Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff on behalf of herself and her five minor children, appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the individual defendant police officers and the City and County of San Francisco (“Defendants”).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants—individual police officers and the City and County of San Francisco— on Plaintiff’s federal claims based on qualified immunity; remanded to the district court Plaintiff’s state law claims for false arrest and negligence; affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants on the remaining state law claims; and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to recuse. The panel first considered whether there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff under the three statutes cited by Defendants. The panel held that there was a jury question whether officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. There were some facts, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, that suggest Defendants may have had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.   However, Plaintiff’s federal claims are still subject to qualified immunity. In applying the qualified immunity analysis to claims of unlawful arrest, there is a two-step inquiry: whether there was probable cause for the arrest and whether reasonable officers could disagree as to the legality of the arrest. The panel held that although a reasonable jury could find that Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because, even construing all facts in Plaintiff’s favor, the law did not clearly establish that probable cause was lacking View "KIRSTIN JOHNSON, ET AL V. KIERSTIE BARR, ET AL" on Justia Law

Idaho enacted the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, Idaho Code §§ 33-6201–06 (2020) (the “Act”), a first-of-its-kind categorical ban on the participation of transgender women and girls in women’s student athletics. Elite athletic regulatory bodies also had policies allowing transgender women athletes to compete if they met certain criteria. The Act, however, bars all transgender girls and women from participating in, or even trying out for, public school female sports teams at every age. At issue is whether the federal district court for the District of Idaho abused its discretion in August 2020 when it preliminarily enjoined the Act, holding that it likely violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Act subjects only women and girls who wish to participate in public school athletic competitions to an intrusive sex verification process and categorically bans transgender women and girls at all levels, regardless of whether they have gone through puberty or hormone therapy, from competing on female, women, or girls teams, and because the State of Idaho failed to adduce any evidence demonstrating that the Act is substantially related to its asserted interests in sex equality and opportunity for women athletes, the panel held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim. View "LINDSAY HECOX, ET AL V. BRADLEY LITTLE, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested for murder and held for almost four years before the charges against him were dismissed, months after another person confessed to the crime. Years later, Plaintiff then sued the County of Riverside and various County officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, claiming that they had violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by suppressing the separate confession. The district court denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the Brady claim.   The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, without prejudice to Parker, asserting a different due process claim. A Brady violation requires that the withheld evidence have a reasonable probability of affecting a judicial proceeding, and no such proceeding was affected here. The panel held that Plaintiff could not show prejudice from the nondisclosure of the confession. A Brady violation requires that the withheld evidence have a reasonable probability of affecting a judicial proceeding. Plaintiff did not state a Brady claim because he did not assert the nondisclosure would have changed the result of any proceeding in his criminal case. The panel rejected Plaintiff’s contention that the prejudice inquiry should be whether the withheld evidence had a reasonable probability of affecting counsel’s strategy. The panel noted that no court has adopted Plaintiff’s proposed rule, and most other courts require a conviction to establish prejudice. Moreover, here, the cause of Plaintiff’s continued detention was not the suppression of the confession, but the District Attorney’s continued prosecution even after receiving the confession. View "ROGER PARKER V. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s order dismissing his First and Eighth Amendment claims brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff alleged that he faced harassment, retaliation, and physical harm. Relevant here, he alleged that prison officer Lieutenant Carmen Herrera repeatedly threatened him, denied him law library access, and assaulted him several times, causing a broken arm and wrist. Plaintiff also alleged that physician’s assistant Jose Esquetini refused to treat his broken bones or take x-rays for six weeks to cover up Herrera’s assaults. Chambers asserts that he was then assaulted by Officer Enrique Velez, who allegedly sprayed him in the mouth and face with mace.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part the district court’s order. Affirming the dismissal of the First Amendment retaliation claim, the panel agreed with Plaintiff that the Supreme Court’s decision in Egbert v. Boule explicitly disavowed any Bivens claims based on First Amendment retaliation. The panel held that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim failed to state a claim under Egbert. The panel held that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim similarly failed under Bivens, but dismissal of that claim should be with prejudice because even plausible allegations could not constitute a Bivens claim for excessive force under Egbert, and amendment would be futile. The panel determined that it was unclear whether the Bivens claim was viable because the plaintiff failed to allege any facts about his injuries, examination, or treatment. View "ROSCOE CHAMBERS V. C. HERRERA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Columbia Basin College officials terminated R.W. from the nursing program after learning that he had sought medical treatment for homicidal thoughts about three instructors. R.W. filed suit seeking damages, reinstatement in the nursing program, and expungement of his failing grades.   On interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit  (1) affirmed the district court’s order determining that Plaintiff’s suit for injunctive relief against Columbia Basin College officials in their official capacity could proceed under the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; and (2) dismissed in part defendants’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction in plaintiff R.W.’s action alleging First Amendment violations and other claims arising from his termination from a nursing program at Columbia Basin College.   The panel held that R.W.’s complaint alleged an ongoing violation of his constitutional rights given the uncertainty as to whether he could reenroll in the nursing program or qualify for financial aid; his claim for prospective relief was not moot; and the Dean of Student Conduct was a proper defendant because he was directly involved with the alleged constitutional violations and there was a question of fact as to whether he had authority to implement injunctive relief if so ordered.   the panel held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s order declining to reconsider its prior partial summary judgment for R.W. on his 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim for violation of the First Amendment. The merits of R.W.’s First Amendment claim were severable from, and neither necessary to nor necessarily resolved by, the district court’s ruling on the Ex parte Young issue and were reviewable upon entry of final judgment. View "R. W. V. COLUMBIA BASIN COLLEGE, ET AL" on Justia Law

