Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an enrolled member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate, a Native American tribe—asked the Dysart School District (“District”) to accommodate her religious practice by allowing her to wear an eagle feather on her cap during high-school graduation. The District declined the request on the ground that the policy permitted no exceptions. Plaintiff arrived at graduation wearing an eagle feather, and District officials prohibited her from attending. But that same day, as alleged in the complaint, the District permitted other students to wear secular messages on their graduation caps.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, asserting, among other things, that the District violated her rights to free exercise of religion and free speech by selectively enforcing its policy of prohibiting students from decorating their graduation caps.   The panel held that Plaintiff plausibly alleged, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, that the District selectively enforced its policy, in violation of her First Amendment rights. As to the claim brought pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause, Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to assert that the District enforced its policy to permit the secular and forbid the religious. As alleged, the District’s policy was not enforced evenhandedly and, therefore, was not generally applicable.   Plaintiff also carried her burden at this stage to show that the District’s selective enforcement of its policy constituted impermissible viewpoint or content discrimination, in violation of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The panel rejected the District’s argument that the restrictions were necessary in order for the District to comply with the Establishment Clause. View "LARISSA WALN, ET AL V. DYSART SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL" on Justia Law

Appellants J.K. and Mr. Electric (jointly “Mr. Electric”) challenged the district court’s grant of summary judgment in this 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action in favor of Defendants-Appellees, and the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries (together “the Department”). Two Mr. Electric employees provided the Department with copious amounts of Mr. Electric’s data, particularly printouts of cell site location information that provided GPS coordinates for company vehicles which showed all movement of electricians in the field. The Department used the data to write citations and assess administrative fines against Mr. Electric for violations of Washington’s electrical code stemming from improper supervision of journeymen electricians in Clark County.   Appellants argued that Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), and Wilson v. United States, 13 F.4th 961 (9th Cir. 2021), foreclosed the Department’s use of Appellants’ location information because, when read together, the cases extinguished the applicability of the private search exception to the Fourth Amendment to location information.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Appellees. The panel noted that although Carpenter held that the third-party doctrine does not apply as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement when the government seeks cell site location information, the private search exception is an altogether separate exception to the Fourth Amendment. View "JAMES KLEISER, ET AL V. BENJAMIN CHAVEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to build housing on their properties in an area that under the the City of Half Moon Bay’s (City) Land Use Plan (LUP) was designated for public recreation and which severely restricted housing development. Plaintiffs took the position that California Senate Bill 330 (SB 330), enacted in 2019 to increase the stock of affordable housing in the state, required the City to approve their proposed development plan. After rejecting Plaintiffs’ proposal, the City informed plaintiffs that it intended to acquire their properties through eminent domain and made a purchase offer based on the properties’ appraised values. Plaintiffs rejected the offer and filed this action in district court claiming, among other things, that the City effected a regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by rejecting their building proposal and enforcing LUP’s restrictions on their property.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting the City’s motion to abstain pending resolution of an eminent domain action in state court. The panel held that as an initial matter, neither Knick nor Pakdel, which address when a claim accrues for purposes of judicial review, explicitly limit abstention in takings litigation. Abstention allows courts to stay claims that have already accrued. The panel held that the requirements for Pullman abstention were met in this case. First, the complaint touched a sensitive area of social policy, land use planning. Second, a ruling in the state eminent domain action would likely narrow the federal litigation. View "THOMAS GEARING, ET AL V. CITY OF HALF MOON BAY" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in August 2021 to halt the September 2021 recall election involving California Governor Gavin Newsom, and later amended his complaint to also assert nominal damages. Plaintiff intended to vote “no” on the first question and wanted to vote for Governor Newsom as a successor candidate on the second question. He argued that, absent injunctive relief invalidating Article II, Section 15(c), California’s recall process would violate his Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights in two respects: by denying him an equally weighted vote, as required under the “one-person, one-vote” principle; and by denying him the right to vote for his candidate of choice on question two.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim of an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The panel first held that this case was not moot even though the election was completed and a majority of voters had defeated the effort to remove Governor Newsom from office. Plaintiff adequately alleged a completed injury—namely, his inability to vote for Governor Newsom on question two during the recall election— that was fairly traceable to the California election procedures; and an award of nominal damages would redress that injury.   Further, the panel held that under controlling precedent, Section 15(c)’s prohibition does not constitute a severe restriction on the right to vote. California has an important interest in ensuring that the power to recall guaranteed to its voters is effective and does not invite an endless cycle of recall attempts. View "A. CLARK V. SHIRLEY WEBER" on Justia Law

