Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, the California Institution for Men (“CIM”) suffered a severe COVID-19 outbreak. In an attempt to protect CIM inmates, high-level officials in the California prison system transferred 122 inmates from CIM to San Quentin State Prison, where there were no known cases of the virus. The transfer sparked an outbreak of COVID-19 at San Quentin that infected over two-thousand inmates and ultimately killed over twenty-five inmates and one prison guard. The wife of one of the deceased inmates sued, claiming that the prison officials had violated her husband’s constitutional and statutory rights. The officials moved to dismiss, asserting that the claims were barred by various federal and state immunities, including immunity under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act and qualified immunity. The district court held that the officials were not entitled to immunity at this stage of the proceedings, and the officials filed this interlocutory appeal.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of immunity under the PREP Act and qualified immunity in an action brought against California prison officials arising from the death of a San Quentin inmate from COVID-19; and (2) dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Defendants’ claims asserting immunity under state law. The panel held that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, which adequately alleged that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the health and safety of San Quentin inmates, including Hampton. View "MICHAEL HAMPTON, ET AL V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against several officers of the Tucson Police Department. Two officers (collectively, “Defendants”) are the only remaining defendants. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged First Amendment retaliation claims arising from Defendants’ investigation of two arsons that occurred at properties connected to the husband. Defendants appealed from the district court’s order denying without prejudice their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the First Amendment claims. The panel concluded that Plaintiffs failed to show that Defendants’ conduct violated clearly established law. It was not clearly established that Plaintiff has a First Amendment right to remain silent when questioned by the police. Nor was it clearly established that a retaliatory investigation per se violates the First Amendment. Defendants were therefore entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claims based on the husband's silence and Plaintiffs’ lawsuits and requests for public disclosures. View "GREG MOORE, ET AL V. SEAN GARNAND, ET AL" on Justia Law

=O.B. who was attending the University on a football scholarship, repeatedly and violently assaulted Plaintiff, his fellow student, in an off-campus house where O.B. was living with other university football players. At the time of the assault, university officials knew that O.B. had repeatedly and violently assaulted two other female undergraduates the previous year. Plaintiff sued the University under Title IX. The district court granted summary judgment to the University.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The en banc court held that to obtain damages under Title IX for student-on-student harassment, a plaintiff must show (1) that the educational institution had substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs; (2) that the harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it denied its victims the equal access to education that Title IX is designed to protect; (3) that a school official with authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures has actual knowledge of the discrimination; (4) that the school acted with deliberate indifference to the harassment; and (5) that the school’s deliberate indifference must cause students to undergo harassment. The en banc court held that evidence in the record would support a conclusion by a reasonable factfinder that University officials had actual knowledge or notice of O.B.’s violent assaults and that Erika Barnes, the University’s Title IX liaison within the Athletics Department, was an official who had authority to address O.B.’s assaults and to institute corrective measures. View "MACKENZIE BROWN, ET AL V. STATE OF ARIZONA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs’ neighbor petitioned for a civil harassment restraining order against Plaintiffs and was granted a temporary restraining order. As a result of the TRO, Plaintiff was ordered to surrender his firearms to a California licensed firearms dealer. Certain California laws make it unlawful for any person subject to a “civil restraining order” issued by a California state court (including temporary restraining orders) to possess firearms or ammunition. Plaintiffs claim these laws violate the Second Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution as applied to them. Though Plaintiffs were subject to civil restraining orders when they filed their suit, the orders against them have expired, and in January 2023, a California court denied the latest request to extend them.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed Plaintiffs’ action as moot. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that, although they were no longer subject to any firearm restrictions, the case fell within the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness. The panel noted that this doctrine is to be used sparingly, in exceptional situations, and generally only where (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again. The panel held that this case was moot because the relevant restraining orders have expired, a three-year-long restraining order is not too brief to be litigated on the merits, and there was no reasonable expectation that Plaintiffs will be subject to the same action again View "MIRANDA WALLINGFORD, ET AL V. ROBERT BONTA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Appellee Gateway Hotel L.P. (“Gateway”) contends that the standard for awarding costs to ADA Defendants is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), which allows courts the discretion to award costs to prevailing parties “unless a federal statute . . . provides otherwise.” Appellant contends that the ADA’s fee- and cost-shifting statute “provides otherwise” because it permits ADA Defendants to receive their costs only where there is a showing that the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. Therefore, he contends that the district court should have granted his motion to retax costs, which would have, in effect, denied Gateway’s application for costs. The district court denied Appellant’s motion because it concluded that the decision in Brown was irreconcilable with the United States Supreme Court’s intervening opinion in Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371 (2013) and was therefore effectively overruled.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that Brown v. Lucky Stores was effectively overruled by Marx v. General Revenue Corp. The panel held that, accordingly, the fee- and cost-shifting provision of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. Section 12205, does not “provide otherwise” within the meaning of Rule 54(d)(1). Rule 54(d)(1), therefore, governs the award of costs to a prevailing ADA defendant and allows such an award in the court’s discretion, thereby keeping the court’s prior award of costs to the defendant intact. View "ORLANDO GARCIA V. GATEWAY HOTEL L.P." on Justia Law

