Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the four cases giving rise to these eleven consolidated appeals, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Director of the California Department of Health Care Services (DHCS), appealed the district court's grant of preliminary injunctions to plaintiffs, various providers and beneficiaries of California's Medicaid program (Medi-Cal). At issue was the implementation of Medi-Cal reimbursement rate reductions. The court held that Orthopaedic Hospital v. Belshe did not control the outcome in these cases because it did not consider the key issue here - the Secretary's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A); the Secretary's approval of California's requested reimbursement rates were entitled to Chevron deference; and the Secretary's approval complied with the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court further held that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits on their Supremacy Clause claims against the Director because the Secretary had reasonably determined that the State's reimbursement rates complied with section 30(A). The court finally held that none of the plaintiffs had a viable takings claim because Medicaid, as a voluntary program, did not create property rights. View "Managed Pharmacy Care, et al v. Sebelius, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action in district court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that her Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by an officer's warrantless entry into her front yard and sought damages for her injuries. Plaintiff sustained serious injuries as a result of the officer's act of kicking down the front gate of her yard while in pursuit of a suspect who had committed at most a misdemeanor offense. The district court found that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity and granted his motion for summary judgment. The court held, however, that the law at the time of the incident would have placed a reasonable officer on notice that his warrantless entry into the curtilage of a home constituted an unconstitutional search, which could not be excused under the exigency or emergency exception to the warrant requirement. Therefore, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity and the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Sims v. Stanton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, asserted that denials by prison officials of his request for a conjugal visit with his wife violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., and the First Amendment, by interfering with his practice of a tenet of his Islamic faith requiring him to marry, consummate his marriage, and father children. The court held that because plaintiff's claim was based on an independently wrongful, discrete act in 2008, which was the denial of his request for conjugal visits with his second wife, his claims were not time-barred, notwithstanding the denial, pursuant to the same regulation, of his prior requests for conjugal visits with his first wife in 2002. View "Pouncil v. Tilton, et al" on Justia Law

In this prisoner civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, plaintiff appealed from the dismissal with prejudice of his first amended complaint for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated his rights by failing to comply with his medical "chrono," which required him to be housed in a ground floor cell and that defendants failed to provide him with an interpreter at medical appointments. The court held that the district court erred by refusing to consider arguments that plaintiff raised for the first time in his objections to a magistrate judge's findings and recommendations on defendants' motion to dismiss; concluding that defendant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; and dismissing his complaint on the ground that he failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Further, the district court erred by failing to provide notice pursuant to Rand v. Rowland. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Akhtar v. J. Mesa, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Yellow Page Companies, challenged the validity of Seattle's imposition of substantial conditions and costs on the distribution of yellow page phone directories (Ordinance 123427). The district court rejected plaintiffs' challenges and granted summary judgment in favor of the City, allowing the Ordinance to stand. The court concluded that, although portions of the directories were obviously commercial in nature, the books contained more than that, and the court concluded that the directories were entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment. As a result, when the court evaluated the Ordinance under strict scrutiny, the Ordinance did not pass strict scrutiny because it was not the least restrictive means available to further the government's interest. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the City and remanded for the entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs. View "Dex Media West, Inc., et al v. City of Seattle, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to install a temporary offsite sign advertising the television program "E! News" without obtaining the required City permits. Deeming the sign "strictly commercial in nature," the City notified plaintiffs that installation of the proposed sign would violate several provisions of its sign ordinance. The district court agreed with the City and granted judgment in its favor. The court held that, in light of plaintiffs' concessions that the E! News sign was an advertisement for a particular product and that it proposed a commercial transaction, the district court properly determined that the signs at issue were commercial speech and correctly dismissed plaintiffs' claims. View "Charles, et al v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging, among other things, that his constitutional rights were violated by defendants' failure to protect him from other inmates and by defendants' deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The court concluded that an inmate's lack of awareness of a correctional institution's grievance procedure did not make the administrative remedy "unavailable" for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), unless the inmate met his or her burden of proving the grievance procedure to be unknowable. Because plaintiff had not met his burden of proof, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Albino v. Baca, et al" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concern the aftermath of the shooting of Kristin Marie Maxwell-Bruce by her husband, Lowell Bruce. The Maxwells brought suit against several parties. These interlocutory appeals concern two sets of claims. First, the Maxwells alleged various constitutional violations by the Sheriff's officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Second, the Maxwells sought tort damages under California law against the Viejas defendants, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367(a). The court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity to the Sheriff's officers on the ground of qualified immunity to the Sheriff's officers with regards to the Maxwell's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims. The court reversed the district court's granting of the Viejas defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to tribal sovereign immunity, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Maxwell, et al v. County of San Diego, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against defendant, a prosecuting attorney, charging, among other things, that Idaho Code 18-606 violated various provisions of the U.S. Constitution. The prosecuting attorney had previously filed a felony criminal complaint against plaintiff, charging her with "the public offense of Unlawful Abortion" pursuant to section 18-606. The Idaho state district court subsequently dismissed the criminal complaint without prejudice and the prosecuting attorney had not determined whether he would re-file the criminal complaint. In the class action suit, the district court issued a preliminary injunction, restraining the prosecuting attorney from enforcing section 18-606 and 18-608(1). Both parties appealed, raising several challenges. The court affirmed the district court's determination that plaintiff would likely succeed with her facial constitutional challenges to sections 18-606 and 18-609(1); affirmed the district court's conclusion that plaintiff lacked standing to seek pre-enforcement relief against the enforcement of the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act (PUCPA), Idaho Code 18-505; reversed the scope of the injunction to the extent that it granted relief beyond plaintiff; and reversed the district court's determination that plaintiff did not have standing to enjoin enforcement of section 18-608(2) in conjunction with section 18-606. View "McCormack v. Hiedeman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit against the manufacturer of an electronic control device - commonly known as a "taser" - and sued police officers for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law wrongful death. At issue was whether a police officer had used constitutionally excessive force by repeatedly deploying a taser against a combative suspect and whether the manufacturer of that device had provided sufficient warning that its repeated use could lead to death. The deceased suspect had gouged out the eye of a family member, attempting to exorcize her demons, when police officers arrived at the scene. The court held that the taser provided sufficient warning as a matter of law. The court also held that, although the officers used significant force in this case, it was justified by the considerable government interests at stake. Because the court concluded that the officers acted reasonably in using force, plaintiffs' state law claims against the officers for wrongful death could not succeed unless the use of the taser constituted deadly force and the use of the deadly force was not justified. The court concluded that it was not convinced that the use of the taser involved deadly force, but even if the taser qualified as deadly force, no reasonable jury could find that the circumstances here failed to justify the use of deadly force. View "Marquez, et al v. City of Phoenix, et al" on Justia Law