Plaintiff moved under state law for an order permitting him to conduct DNA testing and fingerprint analysis on evidence found at the crime scene more than forty years ago. The superior court denied relief in an October 21, 2022 order. Plaintiff sought a review of this order via a special action petition in the Arizona Supreme Court. The state supreme court accepted jurisdiction and affirmed the superior court's ruling. Plaintiff then commenced this federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. He sought a declaratory judgment that the Arizona statutes providing for forensic testing of DNA and other evidence are unconstitutional as applied to him as well as an injunction ordering defendants to permit him to conduct the forensic testing. He moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting his execution until he obtains this relief. The district court denied the injunction, and he appealed.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying the preliminary injunction and remanded with instructions to dismiss. The court concluded that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because this action amounted to an improper appeal of the state court's judgment. View "MURRAY HOOPER V. MARK BRNOVICH, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that Defendant used excessive force while attempting an arrest on June 10, 2018, in Berdoo Canyon, which is considered BLM land. Plaintiff and her husband failed to yield to a park ranger, at which point Defendant was called to assist. As Defendant was trying to stop Plaintiff's vehicle, he fired several shots, hitting her in the hand and grazing her head.Plaintiff filed a Sec. 1983 claim against Defendant. The district court denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment related to Plaintiff's excessive force claim and Defendant appealed.On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, declining to extend Bivens. The existence of alternative remedial structures is reason enough to not infer a new Bivens cause of action. Similarly, uncertainty about the potential systemwide consequences of implying a new Bivens cause of action is by itself a special factor that forecloses relief. The panel held that there was no Bivens cause of action for Plaintiff’s claim, which presented a new context. View "DENISE MEJIA V. WESLEY MILLER, ET AL" on Justia Law

Pursuant to Rule 8.548(b)(2) of the California Rules of Court, the Ninth Circuit requested that the Supreme Court of California decide the certified question presented below: Do non-convicted incarcerated individuals performing services in county jails for a for-profit company to supply meals within the county jails and related custody facilities have a claim for minimum wages and overtime under Section 1194 of the California Labor Code in the absence of any local ordinance prescribing or prohibiting the payment of wages for these individuals? View "ARMIDA RUELAS, ET AL V. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Before her retirement, Plaintiff was employed by the Oregon Health Authority, and SEIU was the exclusive representative for her bargaining unit. Plaintiff never joined SEIU, but the State deducted union dues from her salary and remitted the dues to SEIU. Plaintiff alleged that SEIU forged her signature on a union membership agreement. Plaintiff demanded that the State and SEIU stop the dues deductions and return the withheld payments. After she retired, Plaintiff filed this action against State defendants and SEIU, alleging several constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for prospective relief against all defendants for lack of jurisdiction and her claims for retrospective relief against Service Employees International Union Local 503 (“SEIU”) for failure to allege state action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Because jurisdiction is a threshold issue, the panel first considered whether it could entertain Plaintiff’s claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against all defendants. As to Plaintiff’s claims for prospective relief for violation of her First Amendment rights, the panel concluded that her fear of future harm was based on a series of interferences that were too speculative to establish a “case or controversy” for the prospective relief she sought.   Plaintiff’s theory that potential future unauthorized dues deductions chilled the exercise of her First Amendment rights was also too speculative to establish standing. The panel concluded that she lacked any concrete interest in her future wages or her right to be free from compelled union speech that were threatened by the alleged lack of procedural safeguards. View "JODEE WRIGHT V. SEIU LOCAL 503, ET AL" on Justia Law

After the district court entered default against Defendant on Plaintiff’s claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Unruh Act, it ordered Vo to show cause why it should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. After considering Vo’s response, the district court elected to decline supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(c)(4). The district court determined that there were exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons justifying this exercise of its discretion.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s California Unruh Civil Rights Act claim against Defendant. The panel held that under Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202 (9th Cir. 2021), in order to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in a joint ADA and Unruh Act suit, the district court must properly articulate why the circumstances of the case are exceptional.   The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. First, there were exceptional circumstances regarding comity and fairness in allowing Plaintiff to evade California’s heightened procedural requirements for Unruh Act claims by bringing her claims in federal court. Second, unlike in Arroyo, the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction well before it ruled on the merits of the ADA claim, meaning that the Gibbs values could be effectuated. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there were compelling reasons to decline jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. The panel rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the district court’s order was not sufficiently case-specific. View "THANH VO V. JOHN CHOI" on Justia Law

Crime victim Jane Doe filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this court; she and the defendant in the underlying criminal action also filed a joint stipulation requesting that we “resolve the case on a schedule that parallels a normal appellate process.”   The Ninth Circuit, on a petition for a writ of mandamus in which Jane Doe seeks to vindicate her right under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA) to “full and timely restitution as provided in law,” a motions panel granted a joint motion, filed by Doe and the defendant in the underlying criminal action, stipulating to an extended period for this court to consider Doe’s petition beyond the 72-hour deadline imposed by the CVRA.   Under 18 U.S.C. Section 3771(d)(3), the court of appeals “shall take up and decide a mandamus petition seeking relief under the CVRA within 72 hours after the petition has been filed, unless the litigants, with the approval of the court, have stipulated to a different time period for consideration. . . . In no event shall proceedings be stayed or subject to a continuance of more than five days for purposes of enforcing” rights under the Act. The panel resolved a question of first impression regarding whether the “proceedings” referred to in Section 3771(d)(3) are those of the district court or appellate court. The panel held that the parties can agree to an extension of the 72-hour deadline with the appellate court’s approval, so long as the extension does not involve a stay or continuance of the underlying district court proceedings for more than five days. View "JANE DOE V. USDC-NVL" on Justia Law