Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging that the City of Vallejo violated the Fourth Amendment, by adding license checks to what was concededly a sobriety checkpoint. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants.Reviewing a line of relevant Supreme Court decisions, the court derived a “two-step analysis” for assessing the validity of a checkpoint under the Fourth Amendment. Applying that two-step analysis to this case, the panel first held that because the City’s checkpoint did not have any impermissible primary purpose of advancing the general interest in crime control, it was not per se invalid. The panel then applied the factors for assessing reasonableness set forth in Lidster and concluded that the City’s systematic addition of driver’s license checks to an otherwise valid sobriety checkpoint was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.The court held that, once Plaintiff refused to produce his license for examination at the checkpoint, the officer had probable cause to believe that plaintiff was committing an offense in violation of California Vehicle Code Section 12951(b), and his continued detention and arrest were therefore reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the officer’s action of physically removing Plaintiff from his car by grabbing his arm was objectively reasonable as a matter of law given Plaintiff’s lack of cooperation with her commands up to that point and the modest nature of the force used. View "DAVID DEMAREST V. CITY OF VALLEJO" on Justia Law

The Governor issued Proclamation 20-57, “Concerning the Health of Agricultural Workers,” and an addendum, “Agricultural COVID-19 Requirements” (collectively, the “Proclamation”). The Proclamation acknowledged the hazards posed by “the worldwide spread of COVID-19” and prohibited “any agricultural employer from continuing to operate beyond June 3, 2020, unless the employer complied with all provisions of the Agriculture COVID-19 Requirements – Provisions for All Worksites and Work-Related Functions.”The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim and held that certain mandates issued by the Governor of Washington to address the public health crisis caused by the spread of coronavirus (COVID-19) were not preempted by the Occupational Safety and Health Act.The court first held that Plaintiff’s challenge to the Proclamation was ripe for review because Washington’s Department of Labor & Industries’ Division of Occupational Safety and Health had issued a citation to Plaintiff for violation of the requirements set forth in the Proclamation and imposed a $4,200 fine that had to be paid within fifteen working days. There was nothing speculative about this enforcement action.The court held that the Proclamation was not preempted because the requirements in the Proclamation did not relate to an occupational health and safety standard promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). In light of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in NFIB v. OSHA, 142 S. Ct. 661 (2021), OSHA lacked the authority to promulgate a public health measure that would regulate the general risk of COVID-19 in the workplace. View "FLOWER WORLD, INC. V. JOEL SACKS" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs—a collection of organizations and individuals interested in petitioning in Montana—alleged that both of these restrictions violated their speech and association rights under the First Amendment. In upholding both restrictions, the district court held that strict scrutiny did not apply because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that either restriction imposed a severe burden on their rights. It went on to find that both restrictions sufficiently furthered Montana’s important regulatory interest to survive less exacting review.The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants. The court reversed the district court’s holding with regards to the residency requirement because it (1) imposed a severe burden on the exercise of First Amendment rights and therefore was subject to strict scrutiny, and (2) was not narrowly tailored to further Montana’s compelling interest.The court affirmed the district court’s holding with regards to the pay-per-signature restriction because it concluded that (1) on the basis of the record produced here, plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the pay-per-signature ban imposed a severe burden on First Amendment rights and therefore less exacting review applied; and (2) the state had established that an important regulatory interest was furthered by this restriction. View "NATHAN PIERCE V. CHRISTI JACOBSEN" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendant and the Maricopa County Community College District (the “College District”). Plaintiffs allege that a module on Islamic terrorism within a course in world politics taught by Defendant at Scottsdale Community College (the “College”) violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant’s disparaging treatment of Islam was part of an official policy embraced by the College District. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint, and the Plaintiffs appealed.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the action. The court held that Plaintiffs could not sustain a claim for municipal liability against the College District. First, Plaintiffs abandoned their municipal liability claim on appeal by failing to address it in their Reply Brief even after the College District raised the argument in its Answering Brief on appeal.But even on the merits, the claim could not survive dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Although Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant has taught his World Politics class for 24 years, they did not allege that the course in other years contained the same content that offended Plaintiff, or that Defendant’s views or teaching methods were so persistent and widespread as to constitute part of the College District’s standard operating procedure. Further, the court held that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause and Free Exercise claims. View "MOHAMED SABRA V. MARICOPA COUNTY COMMUNITY COLL" on Justia Law