High-level officials in the California prison system transferred 122 inmates from the California Institution for Men, where there was a widespread COVID-19 outbreak, to San Quentin State Prison, where there were no known cases of the virus. The transfer sparked an outbreak of COVID-19 at San Quentin that ultimately killed one prison guard and over twenty-five inmates. The guard’s family members sued the prison officials, claiming that the officials violated the guard’s due process rights. The officials moved to dismiss, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion with respect to some of the officials, who then filed an interlocutory appeal.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The panel held that based on the allegations in the complaint, Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a violation of the guard’s substantive due process right to be free from a state-created danger, under which state actors may be liable for their roles in creating or exposing individuals to danger they otherwise would not have faced. The panel held that the unlawfulness of defendants’ alleged actions was clearly established by the combination of two precedents: L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1992), which recognized a claim under the state-created danger doctrine arising out of a prison’s disregard for the safety of a female employee who was raped after being required to work alone with an inmate known to be likely to commit a violent crime if placed alone with a woman; and Pauluk v. Savage, 836 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2016). View "PATRICIA POLANCO, ET AL V. RALPH DIAZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

Following a federal trial, Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decisions to (1) instruct the jury that a Section 1983 claim could not be grounded in a Miranda violation alone and (2) exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s coerced confessions expert. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of Plaintiff on the Miranda issue, but the Supreme Court reversed that decision. On remand, Plaintiff concedes that his Miranda claim is no longer viable but maintains that he is entitled to a new trial on his Fifth Amendment coercion claim because the district court improperly excluded his expert witness.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment on a jury verdict in favor of Defendants and remanded for a new trial on Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim that his confession was coerced. The panel held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert witness’s testimony on coerced confessions because the testimony was relevant, false confessions are an issue beyond the common knowledge of the average layperson, and the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s confession went to the heart of his case. View "TERENCE TEKOH V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated from his position as Fire Chief for the City of Stockton based on his religion and, specifically, his attendance at a religious leadership event.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants in Plaintiff’s employment discrimination action under Title VII and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act. The panel held that, in analyzing employment discrimination claims under Title VII and the California FEHA, the court may use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, under which plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged actions. Finally, the burden returns to Plaintiff to show that the proffered nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual. Alternatively, Plaintiff may prevail on summary judgment by showing direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.   The court explained that Plaintiff was required to show that his religion was “a motivating factor” in Defendants’ decision to fire him with respect to his federal claims and that his religion was “a substantial motivating factor” with respect to his FEHA claims. The panel concluded that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient direct evidence of discriminatory animus in Defendants’ statements and the City’s notice of intent to remove him from City service. And Plaintiff also failed to present sufficient specific and substantial circumstantial evidence of religious animus by Defendants. View "RONALD HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON, ET AL" on Justia Law

In an effort to employ an Australian citizen and E-3 visa-holder, Persian Broadcast filed and received approval for a Labor Condition Application (LCA) through the U.S. Department of Labor (“Department”), first in 2011 and again in 2013. An LCA binds an employer to pay the required wages for the period of authorized employment, and only two exemptions can eliminate an employer’s legal obligations: when an employee is nonproductive for personal reasons or there has been a bona fide termination of the employment relationship. In February 2015, the employee filed an administrative complaint with the Department, arguing that Persian Broadcast failed to pay him the full amount of his wages as specified in the two LCAs.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment upholding an Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) order awarding backpay plus pre-and post-judgment interest to the employee. First, the panel held that the employee’s February 2015 complaint was not time-barred. The ARB reasonably relied on the LCAs rather than the employee’s visa to determine the period of authorized employment and Persian Broadcast’s wage obligations. By failing to pay the employee the reported wage under the second LCA period, Persian Broadcast continued to violate the wage requirement until the LCA period ended on September 12, 2015. Second, the panel held that the employee’s circumstances did not meet either of the statutory exemptions to the LCA wage requirement because, by continuing his reporting work, the employee remained in productive status, and there was never a bona fide termination. View "PERSIAN BROADCAST SERVICE GLOB V. MARTIN WALSH, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioners moved to quash trial subpoenas issued by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, requiring them to testify via contemporaneous video transmission from their home in the U.S. Virgin Islands. The bankruptcy court denied their motions, and the Petitioners sought mandamus relief from this court. Petitioners argued that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(1) prohibits the bankruptcy court from compelling them to testify, even remotely, where they reside out of state over 100 miles from the location of the trial.   The Ninth Circuit granted the petition. The panel held that the bankruptcy court erred in refusing to quash the trial subpoenas because, under the plain meaning of the text of the Rules, the geographic limitations of Rule 45(c) apply even when a witness is permitted to testify by contemporaneous video transmission. The panel concluded that Rule 45(c) governs the court’s power to require a witness to testify at trial and focuses on the location of the proceeding, while Rule 43(a) governs the mechanics of how trial testimony is presented. Weighing the Bauman factors to determine whether issuance of a writ of mandamus was appropriate, the panel concluded that the third factor, clear error, weighed in favor of granting mandamus relief. The panel concluded that the fifth Bauman factor also weighed in favor because the petition presented an important issue of first impression. The panel held that the third and fifth Bauman factors were sufficient on their own to warrant granting mandamus relief in this case. View "IN RE: JOHN KIRKLAND, ET AL V. USBC, LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law