Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was cited for misuse of a vehicle horn under Section 27001 after she honked in support of protestors gathered outside a government official’s office.  Plaintiff filed suit to block future enforcement of 27001 against any expressive horn use―including honks not only to “support candidates or causes” but also to “greet friends or neighbors, summon children or co-workers, or celebrate weddings or victories.” She asserted that Section 27001 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments as a content-based regulation that is not narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Alternatively, she argued that even if the law is not content-based, it burdens substantially more speech than necessary to protect legitimate government interests.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of California. The panel determined that, at least in some circumstances, a honk can carry a message that is intended to be communicative and that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the listener to be communicative. The panel next held that because section 27001 applies evenhandedly to all who wish to use a horn when a safety hazard is not present, it draws a line based on the surrounding factual situation, not based on the content of expression. The panel, therefore, evaluated Section 27001 as a content-neutral law and applied intermediate scrutiny. The panel concluded that Section 27001 was narrowly tailored to further California’s substantial interest in traffic safety and, therefore, that it passed intermediate scrutiny. View "SUSAN PORTER V. KELLY MARTINEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff a devout Jehovah’s Witness, objected to California’s loyalty oath because she believed it would violate her religious beliefs by requiring her to pledge primary allegiance to the federal and state governments and to affirm her willingness to take up arms to defend them. he Controller’s Office rejected this proposal and rescinded the job offer. Plaintiff sued the Controller’s Office and the California State Controller in her official capacity, alleging violations of Title VII under both failure-to-accommodate and disparate-impact theories. She also asserted a failure-to-accommodate claim against the Controller’s Office under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), and she alleged that the refusal by both defendants to accommodate her religious beliefs violated the Free Exercise Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.   THe Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that, as currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s alleged injury was redressable only through a claim for damages. The panel held that she lacked the actual and imminent threat of future injury required to have standing to seek prospective relief on any of her claims, but she could attempt to cure this defect by amendment. The panel held that Plaintiff could seek damages from the Controller’s Office on her claims under Title VII. As currently pleaded, she could not obtain damages for her free exercise claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The panel held, however, that the district court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff leave to amend to seek damages from the State Controller in her individual capacity. View "BRIANNA BOLDEN-HARDGE V. CALIFORNIA STATE CONTROLLER, ET AL" on Justia Law

Individuals Plaintiffs, Uber, Inc. (Uber) and Postmates, Inc. (Postmates, and collectively Plaintiffs) appealed the district court’s orders denying their motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissing their Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs filed this action to enjoin the State of California and the Attorney General of California (Defendants), from enforcing California Assembly Bill 5, 2019 Cal. Stats. Ch. 296 (A.B. 5), as amended by California Assembly Bill 170, 2019 Cal. Stats. Ch. 415 (A.B. 170) and California Assembly Bill 2257, 2020 Cal. Stats. Ch. 38 (A.B. 2257, and collectively A.B. 5, as amended), against them. A.B. 5, as amended, codified the “ABC test” adopted by the Supreme Court of California in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018).1 A.B. 5, as amended, however, incorporated numerous exemptions into its provisions.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part district court orders dismissing Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint and denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded. The panel first held that, even under the fairly forgiving rational basis review, Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that A.B. 5, as amended, violated the Equal Protection Clause for those engaged in app-based ride-hailing and delivery services. Thus, Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the primary impetus for the enactment of A.B. 5 was the disfavor with which the architect of the legislation viewed Uber, Postmates, and similar gig-based business models. The panel held that the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ due process claims because Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that A.B. 5, as amended, completely prohibited them from exercising their “right to engage in a calling.” View "LYDIA OLSON, ET AL V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff called 911 seeking emergency mental health assistance for the mother of his children, with whom he lived and had five children. This call set in motion a chain of events that ultimately led to the death of Plaintiff’s ten-month-old twin sons at their mother’s own hand.   