AB 2571, as later amended by AB 160, is codified at Section 22949.80 of the California Business and Professions Code. The statute mandates that “[a] firearm industry member shall not advertise, market, or arrange for placement of an advertising or marketing communication offering or promoting any firearm-related product in a manner that is designed, intended, or reasonably appears to be attractive to minors.” Junior Sports Magazines Inc. publishes Junior Shooters, a youth-oriented magazine focused on firearm-related activities and products. According to Junior Sports Magazines, its ability to publish Junior Shooters depends on advertising revenue. Junior Sports Magazines ceased distributing the magazine in California and has placed warnings on its website deterring California minors from accessing its content. Shortly after California enacted AB 2571, Junior Sports Magazines challenged its constitutionality under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Junior Sports Magazines also moved to preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of Section 22949.80. The district court denied the injunction.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial. The panel first concluded that because California permits minors under supervision to possess and use firearms for hunting and other lawful activities, Section 22949.80 facially regulates speech that concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. Next, the panel held that section 22949.80 does not directly and materially advance California’s substantial interests in reducing gun violence and the unlawful use of firearms by minors. Finally, the panel held that section 22949.80 was more extensive than necessary because it swept in truthful ads about lawful use of firearms for adults and minors alike. View "JUNIOR SPORTS MAGAZINES INC., ET AL V. ROB BONTA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Appellants wish to openly carry handguns in California for self-protection, but California’s current licensing regime effectively establishes a statewide ban on open carry by ordinary law-abiding Californians. Appellants brought a Second Amendment suit against the Attorney General of California in his official capacity and sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of California Penal Code sections that impose criminal penalties for unlicensed open carry. The district court denied the preliminary injunction.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motion. The panel held that the district court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard to deny Appellants’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Instead of analyzing the first factor set forth in Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008)—whether Appellants were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim—the district court erroneously determined that because the public interest and balance of harms disfavored the issuance of a preliminary injunction, it was not necessary to assess Appellants’ likelihood of success on the merits. The panel set forth three requirements to guide the district court’s preliminary injunction analysis on remand. View "MARK BAIRD, ET AL V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was booked into a federal corrections center in San Diego for an alleged sex offense. Given the nature of his charges, Plaintiff requested protective custody. Jail officials, however, declined his request, instead placing him in general population. Plaintiff experienced harassment by other inmates, and at some point, the inmates forced Plaintiff to exercise to the point of collapse, leading to serious medical complications requiring hospitalization. Plaintiff filed suit under Bivens against two jail classification officers in their individual capacities. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that Plaintiff did not state a viable Bivens claim. The district court denied the motion. Although the district court found that Plaintiff’s claim presented a “new Bivens context,” it concluded that an extension of Bivens could be warranted in his case.   The Ninth Circuit reversed. The court explained that when a party seeks to bring a Bivens action, courts apply a two-step test: whether the case presents a new Bivens context, and, if so, whether there are “special factors” that counsel against extending Bivens. Applying the first step, the panel held that this case presents a new Bivens context that the Supreme Court has not recognized in its Bivens jurisprudence. Applying the second step, the panel held that special factors counsel against extending Bivens to this case. The legislature and executive were best positioned to address Plaintiff’s interest and have, in fact, provided alternative remedies through administrative review procedures offered by the Board of Prisons. Accordingly, the panel declined to overstep its constitutional role to create a new damages action. View "STEVE MARQUEZ V. C. RODRIGUEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

Two police officers were dispatched to a gym after a man reportedly threatened gym patrons and assaulted a security guard. The suspect then violently attacked the officers and refused to stop after they repeatedly deployed their tasers. One officer eventually resorted to lethal force to end the aggression. Plaintiff, the man’s mother, filed this lawsuit against Defendant and the City of Los Angeles. She claimed a violation of Section 1983 based on the officer’s allegedly unreasonable use of deadly force. She also sought to hold the City liable under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services. Plaintiff further brought wrongful death actions against the officer and the City under California law. The court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims for similar reasons. Defendant appealed.   The Ninth Circuit reversed. The panel held that because Defendant did not challenge the district court’s determination that a reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant violated the man’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, this appeal turned solely on the second step of the qualified immunity analysis. The panel held that Defendant’s use of deadly force, including his failure to give a warning that he would be using such force, did not violate clearly established law given the specific circumstances he encountered. The court wrote that there was no basis to conclude that Defendant’s use of force here was obviously constitutionally excessive. View "PAULETTE SMITH V. EDWARD AGDEPPA, ET AL" on Justia Law

When Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee and a patient at Patton State Hospital in California, he was twice attacked by a fellow patient. He sued Defendant, the psychiatrist in charge of his unit, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for injuries from the second attack, alleging that Defendant violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel determined that both tests ask whether Defendant’s conduct was reasonable, and both require Alexander to show that Defendant’s conduct was worse than negligent. The panel held that under either test, Plaintiff offered no evidence that Defendant failed to act reasonably, let alone that he was “more than negligent” in not transferring Plaintiff or the other patient after the first attack. Although Plaintiff was attacked a second time, the evidence showed that Defendant’s responses to both incidents were thorough and careful. Accordingly, the panel found no violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. View "SURIE ALEXANDER V. DAU NGUYEN" on Justia Law