The City of Phoenix’s Police Department concluded that a Sergeant with the Department violated a Department policy by posting content to his personal Facebook profile that denigrated Muslims and Islam. When the Department took steps to discipline the Sergeant, he sued, alleging that the Department was retaliating against him for exercising his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s action. In analyzing the content, form and context of the Sergeant’s posts, the court concluded that the posts qualified as speech on matters of public concern. While it was true that each of the Sergeant’s posts expressed hostility toward, and sought to denigrate or mock, major religious faith and its adherents, the Supreme Court has made clear that the inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question of whether it deals with a matter of public concern.The court, therefore, reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claim and his related claim under the Arizona Constitution. The court held that the district court properly rejected Plaintiffs’ facial overbreadth challenge to certain provisions of the Department’s social media policy, except as to the clauses prohibiting social media activity that (1) would cause embarrassment to or discredit the Department, or (2) divulge any information gained while in the performance of official duties, as set forth in section 3.27.9B.(7) of the policy. The court affirmed the district court’s rejection of Plaintiffs’ facial vagueness challenge to the same provisions discussed above and their municipal liability claim. View "JUAN HERNANDEZ V. CITY OF PHOENIX" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s mother was arrested at a traffic stop and fell ill in police custody. Tragically, she died nine days later. Her minor son, J.K.J., brought constitutional claims against the City of San Diego and two officers who participated in the traffic stop. The District Court dismissed J.K.J.’s amended complaint with prejudice. The district court dismissed J.K.J.’s amended complaint with prejudice.   The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order granting a petition for rehearing, denying as moot a petition for rehearing en banc, and amending the prior opinion and dissent; and (2) an amended opinion affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging constitutional violations by police officers in their treatment of Plaintiff’s mother.   The court first held that the district court validly exercised its discretion in choosing to review a bodycam video that Plaintiff had incorporated by reference into the amended complaint. Second, the district court did not assign the video too much weight. Lastly, to the extent the district court found that the video contradicted anything in the amended complaint, it rejected Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations regarding whether the officers’ conduct met the legal standard of a constitutional violation.   The court held that the district court did not err in dismissing the amended complaint. The court further held that the alleged violative nature of the officers’ conduct, in failing to recognize and respond to the woman’s serious medical need, was not clearly established in the specific context of this case. View "J. J. V. CITY OF SAN DIEGO" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged his conviction and sentence through the PCR proceeding because pleading defendants in noncapital cases in Arizona are prohibited from taking a direct appeal. The district court found that the Arizona Court of Appeals had incorrectly determined that Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), did not apply to Arizona’s of-right PCR proceedings. The district court also determined, on de novo review, that Arizona’s PCR procedure was deficient under Anders.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of conditional habeas relief to Petitioner. The panel first explained that it was clearly established that Anders and its progeny apply to Arizona’s of-right PCR proceedings. Because the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision can be construed as finding Anders applicable and nothing clearly suggests otherwise, and a federal habeas court must give the state court of appeals the benefit of the doubt and presume that it followed the law, the panel found that the Arizona Court of Appeals correctly found Anders applies to of-right PCR proceedings. The court, therefore, reversed the district court’s contrary determination. The court held that the district court also erred in reviewing de novo whether Arizona’s of-right PCR procedure is constitutionally adequate under Anders, and should have applied the required deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). View "LINO CHAVEZ V. MARK BRNOVICH" on Justia Law

The Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (“JAG”) program is a federal formula grant that supports state and local criminal justice efforts. Effective Fiscal Years 2017 and 2018, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) imposed new immigration enforcement-related conditions (“Conditions”) on Byrne JAG funds. In order to draw upon their Byrne JAG funds, grant recipients had to certify that their laws complied with independent provisions of the Federal Code, specifically 8 U.S.C. Section 1373, a provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act enacted in 1996, and 8 U.S.C. Section 1644, of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.   The district court for the Northern District of California and the district court for the District of Oregon determined that the Conditions exceeded the DOJ’s statutory authority and permanently enjoined their enforcement. The district courts also held that Sections 1373 and 1644 violated the Tenth Amendment, and permanently enjoined their enforcement.   In consolidated appeals, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part district court judgments. Addressing the facial constitutional challenges under the Tenth Amendment to Sections 1373 and 1644, the court held that these challenges were not justiciable in their present posture. The court explained that because Plaintiffs’ laws complied with the federal provisions, their facial challenges were no longer ripe. Having concluded that Plaintiffs’ facial challenges were either not ripe, or were mooted, the court narrowly vacated the district courts’ determinations that Sections 1373 and1644 were facially unconstitutional. View "CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Two members of the Poway Unified School District (“PUSD” or the “District”) Board of Trustees, (together, “the Trustees”), created public Facebook and Twitter pages to promote their campaigns for office. Plaintiffs, two parents of children in the School District, frequently left comments critical of the Trustees and the Board on the Trustees’ pages, The Trustees eventually blocked Plaintiffs entirely from their social media pages. Plaintiffs sued, asserting that the Trustees violated their First Amendment rights by ejecting them from the social media pages. The district court agreed with Plaintiffs that their First Amendment rights had been violated. Both parties appealed.   The Ninth Circuit rejected the Trustees’ assertion that the dispute was moot because after Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit, the Trustees began using a word filter on Facebook to prevent any new comments from being posted. The court held that: (1) using a word filter on Facebook would not affect Plaintiffs’ claims involving being blocked from Twitter; (2) the word filter limit did not change Facebook’s non-verbal “reaction” feature; and (3) the Trustees failed to carry their burden of showing they would not, in the future, remove the word filters from their Facebook pages and again open those pages up for verbal comments from the public.   The court further held that the district court correctly concluded that at the time the Trustees blocked Plaintiffs, it was not clearly established that Plaintiffs had a First Amendment right to post comments on a public official’s Facebook or Twitter page. The district court, therefore, did not err by granting qualified immunity to the Trustees as to Plaintiffs’ damages claim. View "CHRISTOPHER GARNIER V. MICHELLE O'CONNOR-RATCLIFF" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against the State of Washington, the Review Board, and its members (State Defendants). Plaintiff specifically sought review of the district court’s decision that the Review Board’s actions relating to Plaintiff’s release determination hearing fall squarely within the quasi-judicial nature of the Review Board’s functions, and that Defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an action alleging false imprisonment, negligence and civil rights violations arising from actions taken by the Washington Indeterminate Sentencing Review Board in scheduling Plaintiff’s hearing.   The Indeterminate Sentencing Review Board is a parole board created by the Washington State Legislature that is tasked with reviewing the sentences of convicted sex offenders to determine whether the offenders should be released on parole. The court held that under the facts of this case and in the context of the proceedings as a whole, the Review Board’s setting of hearings pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code Section 9.95.420 was “part and parcel of the decision process,” thereby warranting quasi-judicial immunity. The court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that the scheduling of the hearing was an administrative task not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Because the court agreed with the district court that the Review Board was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, Plaintiff was unable to state a plausible claim for relief against the state Defendants. View "DALLIN FORT V. STATE OF WASHINGTON" on Justia Law