Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2018, Plaintiff filed a federal Terry action against the City of Pasadena and several of its police officers seeking to recover for the death of Reginald Thomas, a father figure to Plaintiff. The Terry action, which included a section 1983 claim, was dismissed with prejudice for lack of Article III standing in 2019. Plaintiff then filed a nearly identical lawsuit in California state court, which the Defendants removed to federal court and successfully moved to dismiss based on issue preclusion.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 action brought against Defendants. The panel held that a plain reading of the first district court’s judgment established that Article III standing was actually litigated and decided, although erroneously. However, erroneous, unappealed judgments are still owed preclusive effect. The panel concluded that issue preclusion was available, and Plaintiff was bound by the prior standing determination. While issue preclusion was available, the panel held that the Defendants waived issue preclusion by removing the refiled case to federal court because a removing defendant voluntarily invokes and acquiesces to the federal courts and bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction and Article III standing. Accordingly, the panel vacated and remanded to the second and current district court to determine, in the first instance, whether jurisdiction lies in the federal courts and whether Plaintiff adequately stated a claim if the Defendants pursue such an argument on remand. View "SHANE LOVE V. AARON VILLACANA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Sacramento County Sheriffs’ Deputies encountered Celia and William Bernal (collectively “the Plaintiffs”) at their home during the Deputies’ investigation into allegations that Plaintiffs’ son planned a shooting at his school that day. During the interaction, the Deputies held Celia’s arms and used a twistlock to prevent her from leaving. The Deputies also pointed a firearm at William, forcibly restrained him, and put him in handcuffs. The district court held that the Deputies did not violate the Fourth Amendment by detaining Plaintiffs even in the absence of reasonable suspicion. The district court further found that the Deputies did not use excessive force during Plaintiffs’ detention and, even if they had, qualified immunity applied.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Deputies in Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 action. The panel first considered whether the initial seizure of Plaintiffs was reasonable. Because Plaintiffs were detained but not arrested, the reasonableness of their detention depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers. The panel held that the Deputies had limited authority to briefly detain and question Plaintiffs about Ryan’s location due primarily to the exigencies inherent in preventing an imminent school shooting. Further, on balance, the panel concluded that the Deputies’ use of force against Celia was reasonable under the circumstances. The panel concluded that the district court erred in finding that the Deputies’ use of force against William was not excessive. The intrusion on William’s liberty was too great in the context of detaining a non-suspect witness. View "WILLIAM BERNAL, ET AL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, ET AL" on Justia Law

In an action brought by Plaintiff and her five minor children alleging federal and state law claims arising out of Plaintiff’s arrest, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants—individual police officers and the City and County of San Francisco— on Plaintiff’s federal claims based on qualified immunity; remanded to the district court Plaintiff’s state law claims for false arrest and negligence; affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining state law claims; and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to recuse.   The panel first considered whether there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff under the three statutes cited by Defendants. The panel held that there was a jury question whether officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Some of the bases on which the defendants attempt to claim probable cause are not supported by the record. However, Plaintiff’s federal claims are still subject to qualified immunity. The court wrote that Plaintiff did not sufficiently show how her arrest violated a clearly established right to be free from an unlawful arrest when the undisputed evidence (under the probable cause analysis) presented before the district court does not show that every reasonable officer would be on notice that the actions taken by the defendants were unconstitutional. The panel vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law false arrest and negligence claims, which were premised on a finding that probable cause existed as a matter of law. View "KIRSTIN JOHNSON, ET AL V. KIERSTIE BARR, ET AL" on Justia Law

The City of Grants Pass maintains ordinances that preclude homeless persons from using a blanket, a pillow, or a cardboard box for protection from the elements while sleeping within the City’s limits. Three homeless individuals filed a putative class action complaint against the City, arguing a number of City ordinances were unconstitutional. The district court certified a class of “involuntarily homeless” persons and later granted partial summary judgment in favor of the class. The district court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement against the class members of some City ordinances, at certain times, in certain places. The City appealed.   In the amended opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s summary judgment and permanent injunction in favor of Plaintiffs; affirmed certification of a class of “involuntary homeless” persons; and remanded. The panel rejected the City’s argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction because Plaintiffs’ claims were moot or because Plaintiffs failed to identify any relief that was within a federal court’s power to redress. The panel held that the district court did not err by finding Plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) such that a class could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). The panel affirmed the district court’s ruling that the City of Grants Pass could not enforce its anticamping ordinances against homeless persons for the mere act of sleeping outside with rudimentary protection from the elements or for sleeping in their car at night when there was no other place in the City for them to go. View "GLORIA JOHNSON, ET AL V. CITY OF GRANTS PASS" on Justia Law