Plaintiff brought a Section 1983 involving the application of the “state-created danger” doctrine in the context of a welfare check; the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ action for failure to state a claim, and remanded. The panel first made clear that the only two exceptions to the general rule against failure-to-act liability for Section 1983 claims presently recognized by this court were the special-relationship exception and the state-created danger exception. The panel, therefore, rejected Plaintiffs’ assertion that the failure to comply with a legally required duty can give rise to a substantive due process claim. The panel further held that the district court correctly held that the special-relationship exception did not apply here.   The panel next held that Plaintiffs’ state-created danger claim against deputies failed because Plaintiffs failed to allege facts from which one could plausibly conclude that Defendants created or enhanced any danger to the twins. The panel held that Plaintiffs adequately stated their Section 1983 claims against the City of Tulare Police Sergeant under the state-created danger exception. Finally, because the panel reversed the dismissal of some of Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims against the social worker and Sergeant, the panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Monell claims against the County and City of Tulare. View "JOSE MURGUIA V. HEATHER LANGDON, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a civil rights suit alleging that he was asked racially and religiously biased questions in a psychological evaluation required for his parole review. He claimed that the psychologists were prejudiced against him as an African-American Muslim man, which influenced their conclusion that Plaintiff presented a “high” risk of future violence. The psychologists contended that they were absolutely immune from suit because they performed a discretionary function integral to the Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”) quasi-judicial decision-making.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of absolute immunity to California Board of Parole Hearings psychologists who prepare comprehensive risk assessment reports for the parole board. Applying the functional approach laid out in the watershed case Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (1993), the panel declined to extend absolute immunity in this case. The panel held that the psychologists’ assessments, while informative, were neither binding nor controlling in any way, nor did the psychologists function in a judicial decision-making capacity. Thus, while the psychologists provided a risk level based on their clinical experience, they had no power of decision in the judicial sense; the psychologists were not members of the Board, and the Board made its own determination about an inmate’s current risk of dangerousness if released to the community. The panel did not address whether qualified immunity was available, leaving the question for the district court to consider. View "OMAR GAY V. AMY PARSONS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action against Defendants Amazon.com Services, Inc. and Amazon.com, Inc., alleging that Defendants’ failure to compensate employees for time spent waiting for and passing through mandatory security screening before and after work shifts and breaks violates Oregon’s wage and hour laws. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings to Defendants, and Plaintiff timely appealed.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in favor of Defendants. The panel had certified the following issue to the Oregon Supreme Court: “Under Oregon law, is time that employees spend on the employer’s premises waiting for and undergoing mandatory security screenings compensable?” In response, the Oregon Supreme Court held that Oregon law aligns with federal law regarding what activities are compensable. Therefore, time that employees spend on the employer’s premises waiting for and undergoing mandatory security screenings before or after their work shifts is compensable only if the screenings are either (1) an integral and indispensable part of the employees’ principal activities, or (2) compensable as a matter of contract, custom, or practice. Plaintiff’s complaint did not allege that either of the identified exceptions applied. Accordingly, the panel held that the district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings to Defendants. View "LINDSEY BUERO V. AMAZON.COM SERVICES, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff contends that the social media company Twitter Inc. and California’s Secretary of State, Shirley Weber, violated his constitutional rights by acting in concert to censor his speech on Twitter’s platform. He alleged that the Secretary of State’s office entered into a collaborative relationship with Twitter in which state officials regularly flagged tweets with false or misleading information for Twitter’s review and that Twitter responded by almost invariably removing the posts in question. Plaintiff further alleged that Twitter limited other users’ ability to access his tweets and then suspended his account. The district court determined that Twitter’s interactions with state officials did not transform the company’s enforcement of its content-moderation policy into state action.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims against Twitter. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Secretary of State Weber because her office did not violate federal law when it notified Twitter of tweets containing false or misleading information that potentially violated the company’s content-moderation policy.   The panel held that Twitter’s content-moderation decisions did not constitute state action because (1) Twitter did not exercise a state-conferred right or enforce a state-imposed rule under the first step of the two-step framework set forth in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co, and (2) the interactions between Twitter and the Secretary of State’s Office of Elections Cybersecurity did not satisfy either the nexus or the joint action tests under the second step. View "ROGAN O' HANDLEY V. SHIRLEY WEBER, ET AL" on Justia Law

Under California law, certain political advertisements run by a committee must name the committee’s top contributors. The City and County of San Francisco adds a secondary-contributor disclaimer requirement that compels certain committees, in their political advertisements, also to list the major donors to those top contributors. Plaintiffs—a political committee that runs ads, the committee’s treasurer, and a contributor to the committee— seek to enjoin enforcement of San Francisco’s ordinance.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The panel first determined that even though the June 2022 election had occurred, this appeal was not moot because the controversy was capable of repetition yet evading review. The panel held that Plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Applying exacting scrutiny, the panel held that San Francisco’s requirement was substantially related to the governmental interest in informing voters of the source of funding for election-related communications. The panel next held that the ordinance did not create an excessive burden on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights relative to the government interest and was sufficiently tailored. Thus, the panel was not persuaded that the secondary-contributor requirement was an impermissible burden on speech because the size of the disclaimer was excessive with respect to larger ads. The district court was within its discretion to conclude that the secondary-contributor requirement had a scope in proportion to the City’s objective. View "NO ON E, SAN FRANCISCANS OPPOSING THE AFFORDABLE, ET AL V. DAVID CHIU, ET AL" on Justia Law

In a case in which federal civil immigration detainees— who are held in the Northeast ICE Processing Center (“NWIPC”), a private detention center in Tacoma, Washington, operated by GEO Group—challenge GEO’s practice of paying them less than the State’s minimum wage to work at the detention center, the Ninth Circuit certified the following questions to the Washington Supreme Court:1) In the circumstances of this case, are the detained workers at NWIPC employees within the meaning of Washington’s Minimum Wage Act (“MWA”)? 2) If the answer to the first question is yes, does the MWA apply to work performed in comparable circumstances by civil detainees confined in a private detention facility operating under a contract with the State? 3) If the answer to the first question is yes and the answer to the second question is no, and assuming that the damage award to the detained workers is sustained, is that damage award an adequate legal remedy that would foreclose equitable relief to the State in the form of an unjust enrichment award? View "UGOCHUKWU NWAUZOR, ET AL V. THE GEO GROUP, INC." on Justia Law

In support of its classified national security investigations, the United States served administrative subpoenas and orders requiring Twitter to provide the government with certain information about Twitter users. In its Transparency Report, Twitter wished publicly to disclose certain information about the aggregate numbers of these governmental requests that it received between July and December 2013. The FBI determined that the number of subpoenas and orders and related information was classified and that Twitter’s disclosure of this information would harm national security. The FBI allowed Twitter to release its Transparency Report only in a partially redacted form.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the United States in an action brought by Twitter alleging First Amendment violations arising from the FBI’s restrictions on Twitter’s publication of a self-described “Transparency Report.” The panel held that Twitter’s constitutional challenges failed to persuade. The panel acknowledged that Twitter has a First Amendment interest in commenting on matters of public concern involving national security subpoenas. Nevertheless, based on a careful review of classified and unclassified information, the panel held that the government’s redactions of Twitter’s Transparency Report were narrowly tailored in support of the compelling government interest in national security. The panel concluded that the government’s redactions of Twitter’s Transparency Report did not violate the First Amendment.   The panel next held that the statutory scheme governing the permissible disclosure of aggregate data about the receipt of national security legal process allowed for sufficient procedural protections. Finally, the panel held that due process did not require that Twitter’s outside counsel receive classified information by virtue of Twitter filing this lawsuit. View "TWITTER, INC. V. MERRICK GARLAND, ET AL" on Justia Law