remand of the district court was not required. Further, the undisputed evidence in the record showed that defendants were not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of an attack if the rival gang member and plaintiff were placed in a cell together. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Labatad v. CCA, et al" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the court considered whether San Rafael's mobilehome rent regulation violated the park owners' substantive due process rights, constituted a regulatory taking under Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, or ran afoul of the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment under the standards articulated in Kelo v. City of New London. The court concluded that the district court properly rejected the City's arguments that MHC's claims were barred by the statute of limitations and precluded by res judicata, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing MHC to amend its complaint. The court also concluded that the regulation did not constitute either a Penn Central or a private taking. Because the court reached the merits of the takings issue, the court need not resolve the question of ripeness. The court further concluded that the district court did not err in granting judgment on MHC's substantive due process claims; the district court did not err in submitting the breach of settlement contract claims to the jury, denying the motion for a directed verdict on that question, denying the motion for a new trial, or awarding attorneys' fees; and in its original lawsuit, MHC waived its claim for damages in order to have a bench trial on the constitutional claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's holding as to the Penn Central and private takings, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "MHC Limited Financing v. City of San Rafael" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the County Defendants. Plaintiff claimed, among other things, that the County Defendants conspired to violate, and did violate, her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they unlawfully searched her home pursuant to an invalid search warrant, used excessive force in the execution of that warrant, and arrested her without probable cause. Because there was probable cause to search plaintiff's residence and to arrest her, the court affirmed the district court's entry of judgment with respect to those claims. Because disputed issues of material fact remained regarding plaintiff's excessive force and conspiracy claims, however, the court reversed and remanded those claims to the district court for further proceedings. View "Cameron v. Craig" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued several police officers and their employer, the City of Los Angeles, for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Plaintiff was charged with attempted murder and was eventually acquitted. At issue was whether plaintiff's action was barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion. The court concluded that plaintiff raised a genuine dispute as to whether an officer fabricated evidence at the preliminary hearing by falsely testifying that the victim had identified plaintiff as the shooter. That alleged fabrication plainly met the materiality threshold for defeating summary judgment on the merits. In this case, the state court never purported to find either that the officer's testimony was credible or that the victim's testimony was not. Accordingly, plaintiff was not barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion and, therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Wige v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

AGC sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Caltrans and its officers, on the grounds that Caltrans' 2009 Disadvantaged Business Enterprise program unconstitutionally provided race- and sex-based preferences to certain groups. On appeal, AGC challenged the district court's adverse summary judgment rulings. The district court held that Caltrans' substantial statistical and anecdotal evidence provided a strong basis in evidence of discrimination against the four named groups, and that the program was narrowly tailored to benefit only those groups. The court dismissed AGC's appeal because AGC did not identify any of its members who have suffered or will suffer harm as a result of Caltrans' program, and therefore AGC had not established that it had associational standing to bring suit. View "Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Cal. Dept. of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against defendants alleging that he was unlawfully arrested and searched in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff was arrested for trespass under California Penal Code 602.8 because he was standing by himself inside a playground that was surrounded by a fence that had "No Trespassing" signs posted at every entrance. The court rejected defendants' argument that the grounds for custodial arrest specified in California Penal Code 853.6(i) applied not only to misdemeanors but also to infractions. Consistent with precedent, the statute's plain language, the rule against superfluity, and other persuasive authority, the court held that California Penal Code 853.5 provided the exclusive grounds for custodial arrest of a person arrested for an infraction. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's state law false arrest claim and remanded for further proceedings. If there are no further issues pertaining to liability on this claim, the district court should enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and proceed to a trial on damages. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining contentions. View "Edgerly v. City and County of San Francisco, et al" on Justia Law