Project Veritas sued the Oregon Attorney General, Ellen Rosenblum, and the District Attorney of Multnomah County, Oregon, Michael Schmidt (collectively, Oregon), challenging section 165.540 as an unconstitutional restriction of protected speech. Oregon moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court partially granted the motion, and the parties agreed to dismiss the remaining claims with prejudice. Project Veritas appealed.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The law provides two exceptions relevant to this appeal: (1) section 165.540(1)(c) does not apply to a person who records a conversation during a felony that endangers human life, and (2) section 165.540(1)(c) allows a person to record a conversation in which a law enforcement officer is a participant if the recording is made while the officer is performing official duties and meets other criteria. Applying Animal Legal Def. Fund. v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018), the panel held that section 165.540(1)(c) regulates protected speech (unannounced audiovisual recording) and is content-based because it distinguishes between particular topics by restricting some subject matters (e.g., a state executive officer’s official activities) and not others (e.g., a police officer’s official activities). The panel further determined that section 165.540(1)(c) burdens more speech than is necessary to achieve its stated interest, and there were other ways for Oregon to achieve its interests of protecting conversational privacy. Because section 165.540(1)(c) is not a valid time, place, or manner restriction, it cannot be saved by striking the two exceptions at issue here. View "PROJECT VERITAS, ET AL V. MICHAEL SCHMIDT, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a federal prisoner, challenges the 300-minute-per-month cap on his phone calls applied by the federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). Plaintiff argued that BOP, by applying the policy to him without exemption, unconstitutionally infringes on his First and Fifth Amendment rights to familial association with his three children. Although the district court found that Plaintiff stated plausible First and Fifth Amendment claims, it dismissed his claims as moot after BOP moved Plaintiff between facilities since his complaint did not name the new facility’s warden.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Although the panel agreed with the district court that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief were moot as to his two previous wardens who were no longer in a position to grant Plaintiff relief at his present facility, one defendant—BOP’s regional director for the Western Region—still plausibly had the authority to redress his claimed injury by directing his current warden to offer him more phone time. And even if that were not the case, the district court clearly erred by offering Plaintiff no opportunity to amend his complaint to name his current warden since amendment would have resolved the sole stated ground for dismissal.   Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief as to his two former wardens, reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief as to the Regional Director defendant, and held that Plaintiff should be given leave to amend his complaint to add his current warden as a co-defendant. View "KENNETH TIEDEMANN V. BARBARA VON BLANCKENSEE, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) Law Enforcement Ranger in Idaho, challenged adverse employment actions taken against him by the Department of the Interior and BLM officials. He sued Defendants, alleging a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process.   In an interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss an action alleging due process violations and seeking damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The panel held that Plaintiff had no claim for money damages under Bivens. Here, Plaintiff’s claims arose in a different context than what the Court has recognized. Congress has also already provided a remedy in this context under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Because this case involves an alternative remedial structure, this case exists in a novel context outside the preexisting Bivens framework. Extending Bivens here would risk impermissible intrusion into the functioning of both the Legislative and Executive Branches. View "DAVID HARPER V. MICHAEL NEDD, ET AL" on Justia Law

The County of Marin (“the County”), at the onset of the pandemic in March 2020, took action to limit the spread of COVID-19 and protect its vulnerable citizens by issuing a public health order that placed certain restrictions on allowable activities. The County continually modified its original health order based on data and increased knowledge of how the virus spreads. During the time that a modified version of the health order was in effect, the County learned of aviation activities by Seaplane Adventures, LLC (“Seaplane”) that violated the applicable health order and began a dialogue with Seaplane regarding its failure to comply with the County’s health order. Seaplane ultimately ceased its operations that were in violation of the County’s health order and filed the suit before us today. Seaplane appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the County.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The panel held that regardless of what the relevant comparison category was for comparing whether the County’s actions were rooted in a rational basis, given that a deadly virus was tearing into the most vulnerable throughout the County, country, and world, the actions of the County met the rational basis standard as it took actions to mitigate the damage of the COVID-19 virus. To the extent that Seaplane was alleging differential treatment between Seaplane and other air carriers providing recreational flights in violation of the health order, the rational basis for the County’s action was also abundantly clear: it simply did not know of the other violators. View "SEAPLANE ADVENTURES, LLC V. COUNTY OF MARIN" on Justia Law

Believing that two men were about to engage in the armed robbery of a gas station, defendant police officers ("Defendants") approached the Plaintiff's’ vehicle with guns pointed and forcibly removed him. The district court denied the Defendants' claim to qualified immunity, and the Defendants appealed.On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. First, it was not clearly established that the officers lacked an objectively reasonable belief that criminal activity was about to occur. Second, clearly established law did not prevent the officers from suspecting Plaintiff might be armed. Here, Defendants believed Plaintiff was about to commit and armed robbery, which is a crime typically involving the use of a weapon. Nothing gave the panel any reason to second guess the officer's "on the ground" determination.The court also rejected Plainitff's claim that it was a violation of a clearly established right to point a firearm at the Plaintiff and demand he exits his vehicle without first identifying themselves as law enforcement. View "DEJUAN HOPSON V. JACOB ALEXANDER, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of Federal contractor employees and Federal employees working for the Department of Energy, challenged two Executive Orders, Executive Orders 14,042 and 14,043 (EOs), issued in September 2021. 1 Those EOs mandated COVID-19 vaccination for Federal contractor employees and Federal employees, respectively. They also provided for legally required medical or religious exemptions. Plaintiffs challenged the EOs as ultra vires exercises of presidential power in violation of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (Procurement Act), the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (Procurement Policy Act), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA), the major questions doctrine, and general constitutional federalism constraints. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief to address their allegedly “imminent and wrongful terminations” for failure to comply with the vaccination requirements. The district court held that Plaintiffs who had submitted religious and medical exemptions but who had not yet completed the exemption request process did not have claims ripe for adjudication. The district court then dismissed the operative Second Amended Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim and without leave to amend.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and dismissed as moot in part. The panel concluded that the case was moot as to all non-RFRA claims. The vaccine mandate exemption processes that the Plaintiffs challenged were premised on the revoked EOs. The panel held that it could not provide relief from EOs and exemption processes that no longer exist. Accordingly, no live controversy remained between the parties. The panel further concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims for damages under RFRA were precluded by sovereign immunity. View "DAVID DONOVAN, ET AL V. BRIAN VANCE" on Justia Law